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ABSTRACT 
Proactive Communication in Multi-Agent Teamwork. (December 2005) 
Yu Zhang, B.S.; M.S., Central South University, China 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Richard A. Volz 
Sharing common goals and acting cooperatively are critical issues in multi-
agent teamwork. Traditionally, agents cooperate with each other by inferring others' 
actions implicitly or explicitly, based on established norms for behavior or on 
knowledge about the preferences or interests of others. This kind of cooperation either 
requires that agents share a large amount of knowledge about the teamwork, which is 
unrealistic in a distributed team, or requires high-frequency message exchange, which 
weakens teamwork efficiency, especially for a team that may involve human members.  
In this research, we designed and developed a new approach called Proactive 
Communication, which helps to produce realistic behavior and interactions for multi-
agent teamwork. We emphasize that multi-agent teamwork is governed by the same 
principles that underlie human cooperation. Psychological studies of human teamwork 
have shown that members of an effective team often anticipate the needs of other 
members and choose to assist them proactively. Human team members are also 
naturally capable of observing the environment and others so they can establish certain 
parameters for performing actions without communicating with others. Proactive 
Communication endows agents with observabilities and enables agents use them to 
track others’ mental states. Additionally, Proactive Communication uses statistical 
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analysis of the information production and need of team members and uses these data 
to capture the complex, interdependent decision processes between information needer 
and provider. Since not all these data are known, we use their expected values with 
respect to a dynamic estimation of distributions. 
The approach was evaluated by running several sets of experiments on a Multi-
Agent Wumpus World application. The results showed that endowing agents with 
observability decreased communication load as well as enhanced team performance. 
The results also showed that with the support of dynamic distributions, estimation, and 
decision-theoretic modeling, teamwork efficiency were improved. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Motivation 
An agent is defined as a mapping from perceptions to actions [102]. It can be 
achieved via hardware (e.g. robotics) or software systems. The agent resides in the 
environment, behaves autonomously, purposively, and flexibly; it may have sensing, 
adaptive, social, and emotional capabilities [127]. The capabilities of a single agent are 
limited by its knowledge, its computing resources, and its perspective. Particularly, 
when interdependent problems arise, agents in the system must coordinate with one 
another to ensure that interdependent problems are properly managed. Thus, they form 
multi-agent systems. In a multi-agent system, multiple agents that cooperate towards 
the achievement of a joint goal are viewed as a team. Teamwork is a cooperative effort 
by a team of agents to achieve a joint goal [121]. 
Sharing common goals and acting cooperatively are critical issues in multi-
agent teamwork [1, 13, 21, 90]. To date, control paradigms for cooperative teamwork 
have allowed agents to communicate about their intentions, plans, and the relationships 
between them [65, 97, 114, 115, 116, 119, 121]. Using communication, team members 
can share common goals and coordinate their actions by distributing valuable 
teamwork-related information. In order to do so, each of the team members should 
track the activities of the others, reason about possible conflicts or constraints, establish 
                                                 
 This dissertation follows the style of Artificial Intelligence. 
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certain parameters for performing joint actions, and provide or ask for any information 
that is needed to perform tasks. Existing solutions for the communication problem have 
four major disadvantages: 
• Agents share a large amount of knowledge about the teamwork, which 
is unrealistic in a distributed team. 
• Communication interactions are hard-coded in teamwork processes, 
which is not universal. 
• Cooperation processes involve high-frequency message exchange, 
which weakens teamwork efficiency. 
• Current solutions ignore communication risk, which is one of the most 
important factors of agent decision-making. 
Moreover, some researchers have found that communication, while a useful paradigm, 
is expensive relative to local computation [2]. Therefore effective, universal, and 
practical communication mechanisms are needed for helping agents produce effective 
and realistic behaviors and interactions in teamwork. 
1.2. Investigating Effective Communication 
Most of the literature (see Section 2.2) reports on technologies empowering 
agents from outside, such as teaching them to obey social conventions [111]. We 
investigate this problem by bringing agent initiatives into play. 
We investigate effective human team cooperation and incorporate the findings 
into multi-agent teamwork. Humans are naturally capable of observing the 
environment and others so they can establish certain parameters for performing actions 
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without communicating with others. A shared mental model [100, 118], one of the 
major psychological underpinnings of teamwork, enables an effective human team to 
anticipate information needs of teammates and offer the information [135]. We call this 
ability proactivity. Therefore, effective team cooperation can be achieved, if agents are 
able to observe the environment and each other, predict needs for teamwork-related 
information and distribute such information proactively. 
1.2.1. Observability 
Observability is the ability to observe the environment and other agents, and 
from it, make inferences about them. Although it has gained some attention [95, 68, 7, 
59], observability in multi-agent teamwork has not been explored deeply. We argue 
that the reasons for this might be threefold. First, from the team point of view, 
observability is a capability of an individual agent, rather than of a whole team. It is 
difficult to abstract a team’s observability based on every team member’s individual 
observability. Second, since belief reasoning is theoretically intractable [47], the 
process of an agent using its observability to reason about teammates’ beliefs becomes 
highly complex. Third, agents lack an effective way to reason about others’ 
observabilities. However, in a dynamic, distributed teamwork environment, apart from 
prior knowledge such as the team goal, observability is a major means for an individual 
agent to obtain information. An agent with observability may produce effective 
communication by observing the environment and its teammates and then estimating 
their beliefs without generating unnecessary messages. 
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1.2.2. Proactivity 
Proactivity is the ability to take initiative by exhibiting goal-directed behavior 
[127]. Intelligent-agent researchers maintain that proactivity is one of the hallmarks of 
agency [127]. Agents with proactivity can respond to external stimuli in a timely way, 
and they can also prepare knowingly for some unexpected future [135]. Hence the 
ability to anticipate the information needs of teammates and assist them proactively is 
highly desirable. While an agent can anticipate certain information needs of teammates, 
it may not always be able to predict all of their needs, especially if the team interacts 
with a dynamic environment. Therefore, when an agent needs some information, it is 
also necessary to anticipate the information production of teammates and ask for the 
information actively. Hence, proactivity allows agents to proactively tell others about a 
piece of information when producing it or to actively ask for a piece of information 
when needing it. Proactivity may produce effective communication in three ways. 
First, messages will be conveyed to agents when they need an information item, rather 
than sending all information to them. Second, proactive tell can partially eliminate the 
need to ask. Third, if there is no proactive tell, active ask may eliminate multiple 
requests for information, i.e., only ask one time per need. 
1.2.3. Challenges 
The challenges in achieving effective communication in an agent team exist in 
three aspects. First, the distributed nature of an agent team and the dynamic nature of 
the world often make it infeasible for an agent to have complete and up-to-date 
information about other teammates and the world. The resultant uncertainty may 
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seriously affect quality of communication among agents. Furthermore, agents have 
different capabilities for solving the problems, such as different observabilities, which 
lead to different abilities for obtaining information. This increases the difficulty of 
deducing what others know and consequently what they need. Third, agents are 
distributed in the world, so they do not realize each time at which a piece of 
information is produced or needed by others. Therefore delivering a tell or ask to others 
at the proper time becomes critical for a team. 
1.3. Our Approach and Its Contributions 
The goal of this research is to devise effective communication mechanisms, 
enabling agent initiatives and dynamic cooperation in multi-agent teamwork. We 
design and develop a new model called Proactive Communication, for supporting 
realistic behavior and interactions in complex and dynamic domains. The central thesis 
of this research is that 
Proactive Communication captures and represents the complex, 
interdependent communication decision-making processes among 
agents, and achieves effective communication by giving agents the 
capabilities of observability and proactivity. Observability helps agents 
to monitor the environment and track teammates’ mental states. 
Proactivity allows agents to act in anticipation of future information 
productions or needs to tell or ask each other about teamwork-related 
information. 
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Our approach endows agents with observability and proactivity via three 
distinct but closely related perspectives: 
• Observation-Based Proactive Communication (OBPC). It allows agents 
to use their observabilities to track others’ mental states as well as 
decreasing the communication load. Different from other observation 
approaches, agents can observe not only the environment, but also 
actions of others, and use this knowledge to decide which information 
might be known by others and therefore does not need to be exchanged. 
• Dynamic Information Prediction (DIP). It is a dynamic estimation of the 
probability distributions of information productions or needs and the use 
of these data to capture the complex internal processes of decision-
making regarding communication. The major feature distinguishing this 
approach is that agents take advantage of their historical knowledge to 
estimate the distributions of the information need and production times. 
• Decision-Theoretic Proactive Communication (DTPC). It is a decision-
theoretic determination of communication strategies. During multi-agent 
teamwork, agents should be able to deal with uncertainties, since they 
may only have incomplete information about the teamwork, the 
environment, and the potential value and cost of information delivery. 
One way to deal with this problem is a decision-theoretical approach 
[25]. Broadly speaking, the decision theory is a means of analyzing a 
series of strategies in order to decide which should be taken, when it is 
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uncertain exactly what the result of taking the strategy will be [92]. 
However, departing from the traditional decision-theoretic approach, 
DTPC emphasizes communication benefiting the team and focuses on 
decision interactions between needer and provider, i.e., their decisions 
are interdependent, so they must consider how their counterpart’s 
decisions impact their own. 
The major novel contribution of this research is the concentration on 
interactions between agents and the emphasis of relations connecting them. This 
feature makes communication benefit the team as well as enhancing agents’ ability to 
take initiatives. Specifically, 1) we use agents’ observabilities to track team members’ 
mental states, so they can infer what the others know and when and therefore can 
decrease the communication load; 2) we introduce an idea of dynamic information 
prediction, which allows agents to anticipate coming information production or need 
time based on historical knowledge; 3) we introduce an model that agents estimate 
others decisions in the decision-theoretic communication, which empowers agents to 
deal with communication interdependencies in team cooperation. 
1.4. Structure of the Dissertation 
This section introduces the motivation of this research and the overall idea of 
our approaches and contributions. The rest of this dissertation is organized as the 
following: 
• In Chapter II, we review related work to this research. 
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• In Chapter III, we represent system architecture and agent execution 
cycle, and give an overview to Proactive Communication and its three 
components: OBPC, DIP and DTPC. 
• In Chapter IV, we focus on OBPC. We 1) define syntax and semantics 
to observability, and 2) develop algorithms for using observability to 
decrease communication load. 
• In Chapter V, we focus on DIP. We 1) introduce a statistical 
approximation of distributions of information production and need, and 
2) introduce the data acquisition process for performing the 
approximation. 
• In Chapter VI, we focus on DTPC. We 1) define communication 
policies, which can be used by agents in different communication 
situations, and time points relevant to information production and need, 
2) define utility function which is used to evaluate each policy, 3) 
introduce agent decision making processes and 4) develop algorithms 
for decision-theoretic proactive communication. 
• In Chapter VII, we 1) introduce criteria of applicable domain for 
Proactive Communication, 2) design an application domain, 3) design 
and analyze two sets of experiments we have run in the domain. 
• Finally, in Chapter VIII, we conclude this dissertation and discuss some 
future work. 
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CHAPTER II 
RELATED WORK 
This research is about communication in multi-agent teamwork and is built on 
several areas of previous research. In this section, we review the literature of these 
areas and the progress of the work at Texas A&M University (TAMU) that is the 
foundation for this research, including teamwork theories and teamwork systems (see 
Section 2.1); decision making models in agent research (see Section 2.2), decision-
theoretic modeling communication (see Section 2.3), other effective communication 
approaches (see Section 2.4), observability and belief maintenance (see Section 2.5), 
problem-specific prediction (see Section 2.6), psychological study of shared mental 
models (see Section 2.7), and context of work at TAMU (see Section 2.8). 
2.1. Teamwork as Represented by Artificial Intelligence 
Recently, researchers have been interested in building teamwork in distributed 
and dynamic domains, where each autonomous team member works cooperatively to 
solve a part of a problem in parallel. However, a team of agents is more flexible and 
efficient than a group of single agents only when a flexible and efficient means of 
coordinating the agents exists. In many ways, the teamwork problem is similar to that 
of parallel computing: doubling the number of processors used in a computation 
usually will not double the speed with which the solution is found. The extra 
processing power does not become an advantage until a sophisticated means of 
cooperative processing is found. This challenge inspires many teamwork theories, such 
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as joint intention [20, 81], shared plan [44, 46], commitments and conventions [63, 64], 
and planned team activity [70]. This section introduces these theories, followed by 
three examples of teamwork system implementations. 
2.1.1. Teamwork Theories 
2.1.1.1. Joint Intention 
Joint intention is one of the most important teamwork theories [20, 80, 81]. It 
was developed based on individual intention, which is a logical formalization called 
persistent goals [19]. Cohen and Levesque derived an operator, PGOAL, which 
describes how an agent’s intentions are related to its beliefs, commitments, and actions. 
An agent A has a persistent goal G, if all of the following are true: 1) A wants G to be 
true at some point in the future; 2) A believes that G is not yet true; 3) A believes that 
either G will be true or G will be impossible before it abandons its goal. 
PGOALS are used to define intentions, in the form of the primitives INTEND1 
and INTEND2. INTEND1 is defined as the persistent goal to perform a particular 
action by an agent. In other words, intending to take an action is a kind of persistent 
goal. Thus, intentions are future-directed. This is a near-approximation to present-
directed intention: the agent desires to have done an action immediately after believing 
that it was about to do it, i.e. intentions are directed towards something happening next. 
However, because INTEND1 is a commitment to perform a particular action, it does 
not handle the case where the agent does not know what action it needs to perform to 
bring about the goal. INTEND2 is defined as the persistent goal to have done some 
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actions to bring about the goal (this means the agent has a plan), and the agent would 
not select these actions if they are thought not to lead to the goal. 
Cohen and Levesque use their theory of persistent goals to build a theory of 
joint intentions. Joint intentions are intended to clarify the relationships among belief, 
desires, and intentions (BDI) for multiple agents [9, 10, 96]. Joint intentions are 
developed on three levels. First, they define weak goals, which specify the conditions 
under which an agent holds a goal, and the actions it must take if the goal is satisfied or 
impossible. Second, they define joint persistent goals for multiple agents. Finally, they 
define joint intentions in terms of weak goals and joint persistent goals. Joint intentions 
are attractive because they are presented in an implementable framework. For example, 
Jennings developed an implementation of joint intentions for industrial robots [65]. 
Joint intention theory imposes a strong “observant and proactive” requirement. 
It uses mutual beliefs to form joint intentions. An agent who personally comes to 
believe that a joint goal is either achieved, unachievable, or irrelevant, must commit to 
let all other team members mutually believe that this is the case. While mutual belief, 
being an infinite recursion about other agents’ beliefs, is undecidable in theory [47], a 
computational approximation is required in practice [65, 97]. Thus, issues of 
observation, prediction and proactive communication are raised for practical 
implementations. 
2.1.1.2. Shared Plan 
Shared plan [44, 46] is another important teamwork theory. It was developed to 
deal with collaborative activities among human-agent mixed teams. It considers team 
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collaboration not as a group of single agents patched together, but as an integrated 
system that needs to be designed from beginning to end [43, 108]. As opposed to joint 
intention, shared plan does not have joint conceptions. It assumes that each agent has 
its own mental state (including intentions, capabilities, and commitments) and shares it 
with others. The formal representation of these aspects of the mental states of team 
members is called a Shared Plan. The shared part can guarantee teamwork, such as two 
agents working together to perform an action. 
Grosz and Kraus propose five types of plans: FIP for full individual plans 
which means an individual agent has a full recipe for doing an action, PIP for partial 
individual plans which means an individual agent only has partial knowledge of doing 
an action, FSP for full shared Plans which means a group of agents has complete recipe 
of some group activity, PSP for partial shared plans which means a group of agents 
only has partial recipe of some group activity, and SP for shared plans which means a 
group of agents has a certain level of belief in their abilities to perform group actions 
[44]. The definitions of FSP and PSP only explicitly state some of the requisite 
knowledge, others which are implicit produced from agents’ interactions form SP.  
These plans are defined in terms of beliefs and intentions in agents’ mental 
states. At the beginning, agents have only partial plans (individual or shared). By 
reasoning individually, communicating with others, or observing the environment, 
these partial plans are completed. In the special case where an agent finds that it cannot 
perform an action, the whole group will revise its procedures. 
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The evolving process mentioned above obviously requires agents’ observation 
and communication. Shared Plan theory touches the proactive communication problem 
in other ways. First, as in joint intention, the theory requires that a group of agents must 
have a mutual belief of a partial procedure in order to have a collaborative plan for an 
action. Second, in several places the theory proposes that in collaborative activities, 
participants not only do means-ends reasoning about their own mental states and 
actions, they also reason about others’ mental states to support others’ actions better. 
For example, the term Int.To (intending to) presents an agent’s intention to do an 
action while the term Int.Th (intending that) presents an agent’s intention that some 
propositions hold true [44]. Thus, Int.Th concerns how others’ intentions affect the 
agent’s intention. Third, the theory requires agents to know that their teammates are 
capable of carrying out their actions. Grosz [44] notes that agents must communicate 
enough about their plans to convince teammates of their capabilities to carry out 
actions. If agents can predict this requirement and tell it proactively, the process can be 
simplified. Fourth, Grosz, in axiom A1, [44] points out that an agent cannot knowingly 
hold conflicting intentions. Note that the axiom is not valid if the agent is unaware of 
the conflict. Since some of these intentions involve others’ mental states, the 
requirements for observation and proactive communication are the same to avoid such 
conflicts. 
2.1.1.3. Commitments and Conventions 
Jennings emphasizes that coordination is a key property that guarantees better 
multi-agent team performance [63, 64]. Without coordination, a multi-agent system can 
  
14
become a collection of incohesive individuals. He developed a model of coordination, 
whose two central concepts are (joint) commitment and (social) convention. Jennings 
views a commitment as a promise to take a certain action, and conventions as rules for 
monitoring these commitments. He argues that “all coordination mechanisms can 
ultimately be reduced to joint commitments and their associated social conventions” 
[63, 64]. 
Properties of commitments and conventions can be found in numerous sources 
[9, 4, 8, 27, 36, 107, 109]. Commitments and conventions have been adopted widely in 
solving multi-agent cooperation problems. In agent-oriented programming (AOP), 
Shoham treats commitments as obligations of agents and uses commitment rules to 
decide their actions [112]. The BDI model [10] uses commitments to direct an agent’s 
actions and planning. In Reusable Task Structure-based Intelligent Network Agents 
(RETSINA), [119] devises a complex negotiation protocol to force agents to agree on 
their commitments and then to perform socially complex actions. In their collaborative 
agent system (COLLAGEN), Rich and Sidner provide a set of conventions based on 
principles underlying human collaboration for collaborative discourse between humans 
and agents [97]. 
Jennings emphasizes that conventions are used to decide what information 
needs to be tracked about agents, and how to track them. For instance, a convention 
may require an agent to report to its teammates any changes it detects with respect to 
the attainability of the team goal. This need to report raises the requirement of analysis 
of communication needs before agents communicate with each other. Jennings also 
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gives an example of specific conventions for high- and low-bandwidth situations, in 
which some knowledge is not communicated to all agents if the bandwidth is not 
available. This raises the issue of the need of effective communication [63, 64]. 
Jennings does not explore deeply such problems as how conventions are selected or 
what the tradeoffs and guarantees associated with the selection of particular 
conventions are. 
Our work provides a solution to effective communication. In our work, agents 
use observation to deduce the amount of communication needed. Meanwhile, agents 
can predict future information production and need by analyzing historical information 
records. DTPC is a sophisticated process that guarantees agents choose the right rules 
(conventions) by which to communicate. 
2.1.1.4. Planned Team Activity 
A group of Australian researchers propose planned team activity in the logical 
and practical design of rational agents cooperating in a team [70]. They suggest that 
joint plans (common to all team members) that specify the means of satisfying joint 
goals are supplied in advance, rather than being generated by the agents. Their 
argument is that the agents embedded in a dynamic environment can respond rapidly to 
important events by adopting applicable plans. The joint plans are represented by 
concepts of team skills and team members’ roles. These plans usually will be qualified 
by preconditions that specify under what circumstances they are applicable. The plan 
execution for each agent consists of the selection and hierarchical expansion of these 
plans. 
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To achieve the planned team activity, common knowledge necessary for 
coordination and synchronization of agents’ activities is imposed on the agents. The 
common knowledge that includes mutual beliefs about the world and about each 
other’s actions places strong requirements upon agents’ observation. Kinny et al. 
propose that the common knowledge can be achieved alternatively by communication 
between agents. This approach implies the need of effective communication. The 
assumption that the plans of individual agents are known at compile time might 
enhance the team’s proactivity by the possibility of reasoning in advance about which 
team members potentially can achieve certain goals. 
2.1.2. Teamwork Systems 
2.1.2.1. STEAM 
STEAM (Shell for TEAMwork) is a teamwork system built on joint-intention 
theory. STEAM addresses two important issues of joint-intention theory: 1) There is no 
practical method given for forming joint intentions; 2) A single agent's defection 
automatically causes the failure of the entire group task. Tambe describes methods for 
solving these two problems [121]. He solves the first problem, that of forming joint 
intentions through communication. He frames the solution in terms of joint intention 
itself. In order to synchronize a joint intention, the cooperating agents form weak 
achievement goals to bring others into their plan. Agents who have accepted the joint 
goal as their own form weak achievement goals. The same mechanisms that enforce 
communication when plans break down under joint intentions are used here to ensure 
synchronization when attempting to form a plan. 
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The second problem, what to do in case an individual agent defects from the 
group, is more interesting. This case necessitates replanning—allowing a single 
defector to cause the failure of the group as a whole is clearly unacceptable in robust 
systems. To implement the replanning process, Tambe created a set of role-monitoring 
constraints, which describe each agent's importance to the plan as a whole. The 
constraints describe cases where one of the following apply: 1) AND-combination, the 
actions of each member of a group of agents are vital to the achievement of the goal; 2) 
OR-combination, the actions of any one of a set of agents would suffice to achieve the 
goal; 3) Role dependency, one agent's actions depend on another agent's actions, such 
that without the second agent, the first can not complete its role. When an agent defects 
from a group action, the remaining agents invoke a repair action. Each examines the 
dependency structure to see whether the remaining group can complete the plan; if so, 
they continue. If the failure was in fact the result of a single agent's defection (Tambe 
calls this situation a critical role failure), the agents reorganize and carry on with new 
roles. If there is no possible reorganization that can complete the goal, then the goal 
fails. 
Another interesting feature of STEAM is selective communication, where 
agents communicate only information with high utility to the completion of the plan. 
Tambe and Rosenbloom proposed that agent-monitoring is a key capability required 
for intelligent interaction [120]. Selective communication involves monitoring other 
agents’s observable actions and inferring their high-level goals, plans, and behaviors. 
Communication is generated based on monitoring and reasoning about the cost of 
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communication in deciding whether to communicate or not. However, Tambe’s work 
focuses on establishing the joint intentions of team members in trying to achieve a joint 
goal, but not on analyzing the information needs among team members in order to 
provide information proactively, which is our focus. The differences between selective 
communication and our approach are examined in greater detail Section 2.3.1. 
The reliance on communication among agents in joint intention theory means 
that the possible domains are limited, however. Joint-intention theory can not be used 
when agents are unable to signal each other or to cooperate with agents that were not 
designed with joint intention in mind. We want a system that can cooperate with agents 
in general, not just those that were designed to cooperate with the present system, 
another reason we use observation as well as communication for inter-agent 
cooperation, thus agents do not need to communicate with each other about the 
information which they can be seen by themselves or which they believe can see by 
others. 
2.1.2.2. GRATE* 
GRATE* is an extended version of GRATE (Generic Rules and Agent model 
Test-bed Environment) [63, 64]. In GRATE*, joint responsibility is built on joint 
intention. GRATE* specifies that preconditions must be attained before collaboration 
can guarantee that individuals behave together either when joint activity is progressing 
satisfactorily or when it runs into difficulty. Like STEAM, it also requires agents to 
agree on the team plans that are to be executed. 
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However, several simplifying assumptions used to approximate a formal 
description of joint responsibility deprive GRATE* of scalability for dealing with more 
general systems. First, GRATE* is used in industrial settings in which foolproof 
communications can be assumed [65], and thus communication is the only way to track 
agents. By comparison, we track agents by both communication and observation. We 
also use observation and decision-theoretic proactive communication to decrease the 
amount of communication. Second, Jennings supposes that agents are able to predict, 
with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the time it will take to execute each of their 
domain-level activities. In order to do so, each action recipe presents its starting time 
and duration of the action. We argue that since agents are in a dynamic environment, 
the starting time and duration of an action vary with a number of uncertain elements, 
such as when an action’s precondition is attained. Thus, we need a prediction of 
communication needs associated with preconditions and effects of an action, rather 
than fixed action starting time and duration in action presentation. Third, GRATE* 
maintains knowledge about other agents through acquaintances models, which are used 
to keep track of what teammates’ capabilities are. However, the question of how much 
knowledge should be used in these models is left unaddressed. In contrast, we use 
observation to track teammates’ mental states, in order to reason about what they can 
see and what they can infer from what they can see. 
2.1.2.3. COLLAGEN 
COLLAGEN (COLLaborative AGENt) [97] is a collaborative human user-
interface system that is built on shared-plan theory. In COLLAGEN, communication is 
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assumed to be reliable. However, from a human-usability perspective, limiting the 
number of communications is still desirable. To address this issue, recent empirical 
work by Lesh, Sidner and Rich [79] utilizes plan-recognition in COLLAGEN. The 
focus of that work is on using the collaborative setting to make plan-recognition 
tractable. For instance, ambiguities in plan-recognition may be resolved by asking the 
user for clarification. 
COLLAGEN includes observation as one kind of communication (another kind 
is discourse) and assumes all agents’ and users’ actions are mutually observable 
through a directed-manipulation graphical interface. We separate observation and 
communication because observation involves a complex belief-maintenance process 
and hence is the basis of communication decisions. Work on COLLAGEN did not 
investigate how much knowledge must be maintained for effective collaborative 
dialogue with the user. In contrast, we are able to provide such knowledge by 
analyzing team plans, i.e., the preconditions and effects of plans. Furthermore, 
analyzing the dialogue plans for risk points may allow systems such as COLLAGEN to 
decide whether to use communication for clarification, regardless of plan-recognition 
ambiguity. 
2.2. Decision Making Models in Agent Research 
Researchers in psychology, cognitive science and computer science have 
generated a variety of computational models of decision making, oriented toward 
understanding and modeling behaviors of human decision making, under situations 
with risky, time pressure, high stakes and dynamic uncertainty settings [142, 72, 71, 
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86, 143, 144, 138, 18]. Perhaps the most familiar fields for AI are two: classic decision 
theory and naturalistic decision-making. We introduce each of these models. 
2.2.1. Classic Decision Theory 
Classic Decision theory [93] is used to select an optimal action. It generally 
includes four areas: 1) decision theory, 2) Bayesian probability theory, 3) Markov 
decision process and 4) game theory. 
2.2.1.1. Decision Theory 
The assumption underlying decision theory is rationality, i.e. the decision 
maker won’t intentionally select an action that is inferior to some other actions. The 
theory requires that the decision maker specifies a set of possible actions, a complete 
and mutually exclusive set of uncertain states, and a set of evaluative dimensions. The 
decision maker then assesses the utility of each action based on the probability of each 
uncertain state and the weight of each evaluative dimension. The theory enables 
decision makers to calculate a utility reflecting the overall desirability of each action. 
With the general decision-making procedure, the decision theoretic models vary. For 
example, the basic model, maximization of expected utility (MEU) [102] consists of 
summarizing the value of each potential outcome multiplied by the probability that the 
outcome would in fact be obtained. This product sum is then compared with the 
expected values for the other actions. The action that has the largest expected value is 
the one that should be selected, called MEU. In the work [142], it summarizes other 14 
types of decision theoretic models, including Maximization of Subject Expected Utility 
(MSEU) which is the same model as MEU except that utility is substituted for dollar 
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value, Lexicographic (LEX) model which assumes that each option has attributes that 
will promote valued outcomes, etc.. It can be seen that in addition to the assumption 
about rationality described above, each of these decision theoretic models assumes that 
the decision maker has preferences for the outcomes and that these preferences can be 
measured, e.g. by a utility function.  
Our decision-making is based on the same rationality consideration, thus the 
decision maker will choose a communication policy with the maximum utility. We 
handle the unknown random variables in the utility function by utilizing the Empirical 
Distribution Function to estimate their probabilities. 
2.2.1.2. Bayesian Probability Theory 
Bayesian probability theory [92, 93] is used to draw inferences about situations. 
It requires that decision maker to identity a set of states (e.g. weather condition of 
Houston when the decision maker is in College Station). Then for each pair of states 
the decision maker can establish whether the pair is independent or not. The decision 
maker then can build a graph in which each node for a state and an arc points from 
state A to state B if the latter depends on the former. The resulting graph is known as a 
Bayesian network [93]. The Bayesian network provides a computational framework to 
calculate the probabilities of preferences to the decision maker. The next steps are to 
assess the probability that each hypothesis is true, identify all the potential observations 
that might bear on those hypotheses in the future, and quantify the impact of each such 
observation. Then as new observations occur, decision makers can use algorithms from 
the theory, such as Bayesian rule, to updating probabilities in the hypotheses. The 
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decision making method in this theory is the same with that of the decision theory. For 
each state, we calculate a utility for each state and we will prefer the state with the 
highest MEU. 
2.2.1.3. Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) 
In essence an MDP is an iterative set of classical decision problems [102]. As 
the Bayesian network, MDP is also represented by a graph in which one node denotes a 
state. Performing an action in that state will result in a transition to one of a number of 
states each connected to the first state, with some probability, and incurs some cost. 
After a series of transitions a goal state may be reached, and the sequence of actions 
executed to do this is known as a policy. Solving an MDP means to find a minimal cost 
policy for moving from some initial state to a goal state [88]. A big problem of MDPs 
is that, it unrealistically assumes that agent knows at every point what state it is in. This 
means that it is possible to measure some aspect of the world and from this 
measurement the agent can tell precisely what state the world is in. In reality, it is more 
likely that from the measurement something there is still uncertain in the world. In such 
case, the states of an MDP are replaced by the agent’s beliefs about those states, and 
we have a partially observable MDP (POMDP) [88]. Because POMDP can capture so 
many real problems, it is currently a hot topic in agent research, despite the fact that 
they are intractable for all but the smallest problems. 
Our problem also deals with partially observable environment. However, 
different from POMDP, our agents make decisions based on not only data collected 
from history, but also estimations of a sequence of future communication interactions 
  
24
between information providers and needers. Different sequences will lead to different 
values of communication policies to be chosen by the agents and the agents will choose 
a best one with the maximum utility (meaning the minimum cost). To handle the 
intractable problem occurring in decision-making processes, we use some 
approximation to balance the quality of decisions with the complexity of computation. 
While this is not exactly precise, it is shown to be a practical solution in our 
experiments. 
2.2.1.4. Game Theory 
Game theory is a branch of economics that studies interactions between self-
interested agents. Perhaps the most compelling area that the game theory has been 
applied on multi-agent systems is negotiation [76, 104, 48]. Game theoretic studies of 
rational choice in multi-agent systems typically assumed that agents were allowed to 
select the best strategy from the space of all possible strategies, by considering all 
possible interactions. The search space of strategies and interactions that needs to be 
considered has exponential growth, which means that the problem of finding an 
optimal strategy is in general computationally intractable. The study of finding 
efficient (polynomial time) algorithms for intractable problems in multi-agent 
negotiations is an ongoing area of work [92]. 
In our system, agents share a common goal, and would therefore be willing to 
assistant others. Therefore, decision-making strategies are different from that of the 
game theory that contains self-interested agents. For example, in a team, agents help 
each other to maximize utility for the whole team; while in a game, every agent acts in 
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the manner maximizing its own utility but minimizing utility for competitors. Many 
human teams (including ours) involving joint decision-making as information 
gathering and task allocations have the computation complexity problem. Again, we 
use some approximations to balance the quality of decisions with the complexity of 
computation. 
2.2.2. Naturalistic Decision Making 
Naturalistic decision directly relates to the way experienced people actually 
make decisions in natural settings [142]. Comparing to the decision theory that is about 
selecting an option, the naturalistic decision focuses on diagnostic decision-making 
(situation assessment). Among many models developed under this field, recognition-
primed decision (RPD) model [72] is the most common one. The RPD model 
emphasizes the recognition of situational dynamics as one of the key drivers in 
selecting an action. The RPD model describes how decision makers can rely on their 
experience to recognize situations and identify viable courses of action without 
comparing the relative benefits or liabilities of multiple actions. The decision maker 
first identifies the situation as familiar or typical. This recognition enables the decision 
maker to know several important things, such as which goals to take, what to expect 
and which actions typically work. The RPD model focuses attention on the importance 
of situation awareness for successful decision making in field settings. For example, 
[33] uses RPD to support human teams to make faster and better decisions when there 
is not time for extensive reasoning.  
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RPD model requires the decision maker to have enough experience to assess 
novel and dynamic environment it encounters. Also the process which enable 
experienced decision maker to develop their situation awareness requires the designer 
have completely understanding to domains; this tends to discourage the generic 
problem solving across different domains. Therefore RPD has wide applications in 
military training tasks, such as training with Tactical Decision Making Under Stress 
(TADMUS) [18]. 
2.3. Decision-Theoretic Modeling Communication 
Though growing up long before the concept of an intelligent agent was 
conceived, decision-theoretic modeling has gained increasing interest as a technique 
for communication in multi-agent systems. 
2.3.1. Selective Communication 
STEAM uses selective communication, by which agents communicate only 
information with high utility [121]. The decision depends not only on the cost and 
benefit of the communication, but also on the likelyhood that the information may be 
already mutually belived. One of two communciation strategies will be chosen: C for 
communicating and NC for not communicating. If C is selected, the team has a reward 
for knowing the information but also has the cost for sending the information. If NC is 
chosen, two outcomes are possible. There is some probability that the information was 
already commonly known, in which case the team is given an extra penalty for 
miscoordimation, besides the reward. Otherwise the team has the reward. 
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There are four major differences between STEAM and our approach. First, 
STEAM focuses on establishing joint intentions of team members, but not on analyzing 
the information production and need among team members in order to be able to 
provide information proactively or ask for information actively, which is our focus. 
Second, in STEAM, the decision to communicate is based on monitoring other team 
members’ sensory capabilities and role constraints, while our model can dynamically 
predict information production and need among agents based on collections of 
historical data. Third, the communication strategies of STEAM are either to 
communicate or not, while our model offers agents more realistic options and considers 
the interdependency of their decisions. Fourth, STEAM does not include risk in 
decision-making, while we consider the risk an important part in the utility function. 
This is particularly necessary in hostile environments. 
2.3.2. Probabilistic Plan Recognition 
Huber and Durfee suggest using a probabilistic plan recognizer [53, 54], similar 
to their 1993 work, to deduce the status of the commitments of other agents involved in 
a joint plan. In fact, it is easier to reason about the commitments of other agents when 
they are known to be following a joint plan than it is to reason about their plans when 
there is no such basis of knowledge between the observing and the observed agents. All 
an observing agent need do is compare the observed agent's current actions with the 
current plan to determine the status of that agent's commitment. Huber and Durfee’s 
system is called the University of Michigan Procedural Reasoning System (UM-PRS) 
[54]; it is used for mapping plans, and for plan recognition by a Bayesian Net approach 
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given in [53] (see also [17] for an introduction to bayes nets, or [93] for a detailed 
description). Huber and Durfee use no vision in their system, assuming that logical 
predicates can be detected directly by the cooperating agents. Strategies such as plan 
recognition normally have high computational complexity that weakens teamwork 
efficiency. However, a major point of our work is that the underlying system interprets 
team plans of the agents do some of the fundamental work for handling 
communication. For example, by analyzing preconditions and effects of the team plans 
and operators, we generate a set of information to be exchanged among the needers and 
the providers. 
2.3.3. Game-Theoretic Recursive Modeling 
Because agents who have different knowledge and capabilities must work 
together, they must communicate the right information to coordinate their actions. 
Gmytrasiewicz et al. developed a rigorous approach for modeling the utility of 
communication, based on decision and game-theoretic methods [39, 40]. The model is 
called Recursive Modeling Method (RMM). An agent that is considering sending a 
message should base its decision on an estimation of whether the message’s recursive 
impact on the sender and receiver’s beliefs will improve the expected outcome of its 
decisions [39, 40]. In this framework, an agent begins with a recursively elaborated set 
of models about another agent. Using the probabilistic nature of these models, the 
agent can compute the expected utility for the other agent’s alternative decisions. It 
then models how exchanged information will influence the probabilities, and thus 
affect the expected utilities of the other agent’s decision.  
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The common thing between our approach and RMM is that we both model a 
message’s recursive impact on the receiver and the sender in turn by using the 
decision-theoretic method. However, there are four major differences between our 
approach and RMM. First, we focus on a multiple agent team cooperating to achieve a 
common goal, while RMM is primarily suitable for two-player teams and considers 
agents’ decision-making from the perspective of an individual agent in a self-interested 
environment.  
Second, RMM estimates a message’s recursive impact regarding to how this 
message is relevant to the receiver’s goal. While in our model, relevance of a message 
is inferred by reasoning about the goals of other agents (specifically, the preconditions 
of these goals constitute the information relevance to other agents). We model the 
impact regarding to timeliness and correctness of the information that is not considered 
by RMM. 
Third, RMM uses a decision tree containing probabilities of other agents’ 
actions and the probabilities are domain knowledge. However, obtaining these 
probabilities when the environment is dynamic and not fully observable is difficult. 
Our model, in contract, does not rely on pre-determined knowledge, but computes the 
timeliness and correctness of the information based on possibly incomplete and 
uncertain knowledge of other agents. 
Fourth, RMM uses iterative deepening of RMM levels to detect convergence or 
cycles. This makes it very costly and time consuming to compute a solution. If the 
depth of a hierarchy is finite and complete, the model can traverse this hierarchy and 
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retrieve the best strategy to play. However, because this nested model can involve 
many branches and extend to deep levels of recursion, so when there is a loop or when 
there is not enough time to traverse the whole hierarchy, RMM may not be able to 
return the optimal solution. Our approach makes decisions based on methods for 
inexpensive approximation to balance the quality of decisions with the costs of making 
them. While this is not exactly precise, it is shown to be a practical solution in our 
experiments. 
2.3.4. Optimal Communication among a Team 
Bui, Kieronska and Venkatesh present a formal framework based on the game 
theory with incomplete information for modeling the coordination and communication 
problem among a team of collaborative agents; they also defined what optimal 
communication means in this setting [11, 41]. The framework defines the notion of 
team optimality (TOP) to be taken as the ideal solution to the team coordination 
problem. Communication is considered to be an extended team problem where agents 
are allowed to broadcast messages. Optimal communication then is defined as a 
combination of communication strategies with maximal value and minimum cost. To 
reduce computation complexity caused by unknown parameters in the utility function, 
the framework uses domain-dependent assumptions to reduce hypothesis space. It also 
assumes the probability distributions about the unknown parameters are given and 
suggests these can be learned by the agents through their repeated interactions with the 
environment and with one other. However it does not give the detail about the learning 
process. We propose a solution that agents attach some relevant data to messages sent 
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to each other and use the practical EDF to model distributions of the unknown 
parameters. 
2.3.5. Multi-Agent Markov Decision Process  
Xuan and Lesser present a multi-agent extension to Markov Decision Process 
(MDP) to optimize both actions and communication [133]. They model communication 
as an explicit action that incurs a cost. They describe how to model communication and 
the cost of communication properly and define the optimality of combining 
communication acts for a group of cooperative agents. However, their framework is 
heuristic and does not consider communication risk in decision-making. To relieve 
prohibitive computation complexity in the optimization problem, they use social 
conventions. For example, one of the conventions they use is “no news is good news”. 
If agents do not hear anything from others, they assume everything is fine and process 
their work without communication. However, they need to negotiate a new plan if the 
progress is not as intended. We are interested in the most comprehensive case where 
cooperative agents must determine which message they should transmit, and when, 
assuming that communication incurs a cost and a risk. 
2.3.6. Dec_POMDP_Com 
Decentralized Partially Observable MDP Communication (Dec_POMDP_Com) 
[41] is a theoretic model for decentralized control of multiple decision-makers that 
share a common set of objectives. Similar to the Multi-Agent MDP model, 
Dec_POMDP_Com aims to find a joint policy that maximizes the expected utility over 
the hypothesis that consists of policies of actions and policies of communications. The 
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difference between them is that to decrease computation, the former uses heuristic 
social conventions while the latter uses a myopic greedy algorithm to approximate 
optimal communication. For example, at the offline planning stage, a best policy is 
specified and will be used throughout the rest processes. Our approach is more 
dynamic in that, without using heuristic assumption or offline planning stage, the best 
policy is always guaranteed at every time of decision-making. To deal with uncertainty, 
we take advantage of history data of information production and need and use a 
practical statistical analysis to approximate distributions of the information production 
and need. This decreases the number of possible outcomes of unknown parameters in 
the utility function to a finite set. 
2.3.7. COM-MTDP 
Communicative Multi-agent Team Decision Problem (COM-MTDP) [95] 
offers a theoretic model that considers the uncertainties and costs in real world 
scenarios, addressing some of the deficiencies of BDI systems. This model compares 
complexity results when either free communication, no communication or general 
communication is assumed. While the model accounts for the value and the cost of 
communication, it does not consider the risk that we examine in our approach. The 
authors applied a single case of communication, which allows an agent to send a single 
message indicating that a certain goal has been achieved. Our work studies a more 
general problem: the agents take advantage of the timing and frequency of information 
production and need and are allowed to communicate (possibly) several times until 
sending out or receiving a teamwork-related information item. We are interested in 
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problems where agents may act independently to perform their own tasks but may need 
to exchange their information from time to time to coordinate in more efficient ways. 
This includes each agent deciding when and what to communicate to whom. 
Additionally, a single agent’s decision is not independent and needs to consider the 
impact of its counterparts’ decisions. 
2.4. Other Effective Communication Approaches  
2.4.1. Centralization Modeling 
In the contract net protocol [115], when an agent needs help from the others in 
the group, it broadcasts a task-announcement message. The other agents evaluate their 
resources and submit bids to the original agent. The original agent then evaluates these 
bids and assigns the task to the most suitable one. The contract net protocol is 
appropriate in a decentralized control regime where the agent does not know in 
advance the other agents' information. With the generality of the broadcast, this 
approach becomes inefficient in many cases. We propose to eliminate the broadcasting 
of this communication with an assisted coordination approach [38]. In this approach, a 
central manager agent tracks the overall status of the group; any agent wishing to locate 
peers sends a message to the manager agent and receives the address of the peer agent. 
Lashkari's collaborative framework [78] is another example of this approach. 
2.4.2. Comparative Reasoning 
Sugawara reports on the use of comparative reasoning and analysis techniques 
for learning and specifying coordination rules for a system in which distributed agents 
coordinate in diagnosing a faulty network [117]. The investigation is focused on 
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optimizing coordination rules to minimize inefficiency and redundancy in the agents’ 
coordinating messages. Upon detecting sub-optimal coordination (via a fault model), 
the agents exchange information on their local views of the system and the problem-
solving activity, and construct a global view. They then compare the local view to the 
global view to find critical values and attributes missing from the local view that gave 
rise to the sub-optimal performance. These values and attributes are used in 
constructing situation-specific rules that optimize coordination in particular situations. 
For example, network-diagnosis agents may learn a rule that guides them to choose a 
coordination strategy in which only one agent performs the diagnosis and shares its 
result with the rest of the diagnosis agents. 
2.4.3. Social Conventions 
Shoham and Tennenholtz suggest that a society of agents adopt a set of 
conventions [50, 111]. Each agent will obey these conventions and will be able to 
assume that all others will obey them as well. On one hand, these rules will constrain 
the plans available to the agents, but on the other, they will guarantee certain behaviors 
on the part of other agents. This approach totally eliminates communication and uses 
convention rules to guide agents’ actions. As an example, Shoham and Tennenholtz 
present a number of traffic laws for a restricted domain of mobile robots. They show 
how social conventions ensure that no collisions or deadlocks occur, and agents are 
still allowed enough freedom to plan close to optimal paths. 
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2.4.4. Focal Points 
In environments where communication is impossible, Fenster and Kraus 
explore a coordination technique common to communication-free human interactions, 
namely focal points [34, 75, 105]. This approach is based on the intuition that humans 
are sometimes capable of sophisticated interaction with little communication, and that 
it ought to be possible for agents to emulate this behavior. Focal points are based on the 
naturalness and intuitiveness of certain objects (or solutions) in the world. Since agents 
do not have the common sense needed to judge the naturalness and intuitiveness, the 
designer endows them with an algorithm capable of identifying focal points to which 
they adhere. They then develop a domain-independent algorithm and test it in 
simulations of various instances of an abstract world. They find that given a problem 
and a set of possible solutions from which the agents need to choose, focal points are 
prominent solutions of the problem to which agents are drawn [34]. In most randomly 
generated situations, there is more than a 90% probability that agents will make a 
common choice. 
2.5. Observability and Belief Maintenance 
In a dynamic, distributed teamwork environment, apart from prior knowledge 
such as the team goal, observability is a major means for an individual agent to obtain 
information. An agent with observability may monitor its teammates by observing the 
environment and their actions and then estimating their beliefs without generating 
unnecessary messages. In what follows, we review literature about belief and belief 
maintenance after observation. 
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2.5.1. Knowledge and Belief 
In [112, 94], the internal state of an agent is called its mental state, and it is 
represented by modal logic. One important modality in mental state is belief. Building 
belief and the process of belief revision and update are very complex [74]. If we want 
to introduce belief, we have to introduce knowledge first. Knowledge, belief, and the 
relationship between them have been studied extensively in philosophy for a long 
time.Most work in Artificial Intelligence (AI) on knowledge and belief has its origins 
in the philosophical work of Hintikka [49]. Moore was an important early researcher 
who introduced Hintikka’s ideas into AI [89]; the most comprehensive and up-to-date 
discussion of knowledge and belief in computer science appears in [31]. 
Most formalization of knowledge and belief is expressed in modal logic. The 
standard logic for knowledge, called the S5 system, contains the following axioms: 
• K  [Kϕ∧K(ϕ ⊃ ψ)] ⊃ Kψ 
• T  Kϕ ⊃ ϕ 
• 4 Kϕ ⊃ KKϕ 
• 5 ¬Kϕ ⊃ K¬Kϕ 
The K axiom says that an agent’s knowledge is closed under deduction, while the T 
axiom says that what the agent knows is true. Axiom 4 implies that the agent knows 
what it knows, while axiom 5 says that it knows what it doesn’t know. 
A logic of belief results from dropping the T axiom from S5 and using the 
operator BEL instead of K. The derived system is called K45. In fact, the most 
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common logic of belief is a strengthening of K45 by the D axiom: BELϕ ⊃ ¬BEL¬ϕ 
(the resulting system is called KD45). Intuitively, the D axiom ensures that the agent’s 
belief is internally consistent. 
2.5.2. Visibility, Seeing, and Knowledge Logic 
In recent years, observability has been used widely to understand behaviors of 
multi-agent systems. One study of particular interest is logic for visibility, seeing and 
knowledge (VSK) [128, 129, 130, 131], which explores relationships between what is 
true, visible, perceived, and known. The VSK logic is an extension of modal logic. The 
semantics of the VSK logic is based on Kripke possible worlds [31]. A space of Kripke 
structures (“worlds”) is defined, each of which encodes the instantaneous state of 
environment plus the internal state local to each agent. Then several equivalence 
relations are defined to capture the meaning of the modal operators. For example, for 
each world, there is a relation, ~v, that determines what other worlds are 
indistinguishable, and similarly for S and K. The content of what an agent sees or 
knows is determined by these equivalence relations. For example, an agent is said to 
know ϕ if ϕ is satisfied by all the worlds accessible from the current world. 
Wooldridge goes on to prove some properties about the interrelations among 
accessibility, sensibility and knowledge in this system, and he also offers a proof of the 
theory with a guarantee of completeness [128].  Wooldridge also investigates a number 
of interaction axioms among agents, such as under which conditions agent a sees 
everything agent b sees, or agent b knows everything agent a sees [128].  
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However, there are three major issues regarding agent cooperation that are not 
addressed in VSK logic: 1) the effects of actions play a major role in helping an agent 
infer what others likely know, while there is no way to treat actions through 
observation; 2) agents do not have an effective way to utilize their observation to 
manage communication and 3) VSK models knowledge (from observation), but not 
belief. Agents should be allowed to believe different or even incorrect things and 
maintenance of multiple agents’ beliefs are a difficulty problem. Our approach uses 
these issues and agents’ observations of the world to determine which information is 
already believe by other agents, and therefore does not need to be communicated. 
2.5.3. Beliefs of Agents 
The VSK logic introduced in last section is basically suitable for describing and 
reasoning about belief and observability of a single agent. In multi-agent systems, 
agents are expected to not only reason about belief and observability of itself but also 
of others.  
Beliefs of Agents (BOA) is a multi-agent belief maintenance and reasoning 
model, from both theoretical and practical aspects [101]. It is able to represent multiple 
states of beliefs and justify beliefs with different strengths [60]. To achieve fast and 
efficient reasoning, BOA implements multi-agent belief reasoning in a first-order logic 
back-chainer by sacrifices some degree of expression (i.e. it does not handle things like 
nested belief) [7]. 
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Comparing with a multi-agent truth maintenance system which maintain the 
integrity of observed and communicated information [28, 55, 84, 85], BOA answers 
two difficulties that are not addressed by the later. 
The first is resolving conflicting beliefs about a certain thing. In the multi-agent 
truth maintenance system, a single agent is generally not free to change the status on its 
own accord and must coordinate with the other agents so that they are all consistent on 
the status of the information. However, agents may come to conflict beliefs about a 
certain thing. For example, agent a may receives a message from agent b saying it is 
raining now, but agent a currently does not observe the rain. BOA resolves this 
problem by reasoning about the justification for the beliefs, including direct-
observation, observability, effects of actions, inferences, persistence and default 
knowledge [60]. 
Second, the main purpose of reasoning about beliefs and observabilities is to 
help agents assist each other. Typical a belief is a fact (proposition) with the value true 
or false. BOA represents the fact that another agents belief is unknown (neither true nor 
false) or whether (either true or false). Then agent a would provide a piece of 
information to agent b if agent a believes agent b does not know the value for the 
information; also agent a would ask about needed information from agent b if agent a 
believes whether agent b know the truth value of the information. 
2.5.4. Seeing Is Believing 
The observability and reasoning of a single agent have received researchers’ 
attention for some time. Perception reasoning is one of these research directions [72, 
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73]. For example, “seeing is believing” has been adopted for perception-based belief 
reasoning [25, 91]. These theories are intended to apply to perception in humans and to 
perception in agents at the level of symbolic interface between a vision system and a 
belief system. They give a logical analysis of perception and then consider when 
perception should lead to change of belief. Similar work can be found in [122]. Van 
Linder et al. describe different ways agents can acquire information: seeing, hearing, 
and jumping (default reasoning) [82]. They also propose a classification of the 
information that an agent processes according to credibility. Agents then can solve 
various conflicts that may arise when acquiring information from different sources, 
based on information credibility. 
2.5.5. Nested Belief Reasoning 
Isozaki and Katsuno [61] propose an algorithm for estimating others’ beliefs 
from observation. An agent maintains its own belief by checking three factors: 1) 
observation factor: if one observes a proposition now, one believes the proposition 
now; 2) effects factor: if one has just observed an action, then one believes in all of its 
effects, even if one has not yet observed them; 3) memory factor: if no new information 
is available, one’s previous belief remains valid. An agent a can estimate agent b’s 
belief at different times: 
• b’s initial belief: agent a checks b’s observation factor at initial time; 
• b’s belief at a time later than initial: agent a checks b’s observation 
factor, effects factor, and memory factor at that time. 
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Isozaki and Katsuno [62] also propose a way to reason about nested beliefs 
(which are one’s belief about what another believes) based on observation. However, 
neither of their works represents the process of observation, i.e., what can be seen and 
under which conditions. 
2.5.6. Cooperation by Observation 
Kuniyoshi, Rougeaux and Ishii [77] proposed a cooperation framework called 
“cooperation by observation”. Its basic function is to allow minimal communication 
supported by mutual observation of actions. Agents cooperate by using visual action-
recognization to classify task patterns. Their framework presents several standard 
attentional templates, e.g. who monitors whom. They define a team attentional 
structure as one in which all agents monitor each other. Viroli and Omicini [123] 
devise a formal framework for observation that abstracts conditions that cause agents’ 
interactive behaviors. Kaminka and Tambe [67] use observation to monitor failed 
social relationships between agents, but they do not give details about how agents’ 
belief about their teammates’ mental states are updated. 
2.6. Problem-Specific Prediction 
There are many learning techniques for problem-specific estimation. Here we 
just name a few. 
2.6.1. OVERSEER  
Kaminka et al. propose OVERSEER, a statistical model for exploring plans 
used by a team to predict team responses effectively during execution [68]. They 
consider communication to be observable action (only to sender and receiver agents) 
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and use plan recognition to predict future observed messages. They assume that the 
duration of a plan is an exponential random variable, and parameters in exponential 
distribution can be acquired from domain experts or learned from previous runs. 
However, they neither explain why the duration of a plan conforms to exponential 
distribution, nor investigate the learning processes in depth. More detail of this work 
can be found in [68] and [69]. 
2.6.2. Successful Story Learning 
In a dynamic teamwork system, agents need to consider not only the dynamic 
changes of the system, but also the actions of their teammates. Agents may have some 
historical data for predicting the actions of others. Schmidhuber and Zhao [106] 
consider a system with three self-interested agents. The agents learn evidence released 
during the course of interaction and use a backtracking method called “successful-story 
algorithm” to establish success histories of behavior, i.e. agents keep actions that have 
been successful and remove actions that have failed. In this way, the successful 
histories can be enforced despite interference from other agents. 
2.6.3. Regression Modeling 
Hu and Wellman [52] adopt regression methods for online derivation of 
relations between other agents’ actions and their internal states. They find that 
performance of an agent can be quite sensitive to its assumption about the policy of 
other agents, and when there is substantial uncertainty about the other agents, 
minimizing assumptions might be the best policy. Another example is Jensen, 
Atighetchi and Lesser [66]. They investigated techniques for allowing agents to gain 
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statistical knowledge about non-local effects (NLEs) and found that a combination of 
three simple learning techniques (empirical frequency distributions, deterministic 
properties of schedules, and linear regression) can be surprisingly effective. 
2.7. Psychological Study of Shared Mental Model in Human Teamwork 
Teamwork is a collaborative activity with diverse knowledge resources and 
distributed team formats. As a team increases in size, it is often difficult or impractical 
to put all necessary information on a single agent. Furthermore, though today‘s 
advanced telecommunications and collaboration technologies allow collaborations 
within geographically distributed team members, coordination in a distributed, large-
scale team is still problematic because working from a distance brings increased 
coordination overhead, communication overload and substantial delays [30]. Ioerger 
presents an overview of current research of human teamwork, focusing on modeling 
teamwork in human-behavior representation simulations in command-and-control 
domains [59]. We review the human teamwork from psychological aspect focusing on 
shared mental model. 
Team psychology research literature suggests that mechanisms like shared 
mental models aid coordination [12, 73, 99]. Shared mental models refer to organized 
knowledge that members share about things like the task, each other, goals and 
strategies [12]. A recent study of teamwork in a flight simulation task found that shared 
mental models had a positive effect on team coordination, which improved 
performance [83]. Studies of software teams have also found that their team members 
need to acquire, share, and integrate substantial amounts of knowledge of the 
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application domain to ensure positive outcomes [23, 124]. Another study with software 
requirement analysis teams found that teams that exhibited a “collective mind”, i.e., a 
shared understanding of the group’s task and each other [125], were more coordinated 
because members understood how their work contributed to group outcomes [22]. 
In this research, shared mental models is developed based on shared knowledge 
about team structures and teamwork procedures, which help team members to form 
accurate information and expectations about the task and each other. This is achieved 
through observing the environment and teammates’ actions, predicting teammates’ 
information production and need, and communicating teamwork related information. 
2.8. Context of Work at TAMU 
The long-term research goal of the research group at TAMU is to develop an 
intelligent-team training system (ITTS), which involves both humans and agents. By 
playing vitual team-member roles, agents train humans and improve the humans’ 
teamwork skills. Previous work includes three parts: 
1. TaskableAgents, a single agent architecture that provides adaptive task 
decompositions. 
2. CAST (Collaborative Agents for Simulating Teamwork), an architecture 
for simulating multi-agent teamwork. 
3. Various proactive information exchange algorithms with different 
focuses on inter-agent communication. 
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2.8.1. TaskableAgents 
TaskableAgents is a general single agent architecture which was originally 
motivated by the purpose of simulating activities of staff officers in tactical operation 
centers in Army combat simulations [139, 140, 57]. TaskableAgents is mainly 
consisted of TRL (Task Representation Language) and APTE (Adaptive Protocol for 
Task Execution), a task decomposition algorithm. 
TRL provides descriptors for representing four fundamental types of 
information: goals, tasks, methods, and operators [57]. Each descriptor starts with a 
keyword, such as :TASK or :METHOD, a symbolic name, and a list of formal 
parameters. The parameters allow arguments to be passed in when a task is invoked. In 
TaskableAgents, greater emphasis is placed on encoding pre-determined tasks and 
methods. This knowledge defines what to do under various circumstances by providing 
procedural descriptions similar to high-level programming languages. 
The tasks and goals assigned to an agent are carried out by the APTE algorithm 
(Adaptive Protocol for Task Execution) for task decompositions [57]. Conceptually, 
there are two phases to APTE. In the very first time step of the simulation, APTE takes 
the top-level tasks given to the agent and expands them downward as a tree by: 1) 
selecting appropriate methods for tasks, 2) instantiating the process networks for 
selected methods, 3) identifying sub-tasks that could be taken in the initial situation, 
and recursively expanding these sub-tasks further downward. Once the expansion is 
down to the set of concrete operators, the execution takes the first step as selecting one 
(perhaps based on priority or preference) and executes it. In every subsequent time 
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step, APTE must repair the task-decomposition tree. This partly involves marking the 
action just taken and moving tokens forward in the next process. More importantly, 
APTE also re-checks each of the termination conditions associated with the tasks and 
methods in the current tree. If a termination condition has been reached (generally 
indicating failure), APTE backtracks and tries to find another method that satisfies the 
parent task. If a task at some level has successfully completed, then a step forward can 
be taken to the parent process. 
In TaskableAgents, agents communicate with each other through the use of 
built-in TRL operators for sending messages. After being received, messages are stored 
in a queue local to each agent. At regular intervals (between normal decision-making 
cycles), all messages stored in an agent’s queue are emptied into its knowledge base. 
The agent can then process the messages accordingly using message-handling methods 
written in TRL [139, 140]. 
Different from the planning system that usually relies on goal-regression to 
select sequences of actions, the TaskableAgents focuses on dynamically selecting and 
managing tasks. It has two distinguishing features: 1) reasoning about how to select the 
most appropriate method for any given task, and 2) being able to react to significant 
changes in conditions and find alternative methods when necessary. TRL is expressive 
enough to allow the specification of complex procedures for the agent to follow, and 
the APTE algorithm enables flexible behavior in the form of reactivity to changes in 
conditions. 
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2.8.2. Collaborative Agents for Simulating Teamwork 
CAST is a multi-agent architecture that simulates and supports teamwork 
involving both human and software agents [135, 137]. Motivated by psychological 
studies about human teamwork demonstrating that intelligent team behaviors rely on 
overlapping shared mental models among team members, CAST is based on the shared 
mental model [118, 100], which states that, by default, all agents are assumed to share 
common knowledge about the roles, capabilities and responsibilities in which they are 
involved within the team, and that they believe all other agents have the same beliefs 
[137]. This assumption reduces the amount of knowledge a team member should have 
and simplifies the belief reasoning among agents. From a teamwork-theory 
perspective, CAST is close to shared-plan theory. CAST starts with only partial 
knowledge of the shared environment and the other participants and uses 
communication and individual information-gathering to determine what the appropriate 
action is, who should perform it, and so on. 
Belief reasoning has been recognized as being intractable [47]. Consequently, 
representing and updating agents’ mental states is a challenging problem. CAST deals 
with this problem in two ways. First, we make a teamwork procedure (such as roles, 
responsibilities, and plans), and all agents share it. This procedure is represented by 
MALLET language (Multi-Agent Logic-based Language for Encoding Teamwork). 
Second, it uses Petri Nets to model the team member’s plans, as a computational form 
of a shared mental model.  
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MALLET is a team knowledge representation language [136]. The team 
knowledge includes team structures (such as team members, agents, roles, 
responsibilities, and capabilities) and teamwork processes (such as team goals, team 
plans, and individual plans). In terms of a MALLET specification, members of a team 
share a static portion of common knowledge described by MALLET. MALLET 
assumes that a team has a set of goals to be achieved. Goals are achieved by assigning 
a team of agents to plans and then invoking these plans, meaning that the agents are 
ordered to achieve the goal. Each plan consists of a set of steps, each of which is either 
a primitive operator (e.g., moveleft), or a composite operation (e.g., a sub-plan). Both 
plans and operators have preconditions and effects associated with them. Each 
precondition and effect is a conjunction of predicates. The difference between 
operators and plans is that operators do not have any body. Plans are essentially 
designed to describe processes which give plans a hierarchical structure. The processes 
consist of invocation of operators, or arbitrary combinations using various constructs 
such as sequential, parallel, branch, and iteration. The syntax of processes can be 
defined recursively based on these constructs. 
2.8.3. Proactive Information Exchange 
Based on TaskableAgents and CAST, the research group at TAMU bore rich 
fruits in proactive information exchange research. Three major algorithms are 
developed with different focuses on inter-agent communication. 
Team-to-Individual Plan Conversion (TIP-C) algorithm [6] is the first 
attainment towards multi-agent communication. It takes plans written in a multi-agent 
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teamwork language (MALLET) and converts them to equivalent individual plans in a 
single agent language (TRL). The algorithm analyzes agent responsibilities and 
automatically inserts necessary and appropriate communication acts to the individual 
plans and will still facilitate proper dynamic teamwork. These communication actions 
can help to produce the complex team activities such as delegation of responsibilities, 
carrying them out, and providing backup behavior. 
Dynamic Inter-Agent Rule Generator (DIARG) algorithm is the preliminary 
implementation of the idea of proactive information exchange [135]. It embeds in the 
CAST kernel that enables CAST agents to decide on-the-fly how to provide 
information proactively to teammates to assist their work. DIARG generates 
communication in order to resolve ambiguity of responsibilities and to predict 
information needs among agents and generate the necessary (proactive) communication 
to fulfill these needs. DIARG includes two parts: offline and online. The offline part 
analyzes the preconditions and effects of operators and generates an information flow 
describing potential information needs. An information flow is defined as a three tuple 
<info, providers, needers>, where info is the predicate name together with zero or more 
arguments; providers is a list of agents who might know such information; and needers 
is a list of agents who might need to know the information. The online part infers the 
potential information needs by reasoning preconditions and effects of actions/plans and 
generates information flow that is a list of needers and a list of providers for every 
piece of information.  
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Proactive Information Exchange (PIEX) [60, 101] improves DIARG in two 
important ways. First, unlike DIARG which is based on analyzing a static predicate 
network, PIEX monitors teammates’ responsibilities and encodes them in a shared plan 
[60]. Agents anticipate information needs based on these responsibilities; this is more 
flexible than the offline information flow generated by DIARG. Second, PIEX includes 
reasoning about other agents’ beliefs to reduce unnecessary message exchanges. It 
provides belief justifications to resolve conflict beliefs. It is also able to represent 
unknown and whether states for other’s beliefs. The communication becomes more 
efficient by narrowing down the receivers of a message to those agents who does not 
know the information, and narrowing down the provider for a message to those agents 
who know whether the information is true or false. 
Our research, Proactive Communication, is similar to PIEX in that both utilize 
agents’ sensing capabilities to reduce what information must be sent. Agents will infer 
some aspects of the mental states of other agents by observing the environment and the 
actions of the other agents. This, together with reasoning about what others can see, 
will allow an agent to decide when it does not need to send information to other agents 
and whom to ask when it needs information, in a manner that reduces overall 
communication. 
Moreover, Proactive Communication provides a communication solution that 
makes decisions under uncertainty according to cost, risk and the value of information 
the communication conveys. DIARG requires a domain expert to publish frequencies 
associated with information production and information need. It looks at the general 
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frequency, i.e., for a piece of information, in spite of how many agents produce it or 
need it, there is only one frequency related to the information production or the 
information need. Hence, this approach is too rigid to apply to different situations. For 
agent communication, DIARG also imposes obeys a regular rule, which says that 
information that is needed more frequently than it is produced must be told proactively; 
otherwise it must be asked for actively. Proactive Communication develops a more 
general way to deal with frequencies of information production or information need. 
Also it uses the decision theory to guide agents to make optimal communication 
decisions under dynamic situations. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROACTIVE COMMUNICATION: AN OVERVIEW 
In this section, we introduce our system archtecture and agent execution cycle, 
and give an overview of Proactive Communciation mechanism. As discussed in 
Section 2.8, this research is based on CAST [135]. We investigate how to add two 
important capabilities humans use, observability and proactivity, to CAST agents in 
order to emulate, as closely as possible, the principles used by humans to achieve 
effective Proactive Communication. 
3.1. The OP-CAST Architecture 
We develop an OP-CAST architecture, as shown in Fig. 3.1, for Observant and 
Proactive CAST, which is an extension of CAST. The extension is threefold: 
• Giving agents observabilities and developing Observation-Based 
Proactive Communication (OBPC) algorithms for reducing 
communication load through agents’ observabilities. 
• Developing Dynamic Information Prediction (DIP) methodology for 
helping agents make communication decisions, by predicting 
information production and needs among the agents dynamically. 
• Developing Decision-Theoretical Proactive Communication (DTPC) 
methodology by which agents communicate proactively by evaluating 
cost, risk and value of communication in the decision-theoretical 
approach. 
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Fig. 3.1. OP-CAST Architecture. 
 
An agent team is composed of a set of agents. An environment simulation 
provides an interface through which the agents interact with the environment. The team 
members share the knowledge of teamwork processes as well as team structures, 
controlled by CAST. Each agent has an individual knowledge base (KB) to specify its 
beliefs to the environment and other agents. During plan execution, individual agents 
observe the environment and their teammates’ behaviors1. Dotted circles in Fig. 3.1 
indicate agents’ observability radiuses. Different agents have different radiuses and 
their radiuses may overlap. Agents communicate with each other by exchanging 
                                                 
1 In this research, observation is not limited to vision; rather it means perception through sensors with 
which the agents are equipped.  
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teamwork-related information2. The teamwork-related information and its provider and 
needer are not chosen arbitrarily; they are specified by exploring team plans. Straight 
lines in Fig. 3.1 connect information provider and needer and arrows show the 
communication could occur in either direction3. Decisions about optimal 
communication strategies are supported by Proactive Communication. 
3.2. Agent Execution Cycle 
Our system uses discretized time. At each time step, every agent has an 
execution cycle, shown in Fig. 3.2: 
• First they observe the environment and teammates’ actions and adjust 
their own beliefs; 
• If they produce or need some information, they will predict the 
information need or production of others; 
• They choose optimal communication strategies. The decision may be to 
communicate or not at this time; 
• They execute the strategy chosen; 
• They act with teammates and the actions affect the environment and 
enter the next time step. 
                                                 
2 There are two kinds of information that can be communicated. One is the information explicitly needed 
by an agent to complete a given plan, i.e., conjuncts in a precondition of plans or operators that the agent 
is going to perform. The other is the information implicitly needed by the agent. For example, if agent a 
needs predicate p and knows p can be deduced from predicate q, even if the providing agent does not 
know p, it still can tell agent a about q once it has q, because it knows that agent a can deduce p from q. 
This research, however, deals only with agents communicating information that is explicitly needed. 
3 This research, however, does not consider chaining communication, such as communicating via third-
party brokers. 
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Fig. 3.2. Agent Execution Cycle. 
 
3.3. Proactive Communication 
Proactive Communication is a decision-theoretic communication mechanism to 
choose the optimal communication strategy during multi-agent teamwork, by giving 
agents the capabilities of observability and proactivity. Observability helps agents to 
monitor the environment and track teammates’ mental states. Proactivity allows agents 
to anticipate future needs or changes and tell or ask each other about teamwork-related 
information. To achieve these objectives, we divide the problem into three pieces and 
developed solutions for each. 
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3.3.1. Observation-Based Proactive Communication 
To endow agents with observability, we express what an agent can see. 
Additionally, successful teamwork requires interdependency among agents [45], which 
suggests that agents should know something about others’ observabilities. 
Consequently, we also express what an agent believes another agent can see. In order 
to explain how agents use their observabilities to observe the environment and others 
and how they reason about others’ observabilities, we clarify notions of:  
• What an agent can see, what it actually sees, and what it believes from 
its seeing. 
• What an agent believes another agent can see, what it believes another 
agent actually sees, and what it believes another agent believes from its 
seeing. 
The purpose of introducing observability is to reduce excessive communication, 
but there are some fundamental issues to be addressed first. We define which kind of 
information will be communicated, who needs it and who provides it, by reasoning 
about team plans. We also develop two algorithms: 
• To determine whether or not an agent having information should tell 
another agent, based on its belief about what the other agent can see. 
• To determine whether to ask some specific agent for needed 
information, based on the needer’s belief about what the specific agent 
can see. 
OBPC is introduced in Chapter IV. 
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3.3.2. Dynamic Information Prediction 
Agents need to know values of teamwork-related information. However, the 
values of the information change in a dynamic environment. It is impossible for agents 
to know all information at all times. 
For a piece of information, we assume that the production time interval by an 
agent and the need time interval by an agent are random according to some unknown 
distributions. A key aspect of DIP is to estimate the time of information production and 
need of teammates based on these distributions. As a basis for accomplishing this, we 
have agents send a partial past history of the time intervals of their information 
production or need when they send or ask for information. This additional information 
can often be sent at modest cost and subsequently enables the receiving agent to make 
predictions about the information production or need times of other agents. After 
gathering previous data on information production and need opportunistically, we use a 
practical Empirical Distribution Function (EDF) [15] to approximate the distributions 
of information production and needs of other agents. The distributions are used in the 
utility functions of communication strategies to help agents decide whether or not to 
tell or ask for a piece of information. DIP is introduced in Chapter V. 
3.3.3. Decision-Theoretic Proactive Communication 
We develop a decision-theoretic approach to determine whether to proactively 
tell (relative to the need for the information) a piece of information to one or more 
other agents, and whether and which agent(s) to ask for a piece of information (relative 
to the production of the information). We equipped agents with a set of communication 
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strategies for different decision-making situations. The utility (difference between cost, 
risk and value) of the strategies allows agents to decide which one to apply. Since not 
all parameters in the utility function are known, we approximate their distributions with 
respect to the dynamic estimation of distributions of information production and need. 
The utility function will be used to evaluate agents’ decisions and their estimations of 
other agents’ responding decisions. Taking others’ decisions into account enables the 
agents to deal with the decision interdependency of team cooperation and to 
communicate in a way benefiting the whole team. DTPC is introduced in Chapter VI. 
3.4. Summary 
The OP-CAST agents are endowed with two capabilities to pursue realistic 
behaviors and effective interactions: observability and proactivity. The first one 
enables them to track teammates’ mental states and decrease the communication load, 
and the second one allows them to estimate information production and need of 
teammates, so they can assist teammates at the proper time. These capabilities are 
encoded in three mechanisms we developed. OBPC formally defines agents’ 
observabilities and deduces extraneous communication by reasoning about the 
observabilities. DIP estimates distributions of information production and need. The 
distributions are used in capturing complex decision interdependency among agents. 
DTPC provides agents an optimal communication strategy when they act in uncertain 
and dynamic environments. 
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CHAPTER IV 
OBSERVATION-BASED PROACTIVE COMMUNICATION 
4.1. Motivation and Overview 
A major problem with CAST is that significant status information must be 
communicated among agents, and there is no attempt to utilize agents’ sensing 
capabilities to reduce the amount of information sent. A more realistic approach (from 
a human perspective) is to give the agents sensing or observing capabilities. Although 
partial observability of dynamic, multi-agent environments has gained much attention 
[95, 68, 60], little work has been done to address how to process what is observable 
and under which conditions; how an agent’s observability affects the individual’s 
mental state and whole team performance; and how agents can communicate 
proactively with each other in a partially observable environment. 
To address these issues, we introduce an explicit treatment of an agent’s 
observability that aims to achieve more effective communication among agents. We 
employ the agent’s observability as the major means for individual agents to reason 
about the environment and other team members. Agents will infer some aspects of the 
beliefs of other agents by observing the environment and the actions of the other 
agents. Together with reasoning about what others can sense, these inferences will 
allow an agent to decide when it does not need to send information to other agents and 
whom to ask when it needs information, in a manner that reduces overall 
communication. 
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We implement the following methods to achieve OBPC: 
• Reasoning about what information each agent on a team will produce, 
and thus, what information each agent can offer others. This is achieved 
through: a) analysis of the effects of individual actions in the specified 
team plans; b) analysis of observability specifications, indicating what 
each agent can perceive about the environment and other agents, and 
under which conditions. 
• Reasoning about what information each agent will need in the process 
of plan execution,through the analysis of the preconditions for 
individual actions involved in team plans. 
• Reasoning about whether an agent should act proactively when 
producing some information. The decision is made in terms of: a) which 
agent(s) needs this information; and b) whether or not the agent who 
needs this information is able to obtain the information independently 
by observing the environment and other agents’ actions. 
• Reasoning about whether an agent should ask actively when needing 
some information. The decision is made in terms of: a) which agent(s) 
produces this information; and b) which agents are able to obtain the 
information through observation. 
The following sections first present preliminary contextual information. Then, 
we introduce a representation of observability and algorithms for reasoning about it. 
Finally we describe algorithms of OBPC. 
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4.2. Preliminaries 
In OP-CAST, the team members share the team knowledge represented in 
MALLET, which provides descriptors for encoding knowledge about teamwork 
processes (i.e. individual and team plans and operations), as well as specifications of 
team structures (e.g., team members and roles) [136]. 
4.2.1. Plans 
Plans are at the center of activity. They describe how individuals or teams can 
go about achieving various goals. Each plan has a process consisting of a set of 
operations, each of which is either a primitive operator, or a composite operation (e.g., 
a sub-plan). A DO statement is used to assign one or several agents to carry out 
specific operators or sub-plans. Fig. 4.1 is an example plan for the multi-agent version 
of Wumpus World (refer to Chapter VII for details; a complete version of Multi-Agent 
Wumpus World MALLET plan is attached in Appendix B). 
 
 
(plan startKill(?fi) 
  (pre-cond (newKnow ?wumpusId ?x ?y)) 
  (process     
    (seq         
        (DO ?fi (moveToWumpus ?fi ?wumpusId ?x ?y))      
        (DO ?fi (shootWumpus ?wumpusId))  
        (DO ?fi (retract (newKnow ?wumpusId ?x ?y))) 
        (DO ?fi (nextStep ?fi)) 
    ) 
  ) 
) 
 
Fig. 4.1. An Example of the Plan. 
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StartKill is an individual plan for a fighter agent ?fi. The plan has a 
precondition which must be satisfied by the fighter before it tries to execute this plan, 
i.e. the fighter must know the location of a newly found wumpus. MoveToWumpus is 
an individual sub-plan by which the fighter will move to an adjacent location to the 
wumpus. ShootWumpus is an individual operator specified as follows: 
(ioper shootWumpus (?wumpusId) 
(effects (dead ?wumpusId))) 
The effect of this operation will be automatically asserted to the fighter’s KB 
after execution (Section 4.4.5 elaborates an algorithm for updating KB). After 
shootWumpus is executed, this wumpus’ id and location will be retracted from the 
fighter’s KB so that the fighter will not kill the same (dead) wumpus at next step. 
4.2.2. Actions 
MALLET operators are defined based on standard STRIPS (STanford Research 
Institute Problem Solver) operators [35], i.e. as discrete state transitions with 
preconditions and effects, which are logical conjunctions. Using STRIPS 
representation is important because we want to reason about precondition and effect to 
make communication decisions (see Section 4.5). MALLET has three forms of action: 
individual action, team action and joint action [32]. 
We view the world in terms of discrete state transitions and assume actions are 
instantaneous operations, i.e. they are performed instantaneously. An individual action 
is the execution of an instantiated operator in a DO statement. It is represented as: 
<action> ::= (DO <doer> (<operator-name> <args>*)), 
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where <doer> is the agent assigned to the action and <operator-name> and <args> 
correspond to the name and arguments of the operator. Team action is very similar to 
individual actions except that <doer> denotes a list of agents involved and these agents 
must perform the action simultaneously [32]. We assume that precondition of an 
action, individual action or team action, must be believed by <doer> before the action 
can be performed and the effect must be believed after the action is performed. If the 
precondition is not believed by <doer>, then Proactive Communication will be 
implicitly considered (see Chapter VI). Fig. 4.1 illustrates the example of invoking the 
shootWumpus action. 
Joint action uses a descriptor joint-do. It includes a list of DO statements and 
specifies three different joint types: AND, OR or XOR. For the type AND, each 
individual DO action must be executed by the corresponding individual agent before 
the complementation of the joint activity, which requires all involved agents acting 
simultaneously. For an OR, at least one DO must be executed by the corresponding 
individual agent while for an XOR, only one DO needs to be executed. Below is an 
example type AND joint action: 
(joint-do AND (?ag1 ?ag2) 
(DO ?ag1 (liftTable)) 
(DO ?ag2 (cleanCarpet))) 
which requires two agents ?ag1 and ?ag2 to cooperate to do a clean operation. 
Comparing team action with joint action, they are in common on that all agents 
involved must perform the action simultaneously. The difference between the two is 
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that, for the team action, the agents evaluate exactly the same precondition before the 
action, perform exactly the same action, and apply exactly the same effect after the 
action; while for the joint-action, the agents only perform the action they are assigned, 
hence they will only evaluate precondition of that action, perform that action and apply 
effect of that action. 
Our approach focuses on observing individual actions. The ideas can be 
extended to team actions and joint actions, which essentially are the collection of 
simultaneous individual actions performed by individual agents. 
4.2.3. Environment and Properties 
Another important setting for agent teamwork is environment. The environment 
is composed of objects. Each object has properties. A property is a predicate 
represented as follows: 
<property> ::= (<property-name> <object> <args>*) 
<object>     ::= <agent>|<non-agent>, 
where <object> could be either agent or non-agent, and <args> is a list of arguments 
describing the property. Sample properties in the Multi-Agent Wumpus World are as 
follows: 
(location ?o ?x ?y), 
(dead ?wumpusId). 
The environment evolves from the state at one time to the state at the next time with an 
action possibly being taken during the time interval, saving only the current 
environment state.  
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During a teamwork process, the environment simulation provides an interface 
through which the agents can observe properties and their teammates’ actions. We treat 
the environment as a knowledge base (KB) denoting objective truths of the world. 
Since actions are domain-dependent, when agents perform the actions, they send a 
signal to the environment KB. Thus, the actions will be added to the environment KB 
as a fact. We assume the environment KB is accessible to all agents. Then, the actions 
can be sensed by those whose observability permits them at the time the actions are 
performed. 
4.2.4. Agent Beliefs 
Each agent maintains beliefs about the environment and about other agents in 
its own KB. These beliefs are used at the time when the agent evaluates precondition of 
plans or actions it is involved. At that time, an attempt is made to match each conjunct 
of the precondition to the agent’s KB via unification, using variables for any or all of 
the arguments. Unification will provide values for the free variables that make the 
conjunct true. If there are no such values, then the value for the conjunct is false.  
The version of MALLET used in this work is based upon the Closed World 
Assumption that assumes that anything that is not true is false [56]. A limitation of this 
assumption is that, there is nothing in the language to distinguish between false and 
unknown, which are other two important states for belief [60]. For example, suppose an 
agent cannot prove a precondition I from its KB, then what the precondition would be 
evaluated to, not I or unknown? This problem will occur frequently, since in many 
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domains, not everything can be inferred from observability. Therefore, proper handling 
of false beliefs and unknown beliefs is important. 
The version of MALLET used in this work avoids this problem by defining 
wait semantics for preconditions. That is, if a precondition evaluates to false, the agent 
waits (possibly indefinitely) for the precondition to become true. This, of course, could 
lead to some branches of a parallel process (or even an entire plan) being blocked 
forever. Proactive Communication algorithms can recognize this situation and invoke 
communication decision processes to determine what information, if any, is exchanged. 
From the perspective of MALLET, then, there is not a need to distinguish in the KB of 
an agent between false and unknown with regard to the value for an information item I 
used in any precondition. 
It still would be better if a more general approach were used. Newer versions of 
MALLET consider alternative semantics for preconditions, such as failing upon false 
preconditions, waiting for a maximum length of time and then fail, or trying to achieve 
the precondition by invoking a planner [32]. Except for the first and last cases, it still is 
left to the Proactive Communication algorithms to determine whether or not to 
communicate when a precondition evaluation fails, and thus would not impact the work 
presented here in a significant way. 
For effect of plans or actions in which the agent is involved, all conjuncts are 
treated as positive facts, with the interpretation that not I means to remove I from the 
agent’s KB. 
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4.3. Agent Observability 
We define the syntax of observability and give semantics to this observability. 
4.3.1. Syntax of Observability 
To represent agent observability, we define a meta-predicate CanSense which 
takes three arguments: 
CanSense(<observer> <observable> <cond>) 
where <observer> specifies the agent doing the observing, <observable> identifies 
what is to be observed, and <cond> specifies the conditions under which the 
<observer> can sense the <observable>.  
Successful teamwork requires interdependency among the agents [44]. This 
suggests that an agent should know at least some things about what other team 
members can sense. However, an agent may not know for sure that another agent can 
sense some things. Rather, an agent may only believe that another agent can sense 
something. We then use 
B(<believer> CanSense(<observer> <observable> <cond>)) 
to mean that one agent believes another agent can sense something under certain 
conditions. Belief is denoted by the modal operator B and for its semantics, we adopt 
the axioms K, D, 4, 5 in modal logic [31]. 
The syntax we use for observability is given in Fig. 4.2.  
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<observability> ::= (CanSense <viewing>)* 
                 (B <believer> (CanSense <viewing>))* 
<viewing>         ::= <observer><observable> <cond>* 
<believer>         ::= <agent> 
<observer>        ::= <agent> 
<observable>     ::= <property>|<action> 
<cond>              ::= <property> 
<property>        ::= (<property-name> <object>* <args>*) 
<action>            ::= (DO <doer> (<operator-name> <args>*)) 
<object>            ::= <agent>|<non-agent> 
<doer>               ::= <agent> 
 
Fig. 4.2. The Syntax of Observability. 
 
For example, the observability specification for a carrier in the Multi-Agent 
Wumpus World is shown in Fig. 4.3, where ca, rca, fi, rfi represent the carrier, 
carrier’s detection radius, fighter and fighter’s detection radius, respectively. 
An agent has two kinds of knowledge, shared team knowledge, encoded in 
MALLET, and individual knowledge, contained in its KB. The syntax of observability 
can be used either as rules in an agent’s KB [141], or as capability incorporated into 
MALLET. In this research, we encode observability as rules in agents’ KBs. 
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((CanSense ca (location ?o ?x ?y)) 
(location ca ?xc ?yc) (location ?o ?x ?y) 
(radius ca ?rca) (inradius ?x ?y ?xc ?yc ?rca) 
) ;The carrier can sense the location property of an object. 
 
((CanSense ca (DO ?fi (shootwumpus ?w))) 
(play-role fighter ?fi) (location ca ?xc ?yc) (location ?fi ?x ?y) 
(adjacent ?xc ?yc ?x ?y) 
) ;The carrier can sense the shootwumpus action of a fighter. 
 
((B ca (CanSense fi (location ?o ?x ?y))) 
(location fi ?xi ?yi) (location ?o ?x ?y) 
(radius fi ?rfi) (inradius ?x ?y ?xi ?yi ?rfi) 
) ;The carrier believes the fighter is able to sense the location property of an 
    object. 
 
((B ca (CanSense fi (DO ?f (shootwumpus ?w)))) 
     (play-role fighter ?f) (≠ ?f fi) (location ca ?xc ?yc) (location fi ?xi ?yi)
     (location ?f ?x ?y) (radius ca ?rca) (inradius ?xi ?yi ?xc ?yc ?rca)  
     (inradius ?x ?y ?xc ?yc ?rca) (adjacent ?x ?y ?xi ?yi)) 
) ;The carrier believes the fighter is able to sense the shootwumpus action of  
    another fighter. 
Fig. 4.3. An Example of Observability. 
 
4.3.2. Semantics of Observability 
To give semantics to observability, we need to consider two perspectives: 1) an 
agent’s observability, which means we need to clarify relationships between what it 
can sense, what it actually senses, and what it believes from its sensing; 2) an agent’s 
belief about another agent’s observability, which means we need to clarify 
relationships between what it believes another agent can sense, what it believes another 
agent actually senses, and what it believes another agent believes from its sensing. 
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4.3.2.1. An Agent’s Observability 
Our notion of observability derives from Woolridge’s VSK logic [128]. Let 
Sense(a, ψ) denote the notion that agent a senses ψ4. Sensing ψ means determining the 
truth value of ψ, together with unification of any free variables in ψ. The Sense 
operator is similar to the S operator in the VSK model. The major differences are that, 
first, in the VSK model S leads to knowledge, Sa(ψ)→Ka(ψ), but we only model belief 
from observation (discussed further below), and agents should be allowed to believe 
different or even incorrect information. Second, instead of saying that the agent senses 
the true fact, it is more natural to say that if something is true, the agent will sense the 
true value, but also, if it is false, the agent will sense the false value. We model the 
Sense operator as follows: 
∀a, ψ, Sense(a, ψ) ≡ [ψ → Sa(ψ)] ∧ [¬ψ → Sa(¬ψ)]. 
Since (ψ ∨ ¬ψ) is an tautology, it follows that 
∀a, ψ, Sense(a, ψ) → [Sa(ψ) ∨ Sa(¬ψ)]. 
Next, we consider the relation between sensing something and believing it. We 
adopt an analogous assumption to the one that “seeing is believing”. While 
philosophers may entertain doubts because of the possibility of illusion, common sense 
indicates that, other things being equal, one should believe what one sees [5, 91]. The 
VSK model also suggests that Sa(ψ)→Ka(ψ) is the axiom adopted by a trusting agent (of 
                                                 
4 In our approach, each agent focuses on reasoning about current observation. Time is implicitly taken to 
be the time of the current step. 
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no illusions, no sensor fault etc.). When ψ is observed, we assume that the agent 
believes the truth value of ψ. This is formalized in the axiom below: 
∀a, ψ, Sense(a, ψ) → {[ψ → B(a, ψ)] ∧ [¬ψ → B(a, ¬ψ)]}, 
which says if ψ is true, agent a believes ψ; if ψ is false, agent a believes ¬ ψ. 
Finally, we model our observability expression as below: 
∀a, ψ, c, CanSense(a, ψ, c) 
≡ c → Sense(a, ψ) 
≡ c →{[ψ → S(a, ψ)] ∧ [¬ψ → S(a, ¬ψ)]}, 
which means that if the condition c holds, then agent a actually does sense the truth 
value of ψ. 
4.3.2.2. An Agent’s Belief about Another Agent’s Observability 
An agent’s belief about what another agent senses is based on the following 
axiom: 
∀a, b, ψ, c, B(a, CanSense(b, ψ, c)) ∧ B(a, c) → B(a, Sense (b, ψ)), 
which means that if agent a believes that agent b can sense ψ under condition c, and 
agent a believes c, then agent a believes that agent b senses ψ. Note that agent a 
evaluates condition c according to its own beliefs. 
One might wonder if agent a can infer the truth value of ψ when it knows that B 
can sense ψ because it can be easily shown that belief is transmissible between agents, 
i.e., B(a, B(b, ψ)) → B(a, ψ) or B(a, B(b, ¬ψ)) → B(a, ¬ψ).  However, we do not have 
such a strong statement of belief on the part of a.  In order to have the necessary 
condition given above, we would have to have the condition 
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∀a, b, ψ, B(a, Sense(b, ψ)) → {[ψ → B(a, B(b, ψ))] ∧ [¬ψ → B(a, B(b, 
¬ψ))]}. 
But, this condition is not necessarily true.  All that a’s belief that b can sense ψ implies 
is that b knows the value of ψ, which is weaker than the statement given above. 
4.4. Belief Maintenance 
We denote the agent who performs belief maintenance as self and the KB for 
self as KBself. Self’s observability is closely tied to its beliefs about what itself, and 
what other agents, can sense. The latter is particularly important because it decides the 
agent’s beliefs about others. In this case, the value of the thing that another agent might 
observe is not of immediate relevance. Only the fact of whether or not the other agent 
can make the observation. This is treated, again, with the Closed World Assumption. 
That is, an observability condition is given for the other agent. If self needs to know 
whether the other agent can sense something, it evaluates this condition. If it evaluates 
to true, it believes that the other agent can sense the thing. If it evaluates to false, it 
believes that the other agent cannot sense the thing. There is no unknown to consider 
because the Closed World Assumption is used throughout. False is represented, not 
explicitly, but by the absence of a true fact5. 
Ioerger [60] has described a belief maintenance system allowing self to 
maintain tuples about an agent’s (possibly a different agent than self) beliefs in the 
form <agent I value>, where value for I can have one of four values: true, false, 
unknown, and whether, and agent is what self believes to have the belief value 
                                                 
5 This is called Negation as Failure, a concept closely related to the Closed World Assumption [1].  
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expressed in the tuple. The value whether is of value for self’s belief about the agent’s 
belief; it means that the agent believes whether the value for I is true or false, but this 
value is unknown in KBself. While when the agent in the tuple is self, whether‘s 
meaning is a bit different; it means self believes the truth value of I and this value is 
known in KBself. 
As the version of MALLET we are using is based on values true or false, we do 
not need to maintain unknown or whether directly. With respect to self’s belief about 
another agent’s observabilities, we maintain only a fact that indicates the agent can 
sense the item in question, which indirectly means that the agent can sense whether, 
when the observability condition is satisfied with respect to self’s KB. 
In the following sub-sections, Section 4.4.1 introduces the concept of belief 
consistency and compatibility which is the core purpose of belief maintenance [28, 61]. 
Section 4.4.2 introduces the structure of KBself and how to construct dependencies 
among beliefs and how to make inference. Section 4.4.3 presents the overall updating 
function updateKB. Section 4.4.4 introduces self’s observability reasoning function 
reasonSelfObs. Section 4.4.5 introduces self’s belief about others’ observabilities 
reasoning function reasonSelfBel. Section 4.4.6 describes the low level belief updating 
function update which maintains belief consistency and compatibility. 
4.4.1. Belief Consistency and Compatibility 
Belief consistency and compatibility is the core purpose of belief maintenance 
[78, 135]. Belief can be classified in two types: 1) ground predicates p which evaluate 
to true or false, and 2) functions with arguments f(?x) where ?x denotes a set of 
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arguments6. f(?x) does not evaluate to true or false, but denotes some other value. For 
example, the function location(w1) can take on the value (1 1), meaning the location of 
W1 is (1 1). In JARE, functions are modeled as predicates in which the function name 
is converted to the predicate name and the argument list for the predicate includes not 
only the function arguments, but a list of arguments for the results of the function.  
Unification will provide the values for the results, if there are any, in which case the 
predicate evaluates to true; otherwise, the predicate evaluates to false. For example, 
location(w1) with arguments (?x ?y) is represented as (location w1 ?x ?y). 
Belief consistency means that no information and its negation are both believed 
[28]. Therefore the pair (p, ¬p) and (p(x), ¬p(x)) can not be believed together in KBself. 
However, belief maintenance should consider more general cases such as the 
following examples: 
• Some functions can only have one value at one time. For example, if 
location(w1) has the value (1 1), then it cannot have another value (2 2), 
because if w1 is on (1 1) it cannot be on anywhere else. 
• Some different predicates cannot be believed concurrently in KBself. For 
example, (clear x) and (on y x) cannot both be believed because if y is 
on x, then x cannot be clear. 
These examples represent constraints within single predicate or among multiple 
predicates. These constraints are normally domain dependent and cannot be resolved 
                                                 
6 We adopt JARE syntax that variables are indicated by symbols prefixed with a ‘?’, and constants are 
represented by symbols or numbers. 
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on a general level. Isozaki names this kind of constraint an incompatibility constraint 
and proposes a formula to represent it between two predicates (or within the same 
predicate) [61]: 
incomp(p(?x), q(?y), term1, term2) 
where term1∈?x and term2∈?y. Incomp means that a ground instance of p(?x) and a 
ground instance of q(?y) are incompatible if they are different and term1 is identical to 
term2. For example, 
incomp((location ?o1 ?x1 ?y1), (location ?o2 ?x2 ?y2), ?o1, ?o2), 
where (?x1≠?x2)∨( ?y1≠?y2), means that if an object is located on one place, it is not 
located on any other place. Another example, 
incomp((clear ?o1), (on ?o2 ?o3), ?o1, ?o3) 
means that if one object is on another object, the latter is not clear. To implement this 
idea, we define a function with the same name incomp(p, q) which will return true if 
two predicate instances p and q are incompatible. 
4.4.2. Inferring Agent Beliefs 
We use a backward-chaining theorem prover called JARE (Java Automated 
Reasoning Engine) [58] to handle belief inference. JARE achieves efficiency by 
avoiding re-computing references (which is used in forward-chaining inference) and by 
a little more restrictive representation (e.g. no templates). Rules in JARE are in Horn 
form which requires that the head of a rule must be a positive literal [102]. A rule is 
made out of one or more predicates (a rule containing a single predicate is often treated 
as a fact). The following is a JARE rule: 
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A∧B→C 
where C, the head, is called conclusion, and A and B, the body, is called antecedent. C 
is derived if both A and B are true. We also say that C is justified by A and B, and {A, 
B, A∧B→C} is a justification for C. Then C depends on A and B. Since A and B could 
be conclusions inferred from other rules, the actually antecedents on which C depends 
could be found by tracing back through A, B, their antecedents, their antecedents, and 
so on. In our implementation, we assume that no rule contains cycles7 and the body is 
made out of positive predicates8. Therefore, rules form a directed acyclic graph where 
nodes are the heads and directed arcs denoting the dependencies. 
KBself is initialized as three parts: 
• Facts, e.g., identities of objects (agent or non-agent), agents’ roles etc.. 
We assume these facts are commonly believed by all agents, and are 
certain truth which won’t be changed over time. 
• Observability rules (self’s and others’) (Fig. 4.3 presents several 
observability rules for the Multi-Agent Wumpus World). 
• rules which describe what are caused by beliefs generated through 
observation. The K axiom of the model of belief says that an agent’s 
belief is closed under deduction [31]. For example, if an agent observes 
                                                 
7 Assumption-based Truth Maintenance Systems (ATMS) is used to solve the problem that rules may 
contain cycles [26]. 
8 Non-monotonic logic is used to model the KB where the body of rule is made out of positive and 
negative predicates [102, 103]. 
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that the switch is on, it believes the light is on though it cannot directly 
observe this. 
The initial KBself is supposed to have no belief about the world or about other 
agents’ beliefs. These beliefs will be generated dynamically during the teamwork 
process, mainly by inferring the observability rules and the causation rules. The order 
of belief inference and the order of belief update by the beliefs derived from the 
inference are important because of the dependencies among the rules. We handle this 
by doing the inference first and then the update. Specifically, after self infers a rule, the 
belief derived from this rule is saved in a temporary place rather than be directly 
asserted to KBself. Then the order of inference does not matter because all rules share 
the same base on which the inference is made. But for clarity, we still make the 
inference in this order – self’s observability rules, others’ observability rules and 
causation rules. After all beliefs are derived (possibly from multiple justifications), 
they will be processed to guarantee that one belief only has one value. Finally, the 
update process starts and these beliefs are asserted to KBself. In next section, we 
introduce the process of the belief inference and the belief update in detail. 
4.4.3. An Overall Belief Maintenance Algorithm 
After a piece of information is inferred from KBself, it may not be asserted to 
KBself immediately, because there may be different values for this information 
generated from multiple sources and these values may contradict one another. Five 
sources generate such values: 1) self’s observation, i.e., belief derived from self’s 
observability rules; 2) others’ observation, i.e. belief derived from others’ observability 
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rules; 3) causation, i.e. belief derived from causation rules; 4) effects, i.e., conjuncts 
inferred from the effect of the action self performs; and 5) communication, i.e., 
messages other agents send to self by communication9. 
In any situation in which belief is acquired from multiple sources, conflicts may 
arise – in terms of inconsistency or incompatibility. For example, observation may 
produce p and causation may produce ¬p but we cannot omit either of them. A strategy 
is needed that prescribes how to maintain KBself in this case. Castelfranchi proposes 
that such a strategy should prescribe that more credible information should always be 
favored over less credible information [16]. Ioerger introduces multiple justification 
types for beliefs and places them in a preference ordering according to strength [60]. 
To define a strategy conforming to these ideas, we assume that each belief is associated 
with a priority that decreases in the order shown in Table 4.110. 
 
Table 4.1. Belief Strengths. 
Source Priority 
Self’s observation 5 
Others’ observation 4 
Effects 3 
Causation 2 
Communication 1 
 
                                                 
9 Effects and communication are not defined as rules in KBself. This is because that effects and 
communication may contain negative predicates but JARE does not allow the head of a rule to be 
negative. Though we can improve this by renaming ¬p/¬p(X) to notP/notP(X) and maintain the truth 
value of the pair, it would be highly inefficient. So effects and communication come from external 
sources but not from KBself. 
10 Belief persistence is handled separately in belief update session in order to maintain belief consistency 
and compatibility (see Section 4.4.6). 
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The rationale for this order is as follows11. An agent always believes what it senses and 
what other agents sense because we assume “seeing is believing”. The belief about 
effects of actions the agent performs is secondarily reliable by assuming the agent 
cannot deny the actions performed by itself. Last, the beliefs caused by observations 
override what the agent hears by assuming the agent trusts its own inference more than 
what others tell it. The truth value of a belief is always supported by the rule with the 
highest priority and whose antecedent is satisfied. 
One thing worth of mention is that there may be multiple equally preferred 
rules with the same strength. For example, an observable item could have multiple 
justifications from observation. In our implementation, the preference depends on the 
order in which the rules are applied, i.e. the newly generated value will override the old 
one, implying that the last rule has the highest priority. 
An algorithm for overall belief maintenance along with the observation process 
is shown in Fig. 4.4. It is executed independently by each agent, self, after the 
completion of each step in which self is involved, i.e., upon completion of an action. 
During an update cycle, self will sequentially perform: 
• At time t-1, self performed action. 
• Immediately after completion of the action at time t-1, self will do 
updateWorld by its last action. Basically, the environment simulation 
updates the environment KB after the action by self. 
                                                 
11 This is the order fitting our system and assumptions. Different orders may be applied for different 
problems. In our system, we never directly obtain a value from inference of others’ observation, because 
we only know that they can sense an item, not the value they sense.  However, in a more general setting 
this source of information may be possible; hence, we included it for completeness. 
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• Because self can infer the effect of its own action, it will keep the effect 
and the credit of the effect in a temporary location called infoList. Since 
there may be multiple conjunct inferred, each will be indexed in 
infoList. 
• Self will do observation and reason causation, keeping results and 
credits in infoList. 
• Self will check messages, keeping results and credits in infoList. 
• Then, for each piece of information in infoList, self will choose a value 
with the highest credit and do two things: 1) update its KB by this value, 
and 2) communicating this value, if so decided (this is not shown in Fig. 
4.4). 
• Loop back to next action. 
This algorithm maintains belief consistency by the fact that, when there might 
be conflict assertions, only the one with the highest credit will be asserted to KBself. 
The updateWorld function is simply a call to the environment telling it to 
update itself in accordance with the parameters provided. ReasonSelfObs infers self’s 
observability rules. ReasonSefBel infers self’s beliefs about others’ observabilities. The 
method update is a low level procedure for updating KBself. The next three sections 
describe the latter three functions in turn. 
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/* The algorithm is executed independently by each agent after the 
completion of each step in which the agent is involved, i.e., upon 
completion of an action. An action may just be a no-op (e.g., if the 
agent is waiting for a precondition to be true). 
The executing agent is denoted self.  
    Below, 
let KBself denote the knowledge base for the agent self. 
let KBenv denote objective truths about the environment. 
*/ 
updateKB(self, action, KBself){ 
infoList=null; 
 
updateWorld(self, action);         //notify the environment to update KBenv 
 
{par 
∀ I in the effect of action 
infoList ← (I, 3);            //the credit of effect is 3 
 
infoList ← reasonSelfObs(self, KBself); 
infoList ← reasonSelfBel(self, KBself); 
∀ I derived from causation rules 
infoList ← (I, 2); 
 
∀ coming message about I 
infoList ← (I, 1); 
}//end of par 
 
∀I∈ infoList 
let info be the value for I with the highest credit; 
update(KBself, info); 
} 
 
Fig. 4.4. An Overall Belief Maintenance Algorithm. 
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4.4.4. ReasonSelfObs: Reasoning Beliefs about Agent’s Own Observability 
The algorithm for inferring what an agent has observed, according to its 
observability rules, is given in Fig. 4.5. This algorithm builds beliefs in KBself by 
checking two things. 
 
reasonSelfObs(self, KBself){ 
list=null; 
 
∀ rule ∈ KBself of the form (CanSense self (property-name object args) 
cond) 
if KBenv |= cond 
if KBenv |= (property-name object args) 
list←((property-name object args), 3); 
else  
list←(¬(property-name object args), 3); 
 
∀ rule ∈ KBself of the form (CanSense self (DO doer (action-name args)) 
cond) 
 if KBenv |= cond 
if KBenv |= (DO doer (action-name args)) 
list←((action-name doer args), 3); 
else  
list←(¬(action-name doer args), 3); 
 
return list; 
} 
 
Fig. 4.5. An Algorithm of Reasoning Agent’s Observability. 
 
When evaluating observability of a property, (CanSense self (property-name 
object args) cond), self checks if KBenv entails cond. If so, and if this property holds in 
the environment, self adds (prop-name object args) and its credit to inforList. If the 
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property does not hold in the environment, self adds ¬(property-name object args) and 
its credit to infoList. 
In the case of (CanSense self (DO doer (action-name args)) cond) where 
doer≠self, self checks if KBenv entails cond as well. If so and if this action holds in the 
environment, self adds (action-name doer args) and its credit to inforList. If the action 
does not hold in the environment, self adds ¬(action-name doer args) and its credit to 
infoList. 
4.4.5. ReasonSelfBel: Reasoning Beliefs about Others’ Observabilities 
Fig. 4.6 introduces an algorithm for inferring what an agent can determine 
about what other agents can sense. The algorithm records which agents are believed to 
sense what. We still consider two cases. 
In the case of (B self (CanSense Agd (property-name object args)) cond), if 
KBself entails cond, self believes Agd senses the property and adds this belief and its 
credit to infoList. If KBself does not entail <cond>, self believes Agd does not sense the 
property and adds this belief and its credit to infoList. 
In the case of (B self (CanSense Agd (DO doer (action-name args))) cond), 
cond is evaluated with respect to KBself and self will update infoList in the similar way. 
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reasonSelfBel(self, KBself){ 
list = null; 
 
∀ rule ∈ KBself of the form (B self (CanSense Agd (property-name object 
args) cond)) 
if KBself |= cond 
list←((Sense Agd (property-name object args)), 3); 
  else 
list←¬(Sense Agd (property-name object args)); 
 
∀ rule ∈ KBself of the form (B self (CanSense Agd (DO doer (action-name 
args)) cond))  
if KBself |= cond 
list←((Sense Agd (action-name doer args)), 3); 
  else 
 list←(¬(Sense Agd (action-name doer args)), 3); 
 
return list; 
} 
 
Fig. 4.6. An Algorithm of Reasoning Others’ Observabilities. 
 
4.4.6. Update: Maintaining Belief Consistency and Compatibility 
When new information is to be asserted to KBself, it may inconsistent or 
incompatible with old ones. The function update, shown in Fig. 4.7, manages history 
and is responsible maintaining for consistent and compatible beliefs in KBself. The 
obvious assumption of this algorithm is that what is not changed during update is 
assumed to stay the same, i.e. persistence. Since the number of time steps could be 
infinite, self keeps only current beliefs in KBself, except that the most recent one is kept, 
even if it is not generated currently. Therefore self still believes some information, 
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even though self does not infer it from KBself or infer it from last action or being told it 
by others. 
Belief consistency and compatibility are maintained from two perspectives. If 
the assertion is a positive literal, it will be asserted to KBself if it is not already there; 
implying that the negated literal derived from the Closed World Assumption would be 
overridden by the addition of positive literal. Also all information which is 
incompatible with the assertion is retracted. If the assertion is a negative literal, the 
positive literal (if any) will be retracted from KBself. 
 
update(KBself, info){ 
if info is a positive literal p 
if KBself |= p 
assert(KBself, p); 
∀q ∋ incomp(p, q) 
retract(KBself, q); 
else //info is a negative literal ¬p 
if KBself |= p 
retract(KBself, p); 
∀q ∋ incomp(¬p, q) 
retract(KBself, q); 
} 
  
Fig. 4.7. A Belief Update Algorithm. 
 
4.5. OBPC: Observation-Based Proactive Communication 
The information worth exchanging comes from analysis of agents’ goals (e.g. 
preconditions of plans or actions that the agents are going to perform). If they do not 
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know a precondition, they cannot act. Therefore telling them proactively or they 
actively asking for it improves efficiency. 
Proactive Communication answers the following questions pertinent to agent 
proactivity during teamwork. First, when does an agent send the information to its 
teammates if it has a new piece of information (either from performing an action or 
observing)? A simple solution could be sending the information when requested. That 
is, the agent would only send the information after it has received a request from 
another agent. In our approach, the agent observes its teammates and commits to 
proactive tell once it realizes that one of the teammates needs the information to fulfill 
its goal and does not have it now. Meanwhile, if the agent needs some information, it 
does not passively wait for someone else to tell it; it asks for this information actively.  
Second, what information is sent in a session of information exchange? There 
are three kinds of information that can be communicated. One is the information 
explicitly needed by an agent to complete a given plan, i.e., conjuncts in a precondition 
of plans or actions that the agent is going to perform. The second is the information 
implicitly needed by the agent. For example, if agent a needs predicate p and knows p 
can be deduced from predicate q, even if the providing agent does not know p, it still 
can tell agent a about q once it has q, because it knows that agent a can deduce p from 
q. The third includes the information for synchronization among team members 
performing actions and joint actions. This research, however, deals only with agents 
communicating information that is explicitly needed. 
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We developed two observation-based communication protocols: O-Tell and O-
Ask. These protocols are used by each agent to decide whether to generate inter-agent 
communication when information exchange is desirable. The O-Tell and O-Ask 
protocols are based three types of knowledge. 
The first is information needers and providers. In order to find a list of agents 
who might know or need some information, we use information flow developed by 
DIARG [137]. DIARG infers the potential information needs by reasoning about the 
goals of the other agents based on the team plan used by the agents. To be specific, it 
analyzes the preconditions and effects of actions and plans and generates information 
flow which is a list of needers and a list of providers for every piece of information. An 
agent is a provider for the effects of any action/plan it is capable of performing. An 
agent is a needer for the precondition of any action/plan it needs to execute.  
The second is beliefs generated after observation. Agents take advantage of 
these beliefs to track other team members’ mental states and use beliefs of what can be 
observed to reduce the volume of communication. For example, if the provider 
believes that the needer senses I, the provider will not tell the needer; if the needer 
believes that a specific provider has I by observing the action performed by the 
provider, the needer will ask this provider, rather than ask all of them. 
The third is beliefs inferred from the effect of the action performed by the 
agent. The agent will tell these beliefs to the needer if it believes that the needer does 
not sense them. 
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Algorithms for deciding when and with whom to communicate for O-Ask and 
O-Tell are shown in Fig. 4.8. 
Considering the intractability of general belief reasoning [47], our algorithm 
deals with beliefs nested no more than one layer. Also the algorithm involves only two 
parts, i.e., sender and receiver. It does not consider the third party communication such 
as agent a asks b to ask c for some information. Therefore, the belief about if another 
agent senses an action executed by a third agent is not included. The algorithm is 
sufficient, thought, for our current study on proactive behaviors of agents, which 
focuses on peer-to-peer proactive communication among agents.  
 
 
/*O-Ask will be independently executed by each agent (self) when it needs the 
    value of information I. 
*/ 
O-Ask(self, I, KBself){ 
     if KBself |=I 
if ∃ Agp≠self, φ∈action ∋ (KBself |=(φ Agp args))∧(I∈ Prec(φ)∨I∈Efft(φ))
                        ask Agp for I; 
            else randomly select a provider 
            ask the provider for I; 
} 
 
/* Independently executed by each agent (self), after it observes I or produced I  
    as effect of an action. 
*/ 
O-Tell(self, I, KBself){ 
     ∀Agn ∈ needers 
             if KBself |= (Sense Agn I) 
                       tell Agn I; 
} 
 
Fig. 4.8. Observation-Based Proactive Communication. 
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For O-Ask, the needer requests the information from a provider who may know 
it. This provider may be explicitly determinable if its action that determines I is 
observed by the needer. If such agent cannot be found, the needer randomly chooses a 
provider from the provider list and asks the provider for I. 
For O-Tell, the provider tells the agents who need I. The needer(s) is(are) 
determined from the information flow. The provider’s beliefs about the needer’s 
sensing capabilities become the basis for this reasoning. The provider will tell I to the 
needer only if the provider does not believe the needer can sense I. The implication 
here is that communication will not go to the needer whom the provider believes can 
sense I. By this means, the communication load can be reduced by an agent’s belief 
about another agent. 
4.6. Summary 
This section has presented an approach to dealing with agent observability for 
improving performance and reducing inter-agent communication. Each OP-CAST 
agent is allowed to have some observability to sense the environment, and to watch 
what others are doing inside its detection range. Based on the observation, the agent 
updates its knowledge base and infers what others may sense at the current time. 
Reasoning about what others can sense allows agents to decide whether to distribute 
information to others. We have proposed a proactive communication mechanism to 
confer some advantage to related team members for realizing team interaction and 
cooperation proactively also. 
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CHAPTER V 
DYNAMIC INFORMATION PREDICTION 
5.1. Motivation and Overview 
To decide a communication policy (such as O-Ask or O-Tell), OBPC adopts the 
same method as the original CAST approach. It requires a domain expert to publish 
frequencies associated with information production or information need, and defines 
inflexible decision-making rules. Thus information with some specific frequency will 
be O-Telled and others will be O-Asked (see Section 4.5). Moreover, it only looks at 
the general frequency, i.e., for a piece of information, in spite of how many agents 
produce it or need it, there is only one frequency related to the information production 
or the information need. Obviously, this method is too rigid to handle dynamic and 
complex situations. 
We develop a more general way, called Dynamic Information Prediction (DIP), 
to deal with frequencies of information production or information need. For a piece of 
information, we take each needer and provider into account separately, and predict time 
points at which production or need occurs. Rather than relying on a domain expert to 
input such knowledge, DIP anticipates distributions of information production or need 
dynamically, by utilizing previous data about information production or need. 
We assume the time intervals for the production or need for a piece of 
information are random according to some unknown distributions. We also assume 
needers and providers keep a record of their own information production or need time 
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intervals. By acquiring history from others, the needer can estimate the distribution of 
time intervals during which an item of information will be produced by a given 
provider. Similarly, the provider can estimate the distribution of time intervals during 
which an item of information will be needed by a given needer. Agents make such 
estimations dynamically, by analyzing the trail of the list of time intervals. 
There are two statistical approaches to describe a probability distribution: 
parametric and non-parametric. The parametric approach utilizes a certain formula to 
model the probabilities. In some domains, obtaining an accurate model of a distribution 
requires complex knowledge acquisition from domain experts, or a complex learning 
process on the part of the agent. Hence, from a practical point of view, the parametric 
approach may be too complicated to support efficient online inference. Alternatively, 
the non-parametric approach does not require knowledge of how the probabilities are 
distributed. It assumes that the sampling distribution of collected data is analogous to 
the population distribution. This feature allows the Empirical Distribution Function 
(EDF) [15] to be used to approximate the distributions of information production and 
need. 
To sum up, the idea of DIP is to gather previous data on information production 
or information need opportunistically and use EDF to approximate their distributions. 
The following sections first introduce our rationale of choosing EDF, and then the 
mechanism of EDF, and considerations which make DIP applicable. 
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5.2. Considcertations of Statistical Models 
To predict the time at which an agent produces or needs a piece of information, 
we need to model the time interval X between the time at which the agent last produced 
or needed the information and the time at which the agent will produce or need the 
information next. In our framework, X is measured as the number of steps taken by the 
agent, and therefore is a discrete variable. 
Modeling this probability distribution brings a challenge. In principle, this 
distribution can be arbitrarily complex, and its structure may vary enormously from 
domain to domain, and even from information to information within the same domain. 
We first need to decide which approach, parametric or non-parametric, is more suitable 
to our problems and assumptions. 
Choosing an appropriate statistical model always depends on the assumptions 
we make about the variables and the objectives we wish to achieve. Some source 
distinguishes parametric and nonparametric on the basis that parametric make specific 
assumptions with regard to one or more of the population parameters that characterize 
the underlying distributions for which the test is employed, while nonparametric makes 
no such assumptions about population parameters [110]. 
Although we may approximate the discrete time variable using a continuous 
distribution, we restrict our discussion to discrete distributions here. Our problem is to 
model the time interval. Among commonly used discrete distributions, it is difficult to 
find one which fits into our problem directly. For instance, the Poisson distribution is 
often applied to counting the number of events in a certain time period, but not the time 
 93
interval itself. It also requires that the mean of the distribution equals the variance, 
which discourages the uses of Poisson distribution under many practical settings [98]. 
Although more complicated models may exist to approximate the distribution of a time 
interval, we want a direct approach, given the main objective of our study. 
An alternative non-parametric approach may accommodate a weaker 
assumption on how the random variable X is distributed.  By using a non-parametric 
approach, we do not need to restrict the data to a specific family of distribution, but 
assume the sampling distribution of collected data to be analogous to the population 
distribution.  For example, for an unknown distribution of P(X), if we have no other 
information, the entire sample will be the best estimate of the population as long as the 
current samples are randomly generated from P(X) [15].  
In our problem, we do not know much about X’s distribution and cannot make 
any distributional assumptions based on the current knowledge. Hence a non-
parametric approach can be applied, where we use the current sample set to 
approximate the true distribution. We propose to use the EDF [15] of X to approximate 
X’s distribution. The only assumption we make is that the sampling distribution of 
collected data is analogous to the population distribution. 
5.3. Empirical Distribution Function 
As will be shown in Chapter VI, given models of the information produced or 
needed that the agents experience during teamwork, the problem of information 
prediction is to determine the probabilities that an agent produces or needs an 
information item at a certain time point, or more precisely, the probability of such 
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production or need before that time. This corresponds to the cumulative probability that 
the information is produced or needed at certain time, Pr(X ≤ tj-tj-1), where tj is the 
certain time point and tj-1 is the last production or need time which is known. However, 
as will be seen in Chapter VI, under some circumstances tj is known and in others it is 
not. In the former case, the cumulative probability may be calculated directly. In the 
latter, one simple approach is to calculate the expected value of tj as an intermediate 
step. Then, the cumulative probability can be estimated from the expected value, Pr(X 
≤ E(X)), where E(X) is the expected value of X= tj – tj-1. However, Pr(X ≤ E(X)) is just 
a simple approximation to Pr(X ≤ tj - tj-1). A more accurate approach is to utilize the 
law of total probability, which is described by the formula as follow: 
Pr(X ≤ tj−tj-1) 
=∑∞= −1jtτ Pr(X≤tj−tj-1 | tj =τ)×Pr(tj=τ). 
This is the approach we take to calculate Pr(X ≤ tj−tj-1) when tj is unknown (refer to 
Appendix A for calculation details). In this section, we focus on how to determine the 
underlying distributions for X. 
Let {X1, …, Xk} be a collected sample, then the Cumulative Density Function 
(CDF) of X is estimated by [24]: 
CDF(X) = 
k
k}i1 ,XX:X{# ii ≤≤≤ , 
and Probability Mass Function (PMF) of X is estimated by [24]: 
PMF(X) = 
k
k}i1 ,XX:X{# ii ≤≤= . 
 95
For example, suppose there are 10 (then k = 10) sample data {20, 30, 24, 33, 
24, 40, 33, 30, 33, 24}, among which the number of 20 is 1, the number of 24 is 3, the 
number of 30 is 2, the number of 33 is 3 and the number of 40 is 1. Then CDF(24) = 
10
31+  = 40% and PMF(24) = 
10
3  = 30%. Fig. 5.1 shows CDF(X) and PMF(X). In our 
use of these formulae, they will be updated from time to time (described in Section 6.9) 
as additional data samples become available. Thus, we expect the distributions to 
become more accurate over the time in which they are used. 
Note that there are many value of X such that PMF()=0 in this example. This 
effect occurs because of a small sample size. One can deal with this situation in a 
couple of different ways. First, one might apply a smoothing function to the 
distribution and then use the smoothing function to estimate the probability for a given 
value of X. For example, the method called cubic spline uses a series of unique third 
degree polynomials to fit between sets of m points, m≥2, of the whole data points, with 
the constraints that the curve obtained is continuous and appears smooth [3]. 
Alternatively, one could simply use the discrete CDF and PMF produced by the 
equations above. The latter becomes increasing accurate as the number of samples 
increases. Whether one uses a smoothing function or not is irrelevant to the research 
discussed here. We simply use the fact that approximating CDF’s and PMF’s can be 
calculated from time to time as increasing history is accumulated. For simplicity, in our 
experiments, we just use the raw CDF and PMF produced.  
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Fig. 5.1. An Example of Using EDF. 
 
Based on the EDF, we can estimate the probability of the information 
production at a certain time tp and the probability of the information need at a certain 
time tn. For each of these, this approach can be formulated as: 
1. Initially collect a small amount of data x1, ..., xk. 
2. Calculate CDF(X). 
 97
3. When an additional value of X is collected and added to the data pool, 
CDF(X) will be adjusted when this process goes on. 
When this process is iterated for many times, the collected data will be closer to "true" 
(or population) distribution and the prediction will be more accurate12. 
Ultimately, the probability distributions computed by EDF will be used to 
calculate utility when some time parameters in the utility function are unknown (the 
utility is introduced in Section 6.4). 
5.4. Data Acquisition 
Applying EDF raises three questions: 1) What kind of previous data do agents 
want to gather and how to initialize the system? 2) How does the agent acquire 
previous data? 3) By which format the previous data will be conveyed? 
5.4.1. Source of History and System Initialization 
Agents can gather previous data on information production- and need-time 
intervals in various ways. They can use the data provided by domain experts, or 
historical data collected dynamically during the execution of a plan. Agents must 
expend extra effort, thus acquiring knowledge from the domain experts, to obtain the 
data by the first way. These efforts limit the system’s dynamic capabilities; therefore, 
we use the historical data, which can be gathered dynamically during the teamwork 
process. 
                                                 
12 A famous application of this theory in statistics is so called bootstrapping method, which makes 
statistical inference based on the re-sampling of current sample set [93]. 
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However, there may be a problem when using EDF at the beginning of 
teamwork, because agents have no sample data. One way of dealing with this problem 
might be to generate random numbers to initialize these times. However, this solution 
lacks regularity, so it may be impractical. Another way might be to develop a rule to 
guide agents at the beginning. For example, the rule could be that the provider and 
needer are obligated to communicate with each other and attach their historical data at 
the first several rounds of production and need rather than using DIP to predict needs 
and productions. However, this solution lacks flexibility and may create many 
messages which against the major goal of Proactive Communication. 
The solution we adopt is to run the system in a trial mode. We will collect data 
from previous test runs and use these data to initialize time intervals. By this way, 
agents are able to predict time points of productions or needs since the system starts. 
Gradually the initialized data will be extended and the prediction will be based mostly 
on the data from actual run. 
5.4.2. Acquisition of History 
Under the approach taken here, agents need to have a history of the production- 
or need- time intervals of others, so they can estimate distributions of the production or 
need. This raises the question of how to obtain these time intervals. Empirical data 
[134] show that the cost of a message may be approximated by C+K*size, where C is a 
base cost of sending a message, size is the message size in bytes, and K is a parameter 
which adjusts the effect of the message size to the message cost. Typically C is much 
larger than K and the cost for a small amount of additional information is almost 
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negligible, allowing the agents to attach historical information on their production- or 
need-time intervals to each message sent to the receiver. This suggests that the 
historical data can be sent opportunistically along with the information exchanged 
between providers and needers. We propose that needers attach a history of 
information need time intervals to every message they send; similarly, that providers 
attach a history of information production time intervals to every message they send. 
Agents certainly will not attach the whole history to every ask or tell message. They 
only attach time intervals from the last sent to the receiver to the latest one. These 
historical data will allow them to approximate the probability of a piece of information 
being needed or produced at certain time point by a specific needer or provider. 
5.4.3. Message Format to Convey History 
The message format is based on Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language 
(KQML) [37]. The syntax of KQML is based on a balanced parenthesis list. The initial 
element of the list is the performative and the remaining elements are the 
performative’s arguments including message content, sender, receiver, and historical 
data of information production or need. An example message ProactiveTelled about a 
wumpus w1’s location from the carrier Ca to the fighter F1 looks like this: 
((performative ProactiveTell) 
(message (location w1 27 58)) 
(sender Ca) 
(receiver F1) 
(data (27 38 40 33 47 39))) 
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The last pair in the example list contains lengths of time intervals of producing 
wumpus’ location information from the last one sent to the fighter to the most recently 
generated one. The sender maintains records of the last sent data regarding each of the  
receivers. The receiver will update its data list after receiving a new message. 
5.5. Important Issues 
Two issues require consideration to make DIP complete. In the following, we 
analyze them and propose some possible solutions. In Section 7.2.4, we investigate 
them further and apply some specific algorithms to experiments. 
5.5.1. Preventing the Provider from Having History Starvation 
During the teamwork process, it is possible that the provider may cease to 
receive need history updates, which occurs when the needer stops asking for the 
information. This case results from the essence of proactivity — agents always assist 
each other proactively, rather than passively waiting to be asked. For example, when 
proactivity is fully enabled, the needer may increasingly depend upon receiving 
information from proactive tells and the number of ask messages gradually decrease to 
zero, in which case the provider would receive no new historical data on need times. 
However, the EDF approach depends on the sample data to increase the accuracy of the 
approximation. If the provider ceases to receive historical data, the CDF and PMF will 
not be adjusted. In order to ensure that the EDF mechanism continues to function, we 
set a time threshold for the provider and for the needer. If neither hears from the other 
within the threshold, it must communicate with the other and attach its historical data. 
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5.5.2. Preventing Communication Deadlock 
Deadlock will result if both needer and provider wait indefinitely for 
communication from the other. Since when needing or producing an information item, 
an agent may either contact the other or wait for the other to contact it (see Section 6.2 
for detail), there is a possibility that they both decide to wait. In investigating this case, 
we found it similar to the history starvation case; thus, if agents do not get any 
information from others in a long time, we adopt the same approach of using a time 
threshold to prevent deadlock. 
5.6. Summary 
In DIP approach, agents are able to utilize previous data about information 
production and need. In order to provide CDF and PMF necessary for estimating the 
values of the utility function, we suggest transmitting data on the times of information 
production or need along with any messages that are sent among agents, and then using 
EDF methods to approximate CDF and PMF. The distributions calculated can help 
agents make better communication decisions in two ways: first, agents can proactively 
tell information to agents if they expect another agent to need it in the near future, 
thereby reducing the number of asks; second, agents can ask for needed information 
actively from specific providers if they do not expect a proactive tell in the near future. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DECISION-THEORETIC PROACTIVE COMMUNICATION 
6.1. Motivation and Overview 
As one has seen, for generating Proactive Communication, the relevance of 
information to another agent can be inferred by reasoning about plans and actions of 
the other agent. Specifically, preconditions of these plans and actions constitute the 
information relevant to the other agent, which is needed by the agent in order to 
execute its plans and actions. 
However determination of relevance is only one part of the requirement of 
Proactive Communication. The other part is to decide whether or not to proactively tell 
or actively ask for the information. Making communication decisions is difficult in that 
agents have different knowledge, and there are always unknown things existing on the 
needer’s and the provider’s sides. We develop agents’ communication decision-making 
based on estimation of the probability distribution introduced in last section Dynamic 
Information Prediction. The purpose of predicting information production or need time 
is to help agents decide whether or not to send messages to active needers or providers, 
rather than always sending to them. An agent becomes active when it is selected to 
participate in executing a team plan. However, in order to know which agents are 
active, the original CAST sends a significant number of extraneous messages to 
maintain the shared mental model, where agents share execution states of teamwork 
processes [11]. And, when there are multiple active providers, a needer will repeatedly 
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ask them until it gets a reply [137]. The drawback is that the needer must wait for a 
reply if the one being asked does not have the information at that moment. Also, even 
if another provider has told the needer proactively (after the ask), the one asked still 
needs to reply when it has the information, since it doesn’t know about the proactive 
tell. Hence the communication either takes longer or there is too much of it. Moreover, 
the original approach obeys a rigid rule, which says that information, which is needed 
more frequently than being produced, must be told proactively; otherwise it must be 
asked for actively. This rule explicitly states two policies, proactive tell and active ask, 
the original approach uses. It also implies a policy wait, i.e., for some information, 
agents have to wait until asked or told. However, information should not be 
communicated in such a strict way, and more options are desired to match reality. 
Additionally, communication involves more complex issues not covered in the 
original CAST approach. First, communication can be valuable if it assists agents with 
timely and the newest information; it also carries communication cost and risks such as 
those in a hostile environment. Not modeling this value, cost and risk will limit our 
application on most practical systems. Hence, communication should be subjected to 
careful cost-risk-value analysis. Second, since an agent is a member of the team and it 
will accomplish the plans with other team members, its utility depends not just on its 
own communication decision, but also on the decision of its teammates. To reconcile 
decision interactions in the team, an agent should have a method of estimating others’ 
decisions and considering how these decisions impact its own. Third, information 
changes dynamically in the environment, and the degree of use of the information may 
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be different too. For some information, agents must consume all changes (e.g., new 
enemy target identified), while for other information agents do not necessarily have to 
process each change (e.g., current location of friendly aircraft). Agents need to check 
every production of the first type information, while the check to the second type 
information depends on agents’ needs. A more comprehensive solution must be 
developed to deal with different types of information. 
In a word, a better communication solution is desired to reduce unnecessary 
messages between needers and providers, and to make decisions under uncertainty 
according to cost, risk and value of information the communication convey. 
We propose Decision-Theoretic Proactive Communication (DTPC), by which 
agents communicate in an optimal way using a decision-theoretic approach. The 
decision-theoretic approach concentrates on identifying the “optimal” policy [93], 
where the notion of “optimal” has a number of different meanings, the most common 
of which is “that which maximizes the utility,” in this case, of communication. We 
incorporated cost, risk and value into the decision-making and expand a set of policies 
that needer and provider will use. The decision-making generally involves computing 
the cost, risk and value of each policy, and choosing the one with maximum utility. 
Moreover, since communication involves needer and provider, and they keep 
interacting with each other during the teamwork process, their decisions may be 
interdependent. When making decisions, it is necessary for them to take the decisions 
of their counterparts into account and communicate in a way benefiting the team. These 
features are bases of DTPC. 
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By DTPC, agents are equipped with a set of communication policies from 
which they must choose when making decisions. To quantify agents’ decisions, we 
have developed a generic utility function that focuses on representing the information 
production and need of team members. After evaluating the utility of each policy, 
agents will identify the optimal policy, which maximizes the utility of communication. 
Two difficulties exist in agents’ decision-making. First, agents cannot compute 
exact values of the utility since some parameters cannot be known precisely. Hence, 
they calculate the utility function by using estimated values of these parameters. 
Second, agents’ decision-making is interdependent, so when evaluating a policy, agents 
must consider their counterparts’ decisions, which also need to be estimated. 
The following sections first define policies and time points for different 
situations of decision-making, followed by introductions to a generic utility function 
and multi-agent communication processes and finally a set of algorithms which handle 
the communication processes. 
6.2. Policies and Time Points 
We made the following assumptions about information production and need. 
• The time interval from one production of information I to the next is a 
discrete random variable. 
• A needer does not generate a new need for I until after the previous need 
has been satisfied. 
• The time at which a need occurs is the time at which the transition from 
no need for I to a point of time where there is such a need is made. 
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• The needs will be continued in the time interval through which the 
needer waits for a value to be obtained either by observation or being 
told by the provider. 
• If there is a need and a newly produced value is received, the value is 
immediately used. 
• Once a value for I is used by a needer, it may not be reused. 
• The time interval from the satisfaction of one need to the occurrence of 
the next need for I is a discrete random variable. 
The provider will face two situations when making decisions. In situation PA, it 
produces a new piece of information. In situation PB, it receives a request for a piece of 
information. The needer also has two situations to consider. In situation NA, it needs a 
piece of information. In situation NB, it receives a piece of information, which may be 
either a reply from the provider whom it has actively asked or a proactive tell from the 
provider. 
In order to make their communication decisions at each situation, agents need 
to consider the relationship between the time at which information is needed and the 
time at which it is produced. The various policies involve using the information 
produced at different times or satisfying needs at different times. Thus, to describe the 
range of possibilities encompassed by the different communication policies adequately, 
several different points in time must be defined. For clarity, we define sets of policies 
and sets of relevant points in time, for the needer and for the provider in different 
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situations. Any time an agent makes a decision, we assume it only chooses one policy 
and acts accordingly. 
For clarity, we assume the system consists of two agents. This is agent a, a 
provider, and agent b, a needer. 
6.2.1. Situation PA: Provider Produces a Value for I 
Fig. 6.1 shows situation PA. Let 0,PaT  be the time at which agent a produces a 
value for I; we consider this to be the current time. Also let { 1,PaT , 
2
,PaT , …} denote the 
(ordered) set of times at which agent a will produce I in the future, which are unknown 
at the current time. There is additional information available to the provider. The 
provider knows the times of each of the values it has produced and which of these were 
sent to the needer. Let lsPaT ,  be the time of the last value for I the provider sent to the 
needer. Let NbT ,  be the time of a need after 
ls
PaT , , which is (probably) unknown to the 
provider, too. It is possible, though, that some of the values for I the provider sent were 
unused. It is also possible that, in the time interval ( lsPaT , , 
0
,PaT ], the provider produced 
one or more value for I and did not send them to the needer. If there are any such 
values, let nsPaT ,  be the largest time at which the provider generated a value for I that it 
did not send. The ordering constraints of these time points are as follows: 
ls
PaT , <
ns
PaT , <
0
,PaT <
1
,PaT <
2
,PaT <…, 
ls
PaT , < NbT , . 
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For these time points unknown, as illustrated in Fig. 6.1, NbT ,  could be any time 
point after lsPaT ,  and 
1
,PaT  could be any time point after 
0
,PaT . 
These time points will be used in utility function. To deal with the uncertainty 
brought by the unknown time points, we take advantage of two kinds of knowledge. 
First we know their low bound. For example, 1,PaT  must be greater than 
0
,PaT  and NbT ,  
must be greater than lsPaT , . Second, we can approximate their distributions by EDF 
approach. By this way, we can deal with uncertainty. 
 
Need time 
°
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Current 
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PaT ,
NbT ,
0
,PaT
1
,PaT
Next production 
time 
Known nsPaT ,
Last not 
send time
 
 
 
Agent a has two policies to choose on this situation: 
ProactiveTell: The agent proactively provides I; 
Silence: The agent does not provide I. 
Fig. 6.1. Situation PA: Provider Produces I. 
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Agent a will either ProactiveTell the value just produced at 0,PaT  to agent b or 
keep Silence. The difficulty of decision-making is that agent a may not know the exact 
time when the needer’s need arises, i.e. NbT , . Therefore, if agent a decides to 
ProactiveTell the just-produced value for I, then the value provided may not be the 
most current because new values may have been produced by the time agent b really 
needs I. However, if agent a decides to keep Silence, agent b may be unable to get the 
information in time if a need was already raised. Therefore, timeliness and currency13of 
the information provided should be a major consideration of decision-making. 
6.2.2. Situation PB: Provider Receives a Request about I 
Situation PB is shown in Fig. 6.2. Let Tb,q be the time at which agent b requests 
I; we consider this to be the current time. Let 0,
q
PaT  be the latest production time, before 
the request time Tb,q, and let 1,
q
PaT  be the next production time, which is unknown, 
following the request time Tb,q. Obviously, the order of these time points is: 
0
,
q
PaT  ≤ Tb,q<
1
,
q
PaT . 
                                                 
13 While timeliness and currency sound somewhat similar, there is a distinct difference.  Timeliness 
refers to the delay between a need arising and the need being fulfilled, while currency refers to whether 
one is using current or old information. 
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Agent a has two policies to choose on this situation: 
Reply: The agent provides most recent value for I; 
WaitUntilNext: The agent waits until next production of I and then 
provides I; 
Agent a will either Reply the value last produced at 0,
q
PaT , or WaitUntilNext 
production time 1,
q
PaT  and reply the value produced at 
1
,
q
PaT . The major consideration is 
still the timeliness and the currency of information provided. The last produced value is 
timely but may lost currency if a new value will be produced soon, while the new value 
may not be timely. Again, the utility function should address these issues. 
Fig. 6.2.  Situation PB: Provider Receives a Request about I. 
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6.2.3. Situation NA: Needer Has a Request about I Arise 
Situation NA is shown in Fig. 6.3. Let 0, NbT  be the time at which agent b’s most 
recent need for I arises; we consider this to be the current time. Let 0,
a
PaT  be the time at 
which agent a most recently produced I and 1,
a
PaT  be the time at which agent a produces 
I next. Let Tb,r be the time at which agent b most recently received a value for I from 
agent a. The relationships among these points are as followings: 
Tb,r≤ 0,aPaT ≤ 0, NbT < 1,aPaT . 
Agent a 
Agent b Unknown 
t 
Production time 
b last received 
Most recent 
production time 
ActiveAsk? 
Wait? 
Silence? 
Current 
time 
Known 0,NbTrbT ,
0
,
a
PaT
1
,
a
PaT
Next production 
time 
 
 
 
Agent b has three policies to choose on this situation: 
Silence: The agent does not ask for I and uses the most recent value it 
has; 
Fig. 6.3. Situation NA: Needer Has a Request about I Arise. 
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ActiveAsk: The agent actively asks for I; 
Wait: The agent waits to be told I proactively. 
If agent b ActiveAsks for the information, the information it uses is always the 
most recent. But this process costs more messages and brings high risk. If the needer 
Waits, it cannot get the timely information. If the needer keeps Silence, i.e., it uses the 
value last received at time Tb,r, this value may not be the most recent because it may be 
changed during the time interval [Tb,r, 0,
a
PaT ]. Again, these considerations must be 
included in utility function. 
6.2.4. Situation NB: Needer Receives I 
Situation NB is shown in Fig. 6.4. In this situation, agent b receives a piece of 
information I, which may be either a reply from agent a whom it has ActiveAsked or a 
ProactiveTell from agent a. Agent b’s choice is deterministic, thus Accepts I. However, 
agent b may use I or not. If I is a reply to the ActiveAsk sent by agent b, agent b 
definitely will use I; if I is sent by the ProactiveTell, use of I  happens if agent b is 
Waiting for I or agent b will hold I and use it later with a Silence decision. Meanwhile, 
agent b will neither notify agent a about the acceptance of I nor the use of I. These 
uncertainties and unknown knowledge bring more difficulties to agent a’s estimation of 
the time of the need. 
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Agent b Agent a
 
Accept. 
 
 
 
In summation, Table 6.1 lists communication situations which an agent will 
face and policies which are available for these situations. 
 
Table 6.1. Situations and Policies. 
Situation Policy 
ProactiveTell 
Silence 
PA: provider produces I 
 
 
Reply 
WaitUntilNext 
PB: provider receives a request for I 
 
ActiveAsk 
Silence 
 
NA: needer has a need for I arise 
Wait 
  
NB: needer receives I Accept 
 
6.3. DTPC Model 
Part of decision-making is to evaluate each of the possible policies for each of 
the situations described above. We need to generalize the notion of situation slightly to 
Fig. 6.4.  Situation NB: Needer Receives I. 
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include the specific item of information I with respect to which it occurs. Let t be the 
time of occurrence of a situation, we denote a situation by St = (SU, I) for SU ∈ {PA, 
PB, NA, NB} and I ∈ set of information items. The policy, denoted δ, used to respond 
an situation St is also relevant. There are two time points closely related to information 
need and production: tn the time at which a need for I occurs, and tp the production time 
of a value for I which is provided for the need at tn. Because obtaining I may involve 
sending messages, these messages are also part of our model. Then, letting E denote a 
finite set of states, we define our model DTPC as: 
DTPC = <E, {St}, {δ}, {tn}, {tp}, M, U> 
where: 
z E = {e} is a finite set of states. Each state e = (εa, εb) where εj ∈ Ei, i = {a, 
b}, are the local states of the corresponding agents. 
z {St} is the set of possible situations occurring at t.  
z {δ} is a finite set of policies.  
z {tn}=N (the natural numbers) is the set of times at which a need may 
occur. 
z {tp}=N is the set of production times of I which are provided for the needs 
at {tn}. 
z M is the set of messages. A special message that belongs to M is the null 
message which is denoted by ϕ. This message is chosen by an agent that 
does not want to communicate to the other agents. 
z U is a utility function assigning a value to the use of a specific policy δ. 
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6.4. Utility Function 
We assume the information needer and provider have the same utility function; 
because as they are cooperative in a team, we consider the utility function to represent 
the utility gained by the team when a particular needer uses a particular item of 
information at a particular time. Consequently, needers and providers have the same 
utility function.   However, because the needer and provider each evaluate the utility 
function based upon their individual knowledge, they are likely to obtain different 
values for it.  In terms of our decision theoretic approach, we must therefore consider 
the evaluation of the utility function separately for the needer and provider. 
6.4.1. Defining the Utility Function 
The utility function is a mapping from agent’s internal states, the current 
situation, a communication policy associated with the situation, time points tn and tp 
and messages in M to a real number: 
U: e × St × δ × tn × tp × {m}→ ℜ  
where {m} is the set of messages used by the policy δ. 
Three terms are generally included in the utility function. The first is values 
gained from the information delivered. The uncertainties existing in the environment 
normally lead to the unfixed time durations of information production and need, which 
further lead to uncertainty in the value gained by communicating the information. The 
second term is the cost of sending a message. The third is the potential communication 
risk due to things like unwanted revelation of the information, such as being overheard 
by an enemy on a battlefield. We define utility as the difference between the value 
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gained by having the information, and the cost of sending the messages and the risk of 
communication: 
U(e, St, δ, tn, tp, {m})  
= V(St, δ, tn, tp) – C({m}) – R(e, St, δ).  
where V denotes a value function, C denotes a cost function, and R denotes a risk 
function. 
6.4.2. Identifying Information Production and Need Time in the Utility Function 
In the utility function U, for a given decision point involving situation St, the 
parameters e and {m} are fixed, when U is evaluated for a specific policy δ which is 
associated with St. On the other hand, parameters tn and tp vary for different policies and 
either or both of them may be unknown at the current time t. 
In Table 6.2, we identify tp and tn for different policies. P and N indicate 
policies for needer or provider; for example, P.ProactiveTell denotes provider’s policy 
ProactiveTell. To is a time cutoff which replaces the length of the time an agent may 
wait in case the communication deadlock (introduced in Section 5.5.2) occurs. Based 
on this, later in our algorithm of decision-making, a needer and provider pair is forced 
to communicate if they kept silent for a period of time To (see Section 6.8). 
For some policies, the time point used for a parameter depends upon the 
counterpart’s response, which is unknown to the decision maker. For example, if a 
needer ActiveAsks for I, it does not know whether the provider will Reply or 
WaitUntilNext; if the needer Waits, it does not know whether the provider will keep 
Silence or ProactiveTell. The needer, therefore, needs to find a way to estimate which 
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policy the provider will choose and how this choice impacts tp. To solve this problem, 
agents are asked to think as their counterparts do. We assume that both needer and 
provider know the other’s possible policies and estimation process. When making a 
decision, each will go through the estimation process of its counterpart to identify the 
policy the counterpart will choose. This process, of course, will be based on each one’s 
own information. The time point of the estimated policy will be used to fill in the 
parameters in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2. Identifying Parameters for Policies. 
Policy           Parameter 
 tn tp 
P.ProactiveTell NbT ,  
0
,PaT . 
   
P.Silence NbT ,  
A production time 
between [ 0,PaT , 
0
,PaT +To].  
   
P.Reply Tb,q 0,
q
PaT . 
   
P.WaitUntilNext Tb,q 1,
q
PaT . 
   
N.Silence 0, NbT  Tb,r. 
   
0
,
a
PaT , if a Reply;  
N.ActiveAsk 
 
0
, NbT  1,
a
PaT , if a WaitUntilNext. 
   
1
,
a
PaT , if a ProactiveTell; 
 
N.Wait 
 
0
, NbT  
A production time 
between [ 0, NbT ,
0
, NbT +To], 
if a Silence. 
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The precise estimation of values for the time points varies from one situation 
and policy to another. These will be developed in conjunction with the development of 
the evaluation formulae for the different situations and policies. 
In the next two sections, we define the cost and the value functions in the utility 
function. Particularly, we focus on analyzing tp and tn which are given values by the 
time points listed in Table 6.2, and the use of the distributions of tp and tn computed by 
EDF introduced in Section 5.2. We defer the risk function to the implementation, 
because risk normally is domain-dependent. For example, in the Multi-Agent Wumpus 
World, the risk of communication depends on the distance between wumpus and 
information sender and hearing radius of wumpus (refer to Section 7.2.3.1 for detail). 
6.5. Cost Function 
In cost function C, policy δ determines the number of messages to be sent. For 
example, policy ProactiveTell indicates one message to be sent while Silence means no 
message will be sent. The cost of sending the set of messages {m} is assumed to be: 
C({m}) =
⎩⎨
⎧
×+
=
otherwiselen({m})kk
{m} if                          0
10
ϕ
 
where len({m}) is the length of {m}, and k0 and k1 are coefficients. 
6.6. Value Function 
We measure the value gained by having I by two factors: correctness of the 
information to the need and timeliness of the fulfillment of the need. The rationale for 
considering these two factors is that there are different things that can affect the value 
of a given policy. In terms of timeliness, there may be a value associated with how 
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quickly a need can be satisfied, i.e., the sooner, the better. In terms of correctness, there 
may be a value associated with using the most recent value for I. For example, if the 
information I used to satisfy a need at time tn was produced at an earlier time, t0, it is 
possible that there is a more recent value for I produced at some time after t0. However, 
since the information produced at time t0 is immediately available, using this 
information may still have some values, although less than the use of more recently 
produced information. The highest value should accrue from using the newest 
information. 
We measure the value gained by having I by two factors: currency of the 
information to the need and timeliness of the fulfillment of the need. The rationale for 
considering these two factors is that there are different things that can affect the value 
of a given policy. In terms of timeliness, there may be a value associated with how 
quickly a need can be satisfied, i.e., the sooner, the better. In terms of currency, there 
may be a value associated with using values other than the most recent for I. For 
example, if the information I used to satisfy a need at time tn was produced at an earlier 
time, t0, it is possible that there is a more recent value for I produced at some time after 
t0. However, since the information produced at time t0 is immediately available, using 
this information may still have some values, although less than that of the use of more 
recently produced information. 
A common payoff function for the case like our problem which has multiple 
factors is to make a linear combination of these factors [29]. Based on this, we define 
the value function in term of the probability of using the most recent information vs. 
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the payoff of using the old information (value for I may have changed since last 
update). 
V(St, δ, tn, tp)  
=Ts(tn, tp)×P(St, δ, tn, tp) + Tf(tn, tp)×(1−P(St, δ, tn, tp)), 
where Ts denotes the reward, in terms of timeliness, of successfully using the most 
recent information, Tf denotes the reward, of using other than the most recent 
information, and P denotes the probability of using the most recent information. 
We will define these three functions in a general way that encompasses a 
number of possible situations. Ts will be chosen to have a maximum value when 
information is immediately available and degrades as stale information is used. Tf will 
be chosen to reflect the value of using old information. P will be chosen to have a 
maximum value of 1 if information being used has not changed since the most recent 
production and have a minimum value of 0 if the information has changed. 
6.6.1. Timeliness Function 
In this section, we define Ts and Tf. First, the timeliness Ts of satisfying the 
need requires considerations of several cases: 
1. The needer uses a value it already has. This means that tp<tn, and the 
value should be maximum because the need is immediately satisfied. 
2. The needer asks a provider for a value and the provider returns a value it 
has previously obtained. This means that we can again consider tp<tn, 
the need is immediately satisfied, and again the value should be 
maximum.  
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3. The needer waits for a provider to proactively tell the information. In 
this case tp>tn and the need is not immediately satisfied. 
4. The needer asks a provider for the information and the provider waits 
until its next production of information to return a value. Again, in this 
case tp>tn, the need is not satisfied immediately, and one can expect a 
lower timeliness value. 
The considerations can all be taken into account if the timeliness component of 
the value function is maximum for tp ≤ tn and decreases as tp becomes greater than tn. 
This, in turn, can be handled by first defining a time difference function d: 
d(tp, tn)=max(0, tp–tn). 
We then define a non-increasing function fs: 
fs (x) s.t. 0<fs (y)≤fs (x) if y≥x. 
fs may take various forms. For example, it might decrease exponentially, or it 
might be constant for a length of time and zero thereafter, indicating that the 
information must be consumed in a finite length of time or it is useless. We leave fs 
unspecified for the high level development. In general, fs is required to have these 
properties:  
1. For cases 1& 2, fs is a max, (but the information may be stale, which is 
captured in the currency). 
2. For cases 3 & 4, the most recent value is used (so currency is a max), 
but there is degradation due to waiting. 
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Later, we determine a specific one in our experiments (see Section 7.2.3.3). Finally, we 
use fs to represent Ts: 
Ts(tn, tp) = fs(d(tp, tn)). 
Next we consider Tf, the reward of timeliness under the condition of using old 
information. In some circumstances, old information still has value. For example, if an 
item (say an enemy troop location) has not been processed, it may still contain valuable 
information (the enemy troop is not far away from the previously reported location), 
although this case might reduce to a more simplistic decision algorithm (always send I 
to a needer). Thus, at the highest level, we represent Tf by a function Tf = ff() that 
expresses the pertinent factors. There are many forms that ff could take for different 
types of I; this provides flexibility of defining Tf based on various focuses of different 
domains. For example, Tf can be a time discount function similar to Ts, if there is a 
value to use old information but the value decreases with the age of the information; or 
Tf can be a constant, implying that there is a fixed reward for using old information; or 
Tf can be zero if old information is completely useless for agents to make their further 
decision. 
6.6.2. Currency Function 
The general idea we will use for developing a model of currency is that value 
for I at time tp should not change between tp and the time it is used to satisfy the need at 
tn. Let tu be the time at which I is used by the needer for the need at time tn. It will be 
useful to note that tu = max(tp, tn), because if the value for I was produced before the 
 123
need arises, the value will not be used until the need arises, and if the value for I was 
produced after the need arises, the value will not be used until it is produced. 
We consider the probability that the value does not change in time interval (tp, 
tu] and use that as the basis for measuring currency. There are still difficulties, as we 
may not know tn and tp and consequently tu may be unknown too. However, from the 
EDF process, we do have probability mass functions on the times between successive 
occurrences of a need for I or production of new values for I. Using these distributions 
and the event time t as a reference point, we determine for each situation and policy 
estimates of the need and production times, and define a function P as: 
P(St, δ, tn, tp) = Pr( ¬∃τ∈Int(tp, tu] ∋ IP(τ) | St ∧ δ), 
where Int(tp, tu] denotes the interval between the two time points, noting that the time 
order is unspecified; IP(τ) denotes the production of a value for I at time τ. P is the 
conditional probability that no other value is produced during Int(tp, tu], conditional on 
a policy δ which is chosen in situation St at time t. For simplicity, we abbreviate this 
conditional event as NOPRODUCE(tp, tu), so P is abbreviated as: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu)). 
6.7. Calculating Probability of Currency 
The currency function needs extensive probability calculations which include 
estimating the production time tp and the need time tn. For different situations, agents’ 
knowledge of the various points in time tn and tp differ. In particular, in some situations 
a time is known exactly (e.g., the needer knows the time at which it needed a value) 
and in other situations, an agent can only estimate one or both of the times based upon 
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the known information. The knowledge of these time points is used in estimating the 
currency for each policy on each situation. We analyze them one by one below. 
6.7.1. Situation PA: Provider Produces a Value for I 
Recall that at the beginning of this section, we introduced a set of time points 
for each situation of decision-making. It is necessary to revisit them here. Fig. 6.5 
redraws the time points and their relations for situation PA. 
Last sent  
time 
Next production time 
Need time 
° t 
NbT ,
°
ls
PaT ,
0
,PaT
1
,PaT
Current 
time 
ns
PaT ,
Last not 
sent time 
 
Fig. 6.5. Time Points for Situation PA. 
 
In this situation, the provider just produced a value for I at time t= 0,PaT . We denote a 
need for I at time tn as IN(tn) and the production of a value for I at time tp as IP(tp). The 
provider is making decisions on whether or not to provide IP( 0,PaT ) to the needer. In 
order to identify tn, the time of the need in question, we observe first that tn > lsPaT , .  
This is because if there were a need before lsPaT , , the needer would either use a value it 
already had, or Wait or ActiveAsk, in which case IP( lsPaT , ) could be either a 
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ProactiveTell or a response to the ActiveAsk. By any choice, the most recent need 
before lsPaT ,  would be satisfied and hence tn > 
ls
PaT , .  Multiple needs may have arisen 
since lsPaT , , the first of which might use the information supplied at 
ls
PaT ,  through use of 
the Silence policy.  Since we assume that the needer does not have a new need arise 
until after it has completed servicing a previous need, and, since we assume that there 
is only one provider, the frequency of new needs cannot exceed the frequency at which 
the provider provides values for I, though delay in satisfying a need could become 
large.  Hence, we assume that in evaluating currency for this case, we need only 
consider the first need that arises after lsPaT , , we denote this time NbT ,  and take tn = NbT , . 
NbT ,  may be in the future and the time may be unknown to the provider, and we will 
have to consider the different policies that the needer might have made at time NbT , . 
As we shall see below, identifying tp is not quite straightforward. In particular, 
it is not always appropriate to take tp = 0,PaT . We must consider two cases: 1) the 
provider uses policy ProactiveTell and 2) the provider uses policy Silence. 
6.7.1.1. PA – ProactiveTell Is Used 
In this case, IP( 0,PaT ) will be provided for the need at NbT , , hence tp = 
0
,PaT . The 
probability P is specified to: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE( 0,PaT , tu)), 
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where tu is unknown because IP( 0,PaT ) may or may not be used by the needer and 
depends on NbT ,  which is unknown. We then divide the problem into two sub-cases 
and tu will be identify in case by case analysis on late this section, 
Sub-case1: there is a need at 0,PaT , i.e. NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ; 
Sub-case2: there is not a need at 0,PaT , i.e. 
0
,PaT < NbT , . 
Based on the law of total probability [149], P can be evaluated as: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE( 0,PaT , tu) | NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ) × Pr( NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ) +  
Pr(NOPRODUCE( 0,PaT ,tu) | 
0
,PaT < NbT , ) × Pr(
0
,PaT < NbT , ). 
This shows that we need the probability that NbT ,  occurs in each of the relevant 
intervals, and given that it does, we need to examine function P through each of the 
possible decisions the needer might make. Some of the needer’s decision, such as 
ActiveAsk, depends on the provider’s responding decisions, such as Reply or 
WaitUntilNext. For this case, we also need to evaluate the provider’s possible 
responding decisions. Thus the provider must estimate which policy the needer will 
choose from Silence, ActiveAsk and Wait and what the provider will response if 
ActiveAsk has been chosen by the needer. 
Pr( NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ) and Pr(
0
,PaT < NbT , ) can be calculated because we known 
0
,PaT  and 
distributions of the unknown time point, thus NbT , . Appendix A provides calculations 
to these two probabilities. 
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What left in P is Pr(NOPRODUCE( 0,PaT , tu)) conditional on two sub-cases 
NbT , ≤ 
0
,PaT  and 
0
,PaT < NbT , . 
6.7.1.1.1. Sub-case1 NbT , ≤
0
,PaT  
In this case, the provider must consider each of the decisions the needer could 
make at NbT , , to estimate if the needer will use IP(
0
,PaT ). If the needer obtains a response 
either by an ActiveAsk or a Wait, the needer will immediately use IP( 0,PaT ) and hence 
tu= 0,PaT . Given tu=
0
,PaT =tp, obviously there no other value has been produced between tu 
and tp. Therefore the probability of NOPRODUCE equals 1 if the needer did not decide 
to keep Silence at NbT , .  However, if the needer kept Silence, it will use the last value 
for I sent at lsPaT ,  by the provider. Then tu = 
ls
PaT ,  and hence there is another production 
between the time interval [tu, tp).  Thus, the needed probability reduces to 
Pr(NOPRODUCE( 0,PaT ,
0
,PaT ) | NbT , ≤
0
,PaT )  
=1 – Pr(needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ). 
Next we calculate Pr(needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ). First the provider 
needs to estimate unknown NbT , . Though 
ls
PaT , < NbT ,  (see Section 6.7.1), the base for 
estimating NbT ,  varies and the provider may or may not know the base. For example, if 
the needer chose Silence for the most recent need before lsPaT , , the base for estimating 
NbT ,  was the time at which the most recent need before 
ls
PaT ,  raised. Denote this time 
 128
1
,
−
NbT . In this case, the provider won’t know 
1
,
−
NbT . While in the case that the needer 
ActiveAsk or Wait at the most recent need before lsPaT , , this need can be satisfied by 
IP( lsPaT , ), so in this case the base is 
ls
PaT ,  and the provider does know 
ls
PaT , . It can be seen 
that the unknown NbT ,  increases the uncertainty on predicting the needer’s decision 
makings.  
To seek a reasonable and computationally feasible solution, we take advantage 
of the average lengths of time between information productions or needs which can be 
obtained from EDF process. We use the average length of information production or 
need as approximations in the future. 
Let τn be the average length of time between needs of I by the needer. It is 
easily to get that 1,
−
NbT  < 
ls
PaT ,  < NbT , . One could use the expected value of where 
ls
PaT ,  
would lie in the interval ( 1,
−
NbT , NbT , ), which under reasonable assumptions would be 
half way in between them.  Then, we use lsPaT ,  + τn/2 as an estimate for NbT , . In the 
current sub-case, though, we are considering NbT , ≤
0
,PaT , and there is no guarantee that 
ls
PaT ,  + τn/2 ≤ 0,PaT .  Thus, we will use 
NbT ,  = min(
0
,PaT , 
ls
PaT ,  + τn/2). 
To estimate the needer’s decision, the provider, using its own knowledge, will 
go through the needer’s decision process and choose a policy which has maximum 
utility. This evaluation can be calculated as follows: 
Pr(needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ) 
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=Pr(U(e, NA, Silence, NbT , , 
ls
PaT , , {m}) > Max(U(e, NA, ActiveAsk, NbT , , 
0
,PaT , {m}), 
U(e, NA, Wait, NbT , , 
0
,PaT , {m}))). 
The solution to this will involve evaluating the utility function under each of the 
possible policies the needer might make at NbT , , the time the need arises.  The 
evaluation of all parts of the utility function except currency is straightforward.  In the 
case of currency, the needer must associate time tn and tp with the time NbT , .  
Fortunately, this is rather straightforward, given the conditions already known.  The 
evaluation of currency for the needer under the condition that a need has arisen is given 
in Section 6.7.3.  Since, as shown in Section 6.7.3, with substitutions for tp and tn, the 
expression for the utility function is deterministic, the utility can be determined for 
each possible policy. Having these utilities, the needer’s decision is deterministic, thus 
it will use the policy which has the max utility. Therefore the provider’s estimate of 
probabilities of the needer’s choices is computable. Moreover, since the needer will 
only choose one policy at one decision point, so these probabilities equal either 1 or 0. 
For example, if the utility of Silence is the highest, then Pr(needer decides to keep 
Silence at NbT , ) = 1; otherwise it equals 0. 
6.7.1.1.2. Sub-case 2 0,PaT  < NbT ,  
In this case, the value provided is not immediately used. Occurrence of the use 
of IP( 0,PaT ) depends upon the decision the needer will make at NbT ,  and the provider’s 
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responding decision at NbT , . Since combinations of cases must be considered, we 
consider distinct four events: 
∑ =4 1n Pr(NOPRODUCE( 0,PaT ,tu) | 0,PaT < NbT ,  ∧En) × Pr(En), 
where  En, n=1,..,4, denote the following events: 
E1: needer decides to Wait at NbT , ; 
E2: needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ; 
E3: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to Reply at 
NbT , ; 
E4: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to 
WaitUntilNext at NbT , . 
We first consider Pr(NOPRODUCE( 0,PaT ,tu) | 
0
,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ En). Since these 
probabilities turn out to be zero for some cases, Pr(En) does not need to be calculated 
for these cases. 
6.1.1.1.2.1. Calculating Pr(NOPRODUCE( 0,PaT ,tu) | 
0
,PaT < NbT ,  ∧En) 
• E1:needer decides to Wait at NbT ,  
In this case, the needer will wait until the next time the provider 
sends it a value for I. Since 0,PaT  < NbT , , the needer certainly will not use 
IP( 0,PaT ) and then IP(
0
,PaT ) is not relevant. In other words, the needer will use 
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another production to fulfill the need raised at NbT , . Therefore the 
probability that no other value will be produced between tp and tu is zero. 
Pr(NOPRODUCE( 0,PaT ,tu) | 
0
,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ E1)=0. 
• E2: needer decides to keep Silence at NbT ,  
In this case, the needer will use the most recent value it has for I. 
So it will use IP( 0,PaT ) when 
0
,PaT  < NbT ,  < 
1
,PaT : 
Pr(NOPRODUCE( 0,PaT ,tu) | 
0
,PaT < NbT ,  ∧E2) 
=Pr( 0,PaT  < NbT ,  < 
1
,PaT ). 
Pr( 0,PaT  < NbT ,  < 
1
,PaT ) is calculated in Appendix A. 
• E3: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to Reply at NbT , ; 
In this case, the needer will use the most recent value for I 
produced before NbT , , This case is similar to the last case E2, i.e. the needer 
will use IP( 0,PaT ) when 
0
,PaT  < NbT ,  < 
1
,PaT . Therefore we have: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE( 0,PaT ,tu) | 
0
,PaT  < NbT ,  ∧ E3) 
=Pr( 0,PaT  < NbT ,  < 
1
,PaT ). 
Again Pr( 0,PaT  < NbT ,  < 
1
,PaT ) is calculated in Appendix A.  
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• E4: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to WaitUntilNext at 
NbT , . 
Since 0,PaT < NbT , , the provider will reply the value for I at or after 
1
,PaT  and the needer will use this value. Then IP(
0
,PaT ) will not be used and 
hence it is not relevant.  
Pr(NOPRODUCE( 0,PaT ,tu) | 
0
,PaT  < NbT ,  ∧ E4) = 0. 
6.1.1.1.2.2. Calculating Pr(En) 
From the above analysis, only two probabilities Pr(E2) and Pr(E3) must be 
determined because the factors on the other event probabilities are zero. 
• Pr(E2): Pr(needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ) 
Pr(needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ) 
=Pr(U(e, NA, Silence, NbT , , tp, {m}) > Max(U(e, NA, ActiveAsk, NbT , , 
tp, {m}), U(e, NA, Wait, NbT , , tp, {m}))). 
where tp will be replaced, for a given policy, by the value that policy calls 
for.  
The time tp is important in predicting the needer’s decisions at NbT , . 
To estimate tp for each policy, the provider must predict its own decisions in 
the future. These decisions, in turn, closely depend on NbT , .  For example, 
in the case of a needer policy of δ = Silence, the needer will use the most 
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recent value for I it has. This value is the last value sent by the provider 
before NbT , . So the provider needs to predict the number of production 
times between 0,PaT  and NbT , . The last sent value could be produced at any 
of these time points, so the provider also must estimate decisions it will 
make, ProactiveTell or Silence, on every production time.  Since NbT ,  is 
unknown, the length of time between 0,PaT  and NbT ,  is undetermined and 
hence the number of production time in between is undetermined.  It can be 
see that the unknown NbT ,  and production time increases the uncertainty on 
predicting future decision makings.  As before, we could take advantage of 
the average lengths of time between information productions or needs 
which can be obtained from EDF process. 
In the following, we estimate NbT ,  and identify tp for each three 
possible policies. Once NbT ,  and tp are fixed, utility for every policy can be 
computed and then the needer’s decision can be estimated. 
We still use lsPaT ,  + τn/2 as an estimate for NbT , . In the current sub-
case, though, we are considering NbT ,  >
0
,PaT , and there is no guarantee that 
ls
PaT ,  + τn/2 > 0,PaT .  Thus, we will use  
NbT ,  = max(
0
,PaT +1, 
ls
PaT ,  + τn/2). 
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Let τp be the average length of time for producing a new value for I. 
We use the following estimation for a future production time i PaT , : 
i
PaT ,  = 
0
,PaT  + i × τp, i ≥1, 
Having these estimations, we can specify i and then fix tp for each policy. 
We consider three needer policies separately. 
Needer δ = Silence 
In this case, tp is the time of the last value for sent I before NbT , . 
Since 1,PaT ≤ NbT , , the provider should not delivery a value for I produced 
before the most recent production time before NbT , , because otherwise this 
provided value is out-of-date for the need raises at NbT , . On this basis, we 
assume tp equals the most recent production time before NbT , . We define a 
function Z: 
Z = ⎥⎥⎦
⎥
⎢⎢⎣
⎢ −
p
0
,
τ
Pab,N TT . 
Z returns 0 or a positive integer, meaning the number of productions during 
NbT ,  and 
1
,PaT . Let: 
tp = 0,PaT  + Z × τp.     (6-1) 
Needer δ = ActiveAsk 
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In this case, tp depends upon the provider’s decision at NbT , . So the 
provider needs to predict its respondent decisions, Reply or WaitUntilNext, 
to the ActiveAsk received at NbT , .  
Pr(the provider decides to Reply at NbT , ) 
=Pr(U(e, PB, Reply, NbT , , tp, {m}) > U(e, PB, WaitUntilNext, 
NbT , , tp, {m})) 
where tp of Reply is the production time just before NbT , . It is exactly Eq. 
(6-1), i.e. tp = 0,PaT  + Z × τp, and tp of WaitUntilNext is the production 
timejust after NbT , :  
tp= 0,PaT  + (Z+1)×τp              (6-2) 
Having these estimations, Pr(the provider decides to Reply at NbT , ) can be 
calculated by computing the utility for each of the possible policies. 
Therefore the utility can be determined for each of the possible policies. 
Again since the provider will make one responding decision at one per 
request, so Pr(the provider decides to Reply at NbT , ) equals either 1 or 0. 
After estimating the provider’s responding decisions, tp can be fixed. 
Thus if the provider Reply, tp is calculated by Eq. (6-1); if the provider 
WaitUntilNext, t pos calculated by Eq. (6-2).  
Needer δ = Wait 
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In this case, tp is the next ProactiveTell time after NbT , . Since there 
is a need, the provider should not let the needer wait long, because 
otherwise the value for I provided is not timely to the need which has 
already risen. Therefore we assume the next ProactiveTell time is the next 
production time after NbT , . Thus, we use Eq. (6-2) as estimate for tp. Once tp 
is estimated, the provider is able to evaluate the utility function under each 
of the possible policies the needer might make at NbT , .  
From above analysis, one can see that, to calculate the probability of 
the needer’s single decision, the provider needs to compute utilities for all 
possible needer’s policies and provider’s responding policies. Then in the 
future if the probability for one needer’s policy can be computed, then the 
probability for other needer’s policies and the provider’s responding 
policies are also computable. 
• Pr(E3): Pr(needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to Reply at 
NbT , ) 
Pr(needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to Reply at 
NbT , ) 
=Pr(needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT , )     
×Pr(provider decides to Reply at NbT ,  | needer decides to ActiveAsk at 
NbT , ) 
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In this equation, Pr(needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT , ) is calculable. This 
is because in the last case E2 which computes Pr(needer decides to keep 
Silence at NbT , ), we calculate the utility for each of the needer’s possible 
policy: ActiveAsk, Silence and Wait. Based on this, Pr(needer decides to 
ActiveAsk at NbT , ) equals 1 if ActiveAsk has the maximum utility, or 0 
otherwise. The probability Pr(provider decides to Reply at NbT ,  | needer 
decides to ActiveAsk at NbT , ) is calculated in E2 the case of Needer 
δ=ActiveAsk. So this probability is computable and equals either 1 or 0. 
6.7.1.2. PA – Silence Is Used 
Above we presented the calculation of currency for policy ProactiveTell in 
situation PA, which is when a provider produces a value for I. This section we consider 
the other provider’s policy Silence in situation PA.  
In this case, the value for I at 0,PaT  will not be provided proactively. tp thus 
depends upon the needer’s decision at tn and, if needed, the provider’s responding 
decision at tn. P equals: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu)), 
where tp and tu will be identified in two sub-cases: 
Sub-case1: there is a need at 0,PaT , i.e. NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ; 
Sub-case2: there is not a need at 0,PaT , i.e. 
0
,PaT < NbT , . 
P can be evaluated as: 
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Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu) | NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ) × Pr( NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ) 
+Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu) | 0,PaT < NbT , ) × Pr(
0
,PaT < NbT , ). 
In this form, Pr( NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ) and Pr(
1
,PaT < NbT , ) have been done in Appendix A. 
So we consider Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu) for the two sub-cases Pr( NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ) and 
Pr( 0,PaT < NbT , ). 
6.7.1.2.1. Sub-case1 NbT , ≤
0
,PaT  
This case means that the needer must not decide to ActiveAsk at NbT , , because 
otherwise the provider would be obligated to provide the value at 0,PaT  and could not 
choose Silence. Thus, the needer either decided to Wait, or keep Silence. If it decided to 
Wait, tp depends upon the decision the provider will make at the production time after 
0
,PaT . For example, if the provider decide to ProactiveTell at 
1
,PaT , then tp=
1
,PaT , 
otherwise if the provider decide to keep Silence then tp again depends upon the 
provider’s decision at 2,PaT  and so on. However, whatever tp would be, since the needer 
is waiting, it definitely will use the value produced at tp, i.e. tu = tp. Obviously there is 
no other value produced between tu and tp, so Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu))=1. 
However, if the needer decided to keep Silence, it will use the value for I 
produced at lsPaT , , then tp = 
ls
PaT ,  and tu = NbT , . Pr(NOPRODUCE(
ls
PaT , , NbT , )) is equal to 
the probability that there is no values for I produced between lsPaT ,  and NbT ,  that the 
provider did not send to the needer. We consider two cases. 
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If the provider knows that there were no values produced between the last one it 
sent to the needer and the current time, then 
Pr(NOPRODUCE( lsPaT , , NbT , ) | NbT , ≤
0
,PaT )=1. 
Otherwise, in order for there to have been at least one value for I produced and not sent 
out between lsPaT ,  and 
0
,PaT , NbT ,  must be less than 
ns
PaT ,  in the interval (
ls
PaT , ,
ns
PaT , ]. The 
provider can then compute: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE( lsPaT , , NbT , ) | NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ) 
=Pr( NbT ,  ∈ ( lsPaT , , nsPaT , ]) 
=CDFb,N( nsPaT , –
ls
PaT , –1). 
where CDFb,N means the cumulative density function of agent b’s need time interval. 
Since it is the provider doing the evaluation, the provider will use its estimate of the 
CDF based upon the information it has received from the needer over the past history 
to calculate this probability. 
6.7.1.2.2. Sub-case 2 Pr( 0,PaT < NbT , ) 
In this case, tp depends upon the decision the needer will make at NbT ,  and the 
provider’s decision at NbT , . We consider the same combinations of cases that have been 
defined in the case ProactiveTell. 
∑ =4 1n Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu) | 0,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ En) × Pr(En). 
We first consider Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu) | 0,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ En) and then identify 
which Pr(En) needs to be determined. 
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• E1:needer decides to Wait at NbT ,  
In this case, tp is the next ProactiveTell time after NbT , , so tu = tp. 
There is no other production between tp and tu, and the probability equals 1: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu) | 0,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ E1) = 1. 
• E2: needer decides to keep Silence at NbT ,  
In this case, tp is the production time of the most recent value for I 
the needer has.  So tu = NbT , . To determine tp, we can calculate Z, as in Eq. 
(6-1), to find the number of productions between 0,PaT  and NbT , .  If Z = 0, 
meaning 0,PaT  < NbT ,  < 
1
,PaT , then tp = 
ls
PaT , .  Pr(NOPRODUCE(
ls
PaT , , NbT , ) | 
0
,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ E1) = 0 because there is at least one production time, 0,PaT , in 
between. If Z ≥ 1, meaning 1,PaT ≤ NbT , , then Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, NbT , ) | 
0
,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ E1) = 1, because tp is the most recent production time before 
NbT , . 
• E3: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to Reply at NbT ,  
In this case, tu= NbT ,  and tp is the most recent production time 
before NbT , . There is no other production between tp and tu: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu) | 0,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ E3) = 1. 
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• E4: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to WaitUntilNext at 
NbT , . 
In this case, tp is the next production time after NbT , , and tu=tp. 
There is no other production between tp and tu: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu) | 0,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ E4) = 1. 
From above analyses, either Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu) | 0,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ En)=1 for all 
En, or it equals 1 for all except for E2, in which case E2 = 0 (from the above argument); 
the choice depends on Z, which the provider can know. For the former case, 
∑ =4 1n Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu) | 0,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ En) × Pr(En)=1. For the latter, we need to 
calculate Pr(E2), Pr(needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ). If Pr(E2)=1, meaning 
Pr(E1), Pr(E3) and Pr(E4) are all equal 0, then  
∑ =4 1n Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu) | 0,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ En) × Pr(En)=0.  
If Pr(E2)=0, meaning one of Pr(E1), Pr(E3) and Pr(E4) must equals 1, then 
∑ =4 1n Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu) | 0,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ En) × Pr(En)=1. 
The calculation of Pr(E2) is similar to what has been done in the previous case 
of ProactiveTell. NbT ,  is estimated to be max(
0
,PaT +1, 
ls
PaT ,  + τn/2)). tp is specified by 
considering each of the needer’s possible decisions at NbT , , Silence, Wait and 
ActiveAsk, and the provider’s responding  decisions, Reply and WaitUnitilNext, to 
ActiveAsk. There is only one difference between the previous case and the present one. 
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For the present case, since the provider won’t provide IP( 0,PaT ), so for the case of 
needer’s δ= Silence policy, if 0,PaT < NbT , < 1,PaT , tp = lsPaT ,  (tp = 0,PaT  for the previous case). 
After estimating tp, the utility for each of the needer’s possible policies is determined 
and then the needer’s decision can be determined. 
6.7.2. Situation PB: Provider Receives a Request about I 
In this situation, the provider receives a request from the needer at time Tb,q. 
For clarity, Fig. 6.6 redraws time points for this situation below. 
Tb,q
t 
1
,
q
PaT
0
,
q
PaT
Last production time Current time
Next production time 
 
Fig. 6.6. Time Points for Situation PB. 
 
There is a need at the current time t = Tb,q, then tn = Tb,q. The provider will 
either Reply with the most recent value produced or WaitUntilNext production. Since 
there is a need, either value which is about to be provided will be used by the needer. P 
equals: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu)), 
where tp and tu will be identified in the policy being chosen. 
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In the case of Reply, the most recent value for I produced at 0,
q
PaT  will be 
provided for the need at Tb,q. So tp = 0,
q
PaT . Because there is a need, the needer definitely 
will use IP( 0,
q
PaT ) when receives it, so tu = Tb,q. By definition the most recent value 
means no other value has been produced since Tb,q, hence there was no other value for I 
produced between 0,
q
PaT  and Tb,q. Therefore: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE( 0,
q
PaT , Tb,q)) = 1. 
In the case of WaitUntilNext, next value for I which will be produced at 1,
q
PaT  
will be provided for the need at Tb,q. So tp = 1,
q
PaT  and tu = 
1
,
q
PaT . Therefore: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE( 1,
q
PaT , 
1
,
q
PaT )) = 1. 
Therefore currency function equals 1 for both policies, Reply and WaitUntilNext, in 
situation PB. 
6.7.3. Situation NA: Needer Has a Request about I Arise 
Fig. 6.7 shows time points for this situation. 
 
Most recent 
production time 
Tb,r 
t 
0
,NbT
1
,
a
PaT
0
,
a
PaT
Last received time Current time 
Next production 
time 
 
Fig. 6.7. Time Points for Situation NA. 
 144
This is a need for I at the current time t = 0, NbT , so tn = 
0
, NbT . When the needer 
needs I at 0, NbT , it has three policies to choose from: Silence, ActiveAsk and Wait. If the 
needer ActiveAsks the provider or Waits for a ProactiveTell from the provider, it will 
always use the most recent value for I. However, if the needer keeps Silence, i.e., it 
uses the value last received at time Tb,r, it is possible that the value for I has been 
changed since then.  We consider each of these sub-cases below. 
P equals: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu)), 
6.7.3.1. NA – ActiveAsk Is Used 
If ActiveAsk is chosen, the value for I provided for the need at 0, NbT  will be 
either 0,
a
PaT  or 
1
,
a
PaT , depending on the provider’s response (Reply or WaitUntilNext). If 
the provider does Reply, it will send the most recent value it has produced, then tp = 
0
,
a
PaT . Since there is a need, the needer will immediately use IP(
0
,
a
PaT ) so tu=
0
, NbT . There 
was no other value produced between 0,
a
PaT  and 
0
, NbT . On the other hand, if the provider 
WaitUntilNexts, tp = 1,
a
PaT  and tu = tp= 
1
,
a
PaT . It is also the case that there has no value 
produced in the interim. Thus, in either case the probability for no other value 
produced between tp and tu is one: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu)) = 1. 
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6.7.3.2. NA – Silence Is Used 
When Silence is used, the most recent value for I that the needer has will be 
used for the need at 0, NbT , so tp = Tb,r. This value will be used at 
0
, NbT , then tu = 
0
, NbT . 
The probability that no other value was produced between 0, NbT  and Tb,r equals to the 
probability of Tb,r= 0,
a
PaT , which means that Tb,r is the time at which the most recent 
value was produced. One can then compute: 
Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu)) 
=Pr(Tb,r= 0,
a
PaT ) 
=1–Pr(Tb,r< 0,
a
PaT )
14 
=1–Pr(Tb,r< 0,
a
PaT ≤ 0, NbT ) 
=1–CDFa,P( 0, NbT –Tb,r–1) 
where CDFa,P means the cumulative density function of agent a’s production time 
interval. Since it is the needer doing the evaluation, the needer will use its estimate of 
the CDF based upon the information it has received from the provider over the history 
to calculate this probability. 
6.7.3.3. NA – Wait Is Used 
If Wait is adopted, tp is some production time of the value for I at which the 
provider will ProactiveTell in the future. This value will not be used until being 
produced, thus tu=tp. Obviously, there is no value produced between tp and tu: 
                                                 
14 Tb,r cannot be greater than 
0
,
a
PaT  since the latter is the most recent production time. 
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Pr(NOPRODUCE(tp, tu)) = 1. 
6.7.4. Situation NB: Needer Receives a Value for I 
On this situation, the needer will Accept the value for I sent from the provider. 
The decision is deterministic, so we do not consider this case. 
6.8. Decision-Making Processes 
Figs. 6.8-6.11 show finite state diagrams representing the communication 
process of getting and telling (respectively) an information item. Each node represents 
a decision point. As one proceeds through the graph, the nodes represent alternating 
decisions by the needer and the provider. The nodes marked “e” are special in the sense 
that they represent the receipt of the information, or a timeout condition (explained 
below). The nodes marked “t” denoting a transfer from one node to another. For 
example, in situation PA of Fig. 6.8, agent a may receive an ActiveAsk from agent b 
when deciding to keep Silence to agent b. In such a case, the state will transfer to the 
start state of situation PB, the situation where a receives a request from agent b. In this 
case, agent a needs to update its data about agent b’s need time and decide if to Reply 
agent b right away or WaitUntilNext production. By either decision which a will make, 
agent b is able to receive an information item, so an “e” node is reached and the 
decision making ends. 
Since some of the decisions that can be made involving waiting an arbitrary 
length of time for another agent to do something, the possibility of infinite waits arises. 
To circumvent this, we use a heuristically chosen loop breaking algorithm. If a needer 
does not get the information during a time cut-off, the needer adopts policy ActiveAsk. 
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We choose the needer to do this, because it very likely that the needer has few chances 
to start communication if proactivity is fully explored. So letting the needer break time-
out can increase chances of sending the needer’s history data to the provider. 
 
0
1
2
e
a-b: ProactiveTell
a-b: Silence
b-a: Accept
b-a: Wait
b-a: Silence
e
e
b-a: ActiveAsk
Situation PA: Provider produces a new piece of information
a: provider        b: needer        e: end         t: transfer
t
 
 
 
0
ea-b: Reply
ea-b: WaitUntilNext
Situation PB: Provider receives a request for a piece of information
t
 
 
 
Fig. 6.8. Decision-Making Process of Provider in Situation PA. 
Fig. 6.9. Decision-Making Process of Provider in Situation PB. 
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b-a: Wait
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a-b: WaitUntilNext
a-b: Silence
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Situation NB: Needer receives a piece of information
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Fig. 6.10. Decision-Making Process of Needer in Situation NA. 
Fig. 6.11. Decision-Making Process of Needer in Situation NB. 
 149
6.9. Decision-Theoretic Proactive Communication 
DTPC (Decision-Theoretic Proactive Communication) is the overall process for 
managing communication. It has three parts: an algorithm for selecting a policy, 
algorithms for providing information and algorithms for getting needed information.  
Fig. 6.12 shows the algorithm for selecting a policy. The identify function 
identifies parameters (tp and tn) that will be used appropriately, based on the values 
listed in Table 6.2. The evaluate function calculates utility of each policy. For each 
counterpart agent Agi, a policy δi with the maximum utility is added to policyList. By 
comparing each δi in policyList, a final `iδ  with maximum utility is selected. 
 
 
/*self is an agent who makes the decision; 
   counterparts is an agent set about whom the decision is made; 
   I is information that communication conveyed. 
*/ 
selectPolicy(self, counterparts, I){ 
 policyList = null; 
 
 ∀ Agi ∈ counterparts 
   ∀ policy δi 
    identify(self, Agi, δi, I); 
    U(δi)=evaluate(self, Agi, δi, I); 
   select one δi with maximum U; 
   add δi to policyList; 
 
 select one `iδ  with maximum U from policyList; 
 return `iδ ; 
} 
 
 Fig. 6.12. A Policy Selection Algorithm. 
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Figs. 6.13 and 6.14 show algorithms for providing a piece of information to a 
needer, or getting a piece of information from a provider. Generally, agents select a 
policy that has maximum utility and act corresponding to that and their counterpart’s 
response. To is a time cutoff 15 used by needer to guarantees that the system does not go 
into a waiting forever state. 
Function updateSelfData updates the decision maker’s (provider or needer) 
information production or need time intervals. updateSelfData is executed when the 
decision maker produces/needs an information item. Function updateOtherData 
updates the decision maker’s knowledge about counterpart’s production or need time 
intervals which are from historical data (if any) attached in each message sent to the 
counterpart. Updating this data can help agents make better estimation for distributions 
of information production or need. 
                                                 
15 Of course, if desired, one could use a different cutoff for each situation. 
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/*Executed when provider is in situation PA at time t. 
   Let pendWUNList be a list of needers whose requests will be replied with 
   WaitUntilNext production. 
*/ 
provideNeededInfo(provider, needers, I, t){//needers is a needer set 
 updateSelfData(provider, I, t);  //update provider’s production time 
 
 if (pendWUNList != null)         //there is pending WaitUntilNext reply(s) 
   reply I to A0;                       //A0 is the first needer on pendWUNList; 
   updateOtherData(A0, I, t); 
   remove A0 from pendWUNList; 
   exit; 
 
 `iδ  = selectPolicy(provider, needers, I); 
 switch( `iδ ) 
   case ProactiveTell: 
       ProactiveTell needersi; 
       updateOtherData(needersi, I, t); 
       break; 
   case Silence: 
    Silence; 
       break; 
} 
 
/*Executed when provider is in situation PB at time t. 
*/ 
receiveRequest(provider, needer, I, t){ 
          //needer is a single agent who needs I 
 `iδ  = selectPolicy(provider, needer, I); 
 switch( `iδ ) 
   case Reply: 
       Reply needer; 
        updateOtherData(needer, I, t); 
       break; 
   case WaitUntilNext: 
        add needer to pendWUNList; 
          break; 
} 
 
Fig. 6.13. Algorithms about Providing Information. 
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/*Executed when needer is in situation NA at time t.*/ 
getNeededInfo(needer, providers, I, t){ 
 set time cutoff To; 
 waitTime = 0; 
 boolean obtained=FALSE, waiting=FALSE; 
 updateSelfData(needer,  I, t);   //update self need time 
  `iδ  = selectPolicy(needer, providers, I); 
 switch( `iδ ) 
     case Silence: 
         Silence;       //use most recent value it has 
         break; 
     case ActiveAsk: 
         ActiveAsk providersi; 
         if providersi sends Reply 
        receiveInfo(providersi, I, t);//transfer to situation NB 
     else          //provider chose WaitUntilNext 
               Wait;       
            waiting = TRUE; 
         break; 
     case Wait: 
         Wait; 
         waiting = TRUE; 
         break; 
 if (waiting) 
     while ((!obtained)&&(waitTime<To)) 
         waitTime++; 
         if providersi sends WaitUntilNext reply 
        receiveInfo(providersi, I, t+waitTime); 
              obtained=TRUE; 
         if a provider p Proactivetells I 
        receiveInfo(p, I, t+waitTime); 
        obtained=TRUE; 
     if (!obtained) 
         randomly select a provider q; 
         ActiveAsk q; 
} 
/*Executed when needer is in situation NB at time t.*/ 
receiveInfo(provider, I, t){ 
    updateOtherData(provider, I, t); 
} 
 
Fig. 6.14. Algorithms about Getting Needed Information. 
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6.10. Summary 
In this section, we have presented a method for achieving proactive 
communication using decision theory for determining the communication policy to be 
used. We have identified each situation that might (or might not) involve the exchange 
of information; we have identified the policies that could be selected. We have then 
introduced the general form of a utility function that can be used for the decision 
theoretic selection of the best policy. In order to do this, it is necessary to estimate the 
value of the utility function, as some of the independent variables cannot be precisely 
known by the evaluating agent. In addition, the decision-making process is 
interdependent between provider and needer, so estimation about each other’s decision 
is also necessary for evaluating these variables. 
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CHAPTER VII 
AN APPLICATION DOMAIN DESIGN AND EVALUATIONS 
This section describes the design for an application domain and the experiments 
used to evaluate the Proactive Communication approach. 
An applicable domain should meet following criteria: 
• Messages are allowed to be sent. 
• Communciation is assumed to have cost and risk. 
• The team has a common goal which can be accomplished by executing 
a set of team plans. There are information needs among the team. 
Agents need to know some information to execute these team plans. 
• There is uncertainty during teamwork. The uncertainty may be caused 
by agents holding incomplete knowledge about the time of information 
production and need and about the world. 
• The teamwork process is characterized by stochastic properties. For 
example, due to random moves of objects in the world, durations of plan 
executions are random variables. 
We have extended the classic Wumpus World problem [102] into a multi-agent 
version and used this as the application domain. Two evaluations were performed: a 
test of the effectiveness of observability, as the part of the overall approach; and a test 
of the effectiveness of the overall approach, which includes the empirical distribution 
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function method for predicting information production and need and the decision 
theoretic method on deciding a communication policy. 
7.1. Evaluation of Observability 
7.1.1. Multi-Agent Wumpus World 
For this evaluation, the world is 20 by 20 cells and has 20 wumpuses, 8 pits, 
and 20 piles of gold. 
The team is composed of 1 carrier and 3 fighters and is allowed to operate a 
fixed number of 150 steps. The team goal is to kill wumpuses and get the gold without 
being killed. The carrier is capable of finding wumpuses and picking up gold. We 
assume that the carrier is strong enough to carry all of the gold it finds. The fighters are 
capable of shooting wumpuses. 
Every agent can sense a stench (from adjacent wumpuses), a breeze (from 
adjacent pits), and glitter (from the same position) of gold. When a piece of gold is 
picked up, both the glitter and the gold disappear from its location. When a wumpus is 
killed, both the stench and the wumpus’ body are removed from the world. The 
environment simulation maintains object properties and agents’ actions. 
The agents may also have observabilities, while their observing radii may be 
different. Each agent has an individual knowledge base (KB) to save the beliefs it 
generates after observing the world and actions of other agents. The observabilities are 
encoded as rules in agents’ KB. The inference engine used is JARE [60]. 
The agents are randomly located in the world and know each other’s starting 
location. In the absence of any target information (wumpus or gold), all agents reason 
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about the world to determine their priority of potential movements. Basically, they 
move to locations not previously visited (when possible, though they may revisit a 
location if there are no reachable unvisited safe locations). If they are aware of a target 
location requiring action on their part (shoot wumpus or pick up gold), they move 
toward the target. In all cases, they avoid unsafe locations. 
If the fighter senses other wumpuses while it is on the way to kill the wumpus 
about which the carrier has told it, it will kill them first. This is because the fighter has 
a limited range of vision, so the wumpuses it senses must be close and can be killed 
quickly. 
7.1.2. Problem Analysis 
In ODBC, Proactive Communication has two primary protocols named O-Tell 
and O-Ask. These protocols are used by each agent to generate inter-agent 
communication when information exchange is desirable. 
Decisions about whether to use O-Tell or O-Ask (see Section 4.5) when 
observing an information item depends on the relative frequency of information need 
vs. production. For any piece of information I, we define two functions, fC and fN 
[135]. fC(I) returns the frequency with which I changes. fN(I) returns the frequency with 
which I is used by agents. We classify information into two types – static16 and 
dynamic. If fC(I)≤fN(I), I is considered static information; if fC(I)>fN(I), I is considered 
                                                 
16Here, static information includes not only information that never changes, but also information 
infrequently changed but frequently needed. 
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dynamic information. For static information we use O-Tell by providers, and for 
dynamic information we use O-Ask by needers17. 
In order to understand the Proactive Communication problem in the Multi-
Agent Wumpus World domain, we present the team’s plans, which are based on the 
team plans in [137], which were developed for the original CAST18. Fig. 7.1 shows the 
major part of the team plan: 
 
 
(plan killWumpus() 
(process 
(seq 
(agent-bind ?ca (constraint (play-role ?ca carrier))) 
(DO ?ca (findWumpus)) ; carrier is assigned 
(agent-bind ?fi (constraint ((play-role ?fi fighter) 
(closest-to-wumpus ?fi ?wumpusId)))) 
;fighter who is closest to wumpus is assigned 
(DO ?fi (startKill)) 
))) 
 
Fig. 7.1. An Example of Plans of the Multi-Agent Wumpus World. 
 
Each agent has a copy of the team plan and will evaluate the pre-cond during 
the plan execution. The evaluation is based on the agent’s own beliefs about the 
environment. The team plan does not explicitly state the communication that is to take 
place. Rather, the agents are to infer the necessary communication from their beliefs of 
the plan and the environment. 
                                                 
17In the next section 7.2, we address some statistical methods to calculate frequencies and hence will be 
able to provide more comprehensive proactive communication protocols. 
18 In the next experiment, we develop a new team plan for current CAST. 
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As one can infer from these plans, the key problems are: 
1) Which kind of information will be communicated? 
2) Who will need or produce the information? 
3) Which information will be O-Telled and which will be O-Asked? 
The answer to the first problem is that the conjunct that is part of the 
precondition of a plan or an action will be communicated in the team at the time when 
the conjunct is evaluated. For this example, the information is “wumpus location.” In 
this evaluation, we encoded a domain-dependent role constraint, closest-to-wumpus, 
for selecting the fighter closest to the wumpus found (see Fig. 7.1). The selected fighter 
will be assigned the startKill plan and will kill the wumpus after arriving at the 
wumpus’ location. Therefore an unknown conjunct that is part of a constraint (e.g., 
“fighter location”) is another piece of information which is to be exchanged. However 
this kind of domain constraint is too specific to be generalized. After developing 
Dynamic Information Prediction and Decision Theoretic Proactive Communication, we 
are able to remove it from the domain and let the carrier decide who can be committed 
on the fly. The capability will be presented in our next evaluation to the overall 
Proactive Communication approach (see Section 7.2). 
To determine who needs and who produces a given item of information, agents 
analyze the preconditions and effects of plans and actions, and generate a list of 
needers and a list of providers for every piece of information. The needers are agents 
who might need to know the information (e.g. the fighters), and the providers are 
agents who might know the information (e.g. the carrier and other fighters). 
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As to the third problem, the “wumpus location” is static information and the 
“fighter location” is dynamic information. Since the static information won’t often 
change, agents use O-Tell to impart the static information they just learned if they 
believe other agents will need it. For example, the carrier O-Tells the fighters the 
wumpus’ location. Agents use O-Ask to request dynamic information if they need it 
and believe other agents have it. For example, fighters O-Ask each other about their 
locations. 
7.1.3. Results and Analysis 
Our goal is to evaluate effectiveness of agents’ observabilities. Therefore we 
used two teams, a team has observability and a team does not have observability.  
We report three experiments. The first explores how observability reduces 
communication load and improves team performance in multi-agent teamwork. The 
second focuses on the relative contribution of each type of belief generated from 
observability to the successes of CAST-O as a whole. Finally, the third evaluates the 
impact of observability on changing communication load with increase of team size. 
7.1.3.1. Overall Effectiveness of Observability 
Two teams are defined in below. Except for the observability rules, the 
conditions of both teams were exactly the same. 
• Team A: The carrier can observe objects within a radius of 5 grid 
cells, and each fighter can sense objects within a radius of 3 grid 
cells. 
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• Team B: None of the agents have any sensing capabilities beyond 
the basic capabilities described at the beginning of the section. 
We use measures of performance which reflect the number of wumpuses killed, 
the amount of communication used and the gold picked up. In order to make 
comparisons easier, we have chosen to have decreasing values indicate improving 
performance, i.e., smaller numbers of communication messages are better. To maintain 
this uniformity with some parameters of interest, we use the quantity of wumpuses left 
alive rather than the number killed. The experiments were performed on 5 randomly 
generated worlds. The results are shown in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 shows that, as expected, Team A killed more wumpuses and found 
more gold than Team B. From other experiments, we have learned that the further the 
agents can, the more wumpuses they kill. It is interesting that the absolute number of 
communications is higher for Team A with observabilities than that of Team B, i.e., 
33.8 vs. 28.8 for O-Tell and 77.4 vs. 67.6 for O-Ask. The number of O-Tells in Team A  
were greater because the carrier, which is responsible for finding wumpuses and O-
Telling their locations to fighters, has further vision than that of the carrier in Team B. 
Hence the carrier in Team A can sense more wumpuses. This feature leads to more O-
Tells from the carrier to the fighters in Team A. The number of O-Tells can be reduced 
by the carrier’s beliefs about the fighters’ observability, i.e., if the carrier believes the 
fighters can sense the wumpus’ location, it will not O-Tell the fighters. However, since 
the fighters’ detection range is smaller than that of the carrier, the reduction cannot 
offset the number of extra O-Tells. The reason for the increased number of O-Asks in 
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Team A is that the more wumpuses team members find, the more likely it becomes that 
they send messages among themselves to decide who is closest to a particular wumpus. 
Although the number of the messages could be reduced by factors such as allowing the 
fighter to sense other fighters’ locations and to sense other fighters killing a wumpus, 
the increase cannot be totally offset because of the fighters’ short vision. Hence, it 
makes more sense to compare the average number of messages per wumpus killed. In 
these terms, the performance of Team A is much better than that of Team B, 2.23 vs. 
5.9 for O-Tell and 5.09 vs. 13.6 for O-Ask. Hence, our algorithms for managing the 
observability of agents have been effective. 
 
Table 7.1. Team Performance and Communication Amounts in Sample Runs. 
Team A T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
Run 1 4 8 82 32 5.12 2.00 
Run 2 5 9 76 35 5.06 2.33 
Run 3 6 6 72 38 5.14 2.71 
Run 4 5 7 80 32 5.33 2.13 
Run 5 4 6 77 32 4.81 2.00 
Average 4.8 7.2 77.4 33.8 5.09 2.23 
       
Team B T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
Run 1 14 14 72 30 12.00 5.00 
Run 2 16 16 62 27 15.5 6.75 
Run 3 16 14 62 27 15.5 6.75 
Run 4 14 15 72 30 12.00 5.00 
Run 5 15 14 70 30 14.00 6.00 
Average 15 14.6 67.6 28.8 13.6 5.90 
T1: number of wumpuses left alive 
T2: amount of gold left unfound 
T3: total number of O-Asks used 
T4: total number of O-Tells used 
T5: average number of O-Asks per wumpus killed 
T6: average number of O-Tells per wumpus killed 
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From this experiment, we learned two things. First, by introducing 
observabilities to agents, the amount of communication is increased slightly, because 
observability is a major means for an individual agent to obtain information about the 
environment and team members; the more information obtained by the agent, the more 
messages it conveys to help others. Second, observability can greatly decrease the 
number of communications when normalized by some measure of team performance, 
which, in this example, is the average number of communications per wumpus killed, 
denoted by ACPWK. 
7.1.3.2. Effectiveness of Different Perspectives of Observability  
The second experiment tested the contribution of different categories of belief 
generated from observability to the successful reduction of the communication. These 
beliefs are as follows:  
1) belief1: beliefs about an observed property. 
2) belief2: beliefs about an observed action whose pre-cond contains the 
information worth exchanging. 
3) belief3: beliefs about an observed action whose effect contains the 
information worth exchanging. 
4) belief4: beliefs about another agent sensing a property19. 
We test their contributions by combining them. We used Team A and Team B 
in this experiment and kept all conditions the same as those of the first experiment. We 
                                                 
19 Currently, our OBPC algorithms involve only two parts, i.e., sender and receiver. They do not 
consider the third party communication such as agent a asks b to ask c for some information. Therefore, 
belief about what another believes about an observed action executed by the third agent is not included. 
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used Team B as a control condition against which to evaluate the effectiveness of 
different combinations of observability with Team A. We named Team B, without any 
of these beliefs, combination 0, since it involves none of the four beliefs. For Team A, 
we tested another 4 combinations of these beliefs to show the effectiveness of each, in 
terms of ACPWK. These combinations are: 
0. Team B.  
1. Team A with each agent’s reasoning restricted to generating beliefs in 
category belief1. Then each agent believes properties it observes. 
2. Team A with each agent’s reasoning restricted to generating beliefs in 
categories belief1 and belief2. This allows the agent to reason what the 
doer believes the pre-cond of the observed action. This combination 
tests the effect of belief2.  
3. Team A with each agent’s reasoning restricted to generating beliefs in 
categories belief1, belief2 and belief3. Then the agent can reason what 
the doer believes the effect of the observed action. This combination 
tests how belief3 improves the situation. 
4. Team A with all the ability to reason for all four belief categories. Then 
the agent addtionlly believes that the others sense some properties. This 
combination tests the effect of belief4 and shows the effectiveness of the 
beliefs as a whole. 
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Each combination was run in the five randomly generated worlds. The average 
results of these runs are presented in Fig. 7.2, in which one bar shows ACPWK for one 
combination. 
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(b) O-Ask Protocol. 
Fig. 7.2. Average Communication per Killed Wumpus in Different Combinations. 
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The first case, agents’ belief1 (combination 1), is a major contributor to 
effective communication, for both O-Tell and O-Ask. As seen in (a), belief1 compared 
to combination 0 causes ACPWK to drop significantly for O-Tell, from 5.9 to 3.52. For 
O-Ask, in (b), ACPWK drops from 13.8 to 11.1.  
The second case, belief2 (combination 2), does not produce any further 
reduction and hence is not effective for O-Tell, but belief2 does produce improvement 
for O-Ask. For O-Tell, when a provider senses an action, meaning the doer believes the 
precondition of the action, so the provider won’t perform O-Tell. So for this example 
belief2 can be of little help in O-Tell. While for O-Ask, belief2 reduces ACPWK from 
11.1 to 9.36, because with belief2, a needer will know who has a piece of information 
explicitly. Then it can O-Ask without ambiguity. 
Third, for the similar reason that belief2 only works for O-Ask, belief3 
(combination 3) contributes little to O-Tell but further decreases ACPWK to 7.97 for 
O-Ask. 
Fourth, belief4 (combination 4) has a major effect on communications that 
applies to both protocols. It further drops ACPWK to 2.23 for O-Tell and to 5.39 for O-
Ask. Belief4 is particularly important for O-Tell. For example, if the carrier believes 
that the fighters sense a wumpus’ location, it will not tell them. 
This experiment examined the contribution of each belief deduced from 
observability to the overall effectiveness of communication. The result indicates three 
things. First, belief1 and belief4 have a strong effect on the efficiency of both O-Tell 
and O-Ask. Second, belief2 and belief3 have weak influence on the efficiency of O-
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Tell. Third, these beliefs work best together, because each of them provides a distinct 
way for agents to get information from the environment and other team members. 
Furthermore, they complement each other’s relative weaknesses, so using them 
together better serves the effectiveness of the communication as a whole. 
7.1.3.3. OBPC’s Contributions to Team Scalability 
We designed the third experiment to show how communication load changes 
with increased team size. O-Ask is directed to only one provider at certain time, while 
the O-Tell goes to all needers who do not have the information. So we assume that O-
Tell brings more communication into play than O-Ask, and then we chose to test the O-
Tell protocol. If the test results are good for O-Tell, we can expect that they are valid 
for O-Ask as well. 
We used the same sensing capabilities for Teams A and Team B as in the first 
experiment. However, we increased the number of team members by 1, 2 and 3, in two 
tests that we ran. In the first test, we increased the number of needers, (i.e. fighters,) 
and kept the same number of providers, (i.e. carriers). In the second test, we did the 
opposite. In each test, for each increment and each team, we ran the five randomly 
generated worlds and used the average value of ACPKW produced in each world. 
Fig. 7.3 shows the trend of ACPKW as a function of increasing team size. In 
(a), Team B has an obvious increase in ACPKW with increasing the team size. 
However, Team A the ACPKW remains the same. The trend can be attributed to two 
factors: first, the number of O-Tells is held down because if the carrier believes the 
fighters can sense the wumpus, the carrier does not perform O-Tell; second, the more 
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fighters there are, the more wumpuses will be killed, which enlarges the numerator of 
ACPKW. 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 2 3 4 5
Team size presented by number of needers
Av
er
ag
e 
O
-T
el
l p
er
 k
ille
d 
w
um
pu
s
Team A Team B
 
(a) Needers Increment. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
1 2 3 4 5
Team size presented by number of providers
Av
er
ag
e 
O
-T
el
l p
er
 k
ille
d 
w
um
pu
s
Team A Team B
 
(b) Providers Increment. 
Fig. 7.3. The Comparison of O-Tell with Different Team Sizes. 
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In (b), increasing the number of providers breaks the constant trend in Team A 
and shows an increased ACPWK. However, comparing this increase to that of Team B, 
it is a moderate number. In Team B, incrementing the number of providers almost 
doubled the number of O-Tells in every case. The communication load increased 
because different carriers duplicated the O-Tells of other carriers. For example, each 
carrier always provides the wumpus’ location to fighters when observing a wumpus. 
The carriers lack an effective way to predict when a piece of information is produced 
and by whom, which is one of main concerns for the empirical distribution function 
method for predicting information production and need and the decision theoretic 
method (see next Section 7.2). This experiment shows that ACPWK grows more 
slowly with increase of team size, in the team empowered with observability, which 
may indicate that observability will improve team scalability in some sense. 
7.2. Evaluation of Proactive Communication 
The experiments introduced in this section are overall evaluations of the 
Proactive Communication developed. We specify the form of utility function in the 
Multi-Agent Wumpus World domain. To show that Proactive Communication helps 
produce more effective interaction among agents in multi-agent teamwork, we design 
two other communication conditions, Always Tell and Always Ask. Experiments have 
been run under controlled by these three conditions. The results are presented that 
show the advantage of Proactive Communication in enhancing team performance as 
well as decreasing communication load. 
 169
To demonstrate Proactive Communication’s ability of handling complex 
problems, we adjusted the existing Multi-Agent Wumpus World by adding more 
uncertainties and flexibility into it, as described in the next section. 
7.2.1. Adjusted Multi-Agent Wumpus World 
The world is 20×20 and has 4 wumpuses. The team is still composed of 1 
carrier and 3 fighters. The team goal is to kill wumpuses. A complete MALLET team 
plan is given in Appendix B. The team is allowed to operate a fixed number of 5000 
steps. We let the agents’ observability region be an equilateral rhombus whose vertices 
are 7 (for carrier) or 1 (for fighters) in the X and Y directions from the agents’ location. 
We assume the agents know each other’s initial location. At each time step, the 
carrier makes a random safe move to an adjacent location not previously visited within 
the last 50 steps if possible. If there is no such location, the carrier will visit the least 
recently visited adjacent safe location.  At the start of a trail, each fighter remains at its 
initial location until it receives a wumpus location from the carrier.  Similarly, after 
killing a wumpus, a fighter will stay at the location where it killed a wumpus until it 
receives a new wumpus’ location from the carrier.  The carrier chooses the first fighter 
the carrier evaluates, if two or more fighters have the same utility. 
To facilitate estimating the time duration until the next information need (in this 
implementation, the time it takes for a fighter to kill a wumpus) and the next 
information production (the time of finding a wumpus), the fighters and carriers 
exchange information about the times at which they killed or found a wumpus.  
However, this exchange of information is included as part of tell or ask messages, and 
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is not sent separately.  For example, for each wumpus found, the carrier records the 
time at which the wumpus was found and attaches such historical data to messages sent 
to the fighters. Fighters attach the times at which they received wumpus locations and 
killed the corresponding wumpuses with each active-ask. In addition, the location of 
the sender is also included in messages sent. So the carrier knows the fighters’ present 
locations, which are the last wumpuses’ locations the carrier told the fighters, and the 
fighters know the carrier’s location (may be present or not) from the message sent by 
the carrier. Though the fighters may not have the carrier’s present location since the 
carrier keeps moving all the time, the carrier may frequently contact the fighters and 
attaches its location if proactivity is fully enabled. 
The wumpuses periodically jump to some other random location from time to 
time after their first appearance. There is no limit for how far they can jump (other than 
that they cannot jump outside of the world). The length of time they stay at their 
current locations is randomly generated from 1 to 40 steps (agents are assumed know 
this range). There is a new wumpus born at a randomly chosen location on the step 
after one has been killed, allowing us to maintain a constant number of wumpuses in 
the world. 
When a wumpus jumps before the fighter arrives at the wumpus’ location and 
kills it, we consider a new need to arise. The fighter will continue to move to the 
location at which it was told the wumpus was, and then stay at the wumpus’ location 
and make a new decision. 
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Each wumpus is assigned a hearing rhombus of radius 8 when it is generated. 
The wumpuses have a probability (the same for all wumpuses) of hearing sounds 
(messages) within their radius. A wumpus does not always hear messages because it 
does not always focus on hearing (e.g., it sleeps some). However, once a wumpus hears 
a message (sent either by a carrier to a fighter or vice versa), it will be alerted. If the 
message is from the carrier to a fighter, the wumpus can tell whether it has been 
identified. If the message is a request from a fighter to the carrier, the wumpus will 
focus on the coming reply from the carrier. But, if the wumpus has jumped before the 
time at which the reply is sent, we assume it no longer pays specific attention to the 
message emanating from a carrier within its hearing radius. Agents are assumed to 
know the wumpus’ hearing radius and the probability of hearing a message, but they 
may not know whether or not the message sender is within the wumpus’ hearing 
radius. The wumpus also has short sensing ability to an adjacent cell. Once a wumpus 
is alerted by a message and identifies itself as the target, it can sense the adjacent 
fighter and starts to fight with the fighter. The wumpus has a probability of winning the 
fight. Agents are also assumed to know this probability. One can see that, if more 
information has been sent, chances are greater that the fighters may be killed, and 
consequently fewer wumpuses will be killed in the limited length of time. Moreover, 
the game may be forced to end before the time limit if there are no fighters left. 
We assume that the wumpuses are distinguishable. This means that the carrier can 
determine whether it is sensing a wumpus for the second time (after a series of moves 
by the carrier) or is sensing a second wumpus. While the problem where the wumpuses 
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are indistinguishable is very interesting, it focuses more on the planning and reasoning 
required and obscures the principal issues of communication being addressed here. So 
we focus on the case in which the wumpuses are distinguishable in this 
implementation. 
7.2.2. Problem Analysis 
Information to be communicated in the team consists of conjuncts which are 
part of the precondition of a plan or an action and their value are unknown. For this 
example, the information is “wumpus location”. 
A list of needers and a list of providers for a given piece of information are 
generated by analyzing the preconditions and effects of plans and actions [135]. For 
this example, the provider is the carrier, and the needers are the fighters. We removed 
the domain-specific constraint which says the closest fighter will be assigned a found 
wumpus’ location (used by Yin [137]). Instead, the assignment is decided by utility 
function in determining communication policies. 
Challenges come from the problem of when the information will be provided or 
asked for. It is unnecessary that all needers be told about “wumpus location” when the 
location is discovered or that the provider always be asked about “wumpus location” 
when the location is needed. The decisions about whether or not to communicate 
depend on two kinds of knowledge: agents’ observabilities and time points at which the 
information is produced or needed. Observabilities are useful in the case that one agent 
can deduce others’ beliefs from what it has sensed. For example, if the carrier believes 
the fighter also can sense the wumpus’ location that was discovered by the carrier, the 
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carrier does not need to tell a fighter about this location, or if a fighter can find 
wumpuses by itself, the fighter does not need to ask the carrier for this information. 
However, knowing when the information is needed or produced is very important in 
the system where agents’ observabilities are limited. For example, in this domain, 
because of the fighters’ limited observabilities, it is very likely that the fighters have to 
obtain the “wumpus’ location” information via communication. The communication 
could be either the carrier proactively telling the information to the fighters, or the 
fighters actively requesting it from the carrier.  
However, knowing when the information is needed or produced is sometimes 
impossible, because the domain has uncertainties. The uncertainties come from two 
aspects. First, since the carrier moves randomly, and since the wumpuses appear 
randomly, the time duration needed for finding and killing the wumpuses would not be 
fixed and cannot be precisely calculated. Second, the agents’ decisions are not fixed 
and may vary in different situations. For example, the more up-to-date the information 
the fighters receive, the better their chance of locating the wumpuses. Nevertheless, 
since the wumpuses do not move before the next jump, a piece of old information may 
also be useful to the fighters, in the case that the fighters do not have the most recent 
one. 
7.2.3. Determining the Form of the Utility Function 
The utility function is composed of risk, cost, timeliness, and currency 
functions and those functions have been defined on a higher level in Section 6.4. In this 
implementation, they are given specific forms. 
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7.2.3.1. Risk Function 
Communication incurs risk in the Multi-Agent Wumpus World. The risk is 
defined as the potential loss of wumpuses that a fighter would kill resulting from the 
possibility that a fighter may be killed if a wumpus overhears the message delivered 
(no matter by a carrier to the fighter or by the fighter to a carrier). This is because only 
fighters are able to kill wumpuses and consequently if the wumpus has been alerted by 
the communication and kills a fighter, the loss of the fighter will seriously degrade the 
team’s ability to kill wumpuses in the future. On the other hand, because of the 
carrier’s large observability radius, it may sense wumpuses far enough away that there 
is a much lower chance of the carrier being killed; only if a wumpus is generated in the 
same cell as the carrier will the carrier be killed. The probability of this occurring is 
much lower than that of a message being overheard, and thus, we do not consider the 
possible loss of a carrier in the risk function. 
There are two cases to consider: 1) the wumpus overhears a carrier, and 2) the 
wumpus overhears a fighter. In the case that the carrier is the sender, the risk is directly 
associated with the message about wumpus whose location was found.20 However, in 
the case that a fighter is the sender, the message sent will not cause a risk directly, 
because the message is just a request and wumpuses are unable to tell who will be the 
target by hearing it. Instead, the risk is associated with the reply sent by the carrier to 
the request. Therefore, for both cases, the risk is associated with the messages sent by 
                                                 
20 Though multiple wumpuses may be discovered simultaneously, the carrier will make decisions 
regarding to each of their locations. Therefore at each decision point, we consider one wumpus 
discovered. 
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the carrier. The fighter who may be killed is the one to be told about the wumpus 
location and the wumpus that might kill the fighter is the one whose location was 
transmitted. Although unobserved wumpuses may hear the message as well, we assume 
they will not cause the risk since they are able to identify that they are not the target so 
they will not fight with the fighter. 
The risk function has been defined as R(e, St, δ) where e is the agent’s internal 
state, St is the agent’s situation at the time t of decision-making, δ is the policy under 
consideration (see Section 6.4.1). In this domain, we assume the risk of communication 
is associated with the number of steps left in a game, and two probabilities Prh and Prf: 
R = k × (5000 − t) × Prh × Prf     (7-1) 
where k is the number of wumpuses a fighter can kill per unit time, t is the number of 
steps passed, Prh is the probability that the wumpus hears the message sent by the 
carrier, and Prf is the probability that the wumpus can win against the fighter. 
To give a number to k for initial tests, we ran the system in a trial mode and k 
was estimated by the data collected from previous test runs21. We learned that the 
average number of wumpuses a fighter can kill per step is 0.01. We then set  
k=0.01. 
Regarding to Prf, we learned that if Prf is set to a number like 0.2, it is usually 
the case that all fighters died before the game ends at 5000 steps. We also learned that 
setting Prf to a low number such as 0.05 will limit the effect of risk factor. We thus set  
                                                 
21 It would be possible to obtain estimates for k dynamically as a game progresses, using EDF in a 
manner similar to that used for other aspects of the process. 
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Prf = 0.1. 
The last value to compute is Prh.  Computing Prh is more complex and dynamic 
than computing the other variables.  Suppose the area of the world is O, and rc and rf 
represent observable rhombus vertex distance from the carrier and the fighter, 
respectively. Further, we assume that the wumpus is able to hear messages sent by an 
agent within a rhombus with vertex distance of rw from the wumpus. However, the 
wumpus may or may not be paying attention to messages (e.g., it might be asleep). We 
are interested in the probability that the wumpus does hear and take action on a 
message it intercepts. We thus denote the probability that the wumpus “pays attention” 
to a message, given that it can hear the message, by Pra. We use Prr to denote the 
probability that an agent is within the hearing range rw. Then Prh, the probability of 
hearing a message, is the product of Prr, the probability that an agent is within the 
wumpus’ hearing range rw, and Pra, the probability that the wumpus pays attention to 
the message: 
Prh = Prr × Pra. 
There are two cases to consider for Pra: 1) the wumpus is “unalerted” by the 
request from the fighter, and consequently will not pay attention to the coming reply; 
and 2) the wumpus is “alerted” so will pay attention to the coming reply. For the 
“unalerted” status, since the wumpus may or may not focus on hearing at any time, we 
assume Pra is 0.1: 
Pra = 0.1. 
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One can expect that the consideration of Pra for the “alerted” status is more 
complex. Therefore in the form Prh=Prr×Pra, we focus on Prr and Pra for the “alerted” 
status. We consider rc < rw, which is our current setting22. We analyze Prh separately for 
the case that the carrier is proactively telling a message or that a message is a reply sent 
by the carrier regarding to a request from a fighter. Then the risk will take place for 
three of carrier’s policies: ProactiveTell, Reply and WaitUntilNext. 
Table 7.2 shows Prh, the probability that the wumpus hears the message sent by 
the carrier, for these policies (calculation details is presented in Appendix C). Once Prh 
is computed, risk can be easily computed by Eq. (7-1).  The difficulty is that there are 
two unknown parameters in this table, H and Dn. H is the length of time between the 
last time the carrier was the wumpus and the time the wumpus will jump.  Dn is the 
time between the time the carrier last saw the wumpus and the current time.  These 
parameters must be estimated. The methods of estimating these parameters are also 
given in Appendix C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 The calculation of Prh in rc ≥ rw would be simpler than the current setting, in that the carrier can 
explicitly calculate whether or not the wumpus is able to hear the message. So we only consider rc < rw in 
experiments. 
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Table 7.2. Prh in Risk Function for Different Policies. 
                                   Probability 
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7.2.3.2. Cost Function 
We have defined the cost as the following form in Section 6.4: 
C({m})=
⎩⎨
⎧
×+
=
otherwiselen({m})kk
{m} if                              0
10
ϕ
 
where k0 and k1 are coefficients and {m} is a set of messages used by a policy. 
Empirical data shows that k0 is a base cost of sending a message and k1 is a parameter 
which adjusts the effect of the message size to the cost [134]. Typically, k0 is much 
larger than k1. Therefore, we assume that k1=0. Communication is generally considered 
to be cheap in the present time. Hence we also set k0=0. According to this, 
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C({m})=0. 
7.2.3.3. Timeliness Function 
At the abstract level, the timeliness is represented by two functions: fs, the value 
of timeliness under the condition that the most recently produced information is sent, 
and ff, the value of using old information (see Section 6.6.1 for detail). 
fs has been defined as a non-increasing function of a time difference d between 
tn, the time at which an information item is needed, and tp, the time at which the 
information provided is produced: 
fs(d(tn, tp)) 
where d=max(0, tp–tn). If the fighters are able to receive wumpuses’ locations as 
quickly as possible, they may catch more wumpuses before the wumpuses jump and 
kill them. Thus, the timeliness loss is the number of wumpuses a fighter can kill per 
unit time multiplied by the delay time. Accordingly, we assume the form of function fs 
in this example as: 
fs= ⎩⎨
⎧
−
<
otherwise    )tk(t
t tif                    0
pn
np . 
The rationale for this form of timeliness is that the further in the future the value used 
will be produced, the more likely the more opportunity to kill wumpuses is lost while 
waiting.  
ff generally is domain dependent and can be determined on many different 
bases. In this domain, the wumpuses periodically jump to some other random location 
and the time duration of staying on one place is also random. Therefore, once a 
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wumpus jumps (meaning the value for I is changed), there is no gain for a fighter to 
chase the old wumpus’ location. Hence the value for communicating the old location is 
zero: 
ff = 0. 
7.2.3.4. Concurrency Function 
On the highest level, the currency has been defined as a probability function P: 
Pr( ¬∃  τ ∈ Int(tp, tu] ∋ IP(τ) | St ∧ δ), 
which means that no other value is produced between (tp, tu], conditional on a policy δ 
which is chosen by agents in the situation event St at time t (see Section 6.6.2). 
The currency function of this implementation is not exactly the same because of 
the unique characteristics of the domain. However, it rests on the same idea worked out 
in Section 6.6.2. At the highest level, P uses tu, which is the time at which IP(tp) is used 
by the needer. But we did not specify whether tu denotes when the use of IP(tp) begins 
or ends. In this domain, it is important for a fighter to arrive at a found wumpus’ 
location before the wumpus jumps. Therefore tu represents the end use of IP(tp). Hence 
in this domain, tu is the time at which the fighter arrives at the wumpus’ location. We 
assume P represents the probability that the wumpus does not jump between the time 
interval Int(tp, tu]: 
Pr( ¬∃  τ ∈ Int(tp, tu] ∋ wumpus jumps at τ | St ∧ δ). 
For simplicity, P is represented as: 
Pr(WNJ(tp, tu)), 
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where the event “wumpus not jump between Int(tp, tu]” is abbreviated as WNJ(tp, 
tu).Though the probability function P is computed on a general level in Section 6.7, 
Pr(WNJ(tp, tu)) must be reconsidered since it is a specific form for this domain. 
In the following sub-sections, we describe the general idea of computing 
Pr(WNJ(tp, tu)). 
7.2.3.4.1. General Ideas 
We need to determine the probability of a wumpus not jumping between tp, the 
time at which the wumpus location provided to the needer is produced, and tu, the time 
at which the fighter arrives at that location. This probability equals: 
Pr(WNJ(tp, tu))=Pr(tu−tp<J),                (7-2) 
where J denotes the difference between the time at which the value for I was produced 
and the time at which the wumpus jumps. J must conform to this constraint: 
J∈[1, 40−D0], 
where D0 (D0∈[1, 40]) denotes the length of time that the wumpus was in its current 
location before being sensed by the carrier. 
Eq. (7-2) depends upon a number of parameters, the obvious ones being D0, J, 
tu and tp.  However, it also depends upon Lw(tp), and Lf(tn), where Lw and Lf refer to the 
locations of the wumpus and the fighter respectively because these locations determine 
the distance between the fighter and the wumpus, and hence the time required for the 
fighter to move to the wumpus. In addition, for some possible values for Lw, there is a 
dependence upon the location of the carrier, Lc. Let t be the current time at which the 
evaluation is being performed. One important notational issue is that, rather than 
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referring to locations at specific times, Lw and Lc refer to locations at tp while Lf refers 
to the location at tn.  
Depending upon the communication policy for which Pr(tu−tp <J) is being 
calculated, several of the parameters are known. Nevertheless, in each case some 
parameters remain unknown. In some of these cases, the probability distributions of the 
values of unknown parameters can be obtained through the EDF methodology 
described in Section 5.3; in others, the probability distributions can be determined 
easily from the environment description. In a few cases, it is possible to make 
reasonable estimates of the distributions. Thus, we treat the unknown parameters as 
random variables and use the law of total probability to calculate E{Pr(tu−tp <J)} with 
respect to the unknown values: 
)lL ,lL ,lL ,τ t,τ tj,J d,Pr(D
)lL ,lL ,lL ,τ t,τ tj,J d,D | JtPr(t
ffwwcc2n1p0
ffwwcc2n1p0pu
lllττjd fwc21
=======×
=======<−
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑
      (7-3) 
The parameters all have discrete values. Some of the distributions are joint. Some of 
the random variables are independent, e.g., D0, and their distributions can be 
determined separately. Though theoretically, the time parameters have infinite ranges, 
in practice, the EDF distributions used as approximations will have only finite ranges.  
Some notes can be made regarding parameters in this expression. First of all, J 
has a relationship to D0, i.e., J ≤ 40-D0. The carrier can sometimes decide whether 
D0=0 or not by analyzing what it has observed. The carrier moves only one step every 
time. So a newly found wumpus should be on the edge of the carrier’s observability 
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radius. If this is not true, the carrier can then decide that this wumpus just jumped into 
the carrier’s observable area and hence D0=0. The judgment also can be made the other 
way around. If a found wumpus that is not on the edge suddenly disappears on current 
observation, the wumpus jumped, or if a found wumpus is not in the same position as a 
previous observation, the wumpus jumped. Remember, we assume wumpuses are 
distinguishable, so the carrier is able to track each wumpus’ position and often use this 
knowledge to deduce D0. 
Handling the case in which D0=0 is straightforward; the first summation in 
expression (7-3) simply drops out and d =0 is used in the rest of the equation. As this is 
a simple modification of the general result, we assume D0 ≠ 0 in the rest of our 
analysis. Therefore, the probability mass function for d in expression (7-3) is simply a 
constant equal to 1/40, and is independent of all of the other variables. J has a 
relationship to D0, i.e., J ≤ 40−D0; hence the mass function for j may be treated as 
1/(40−d), and it is then independent of all of the remaining variables. 
We can do statistical estimations for tn and tp based on their EDF distributions. 
As for Lc, Lf and Lw, determination of exact distributions is unduly computational 
complex because of the limited observability of agents and the random walk of agents. 
Hence we need to seek a reasonable and computationally feasible approximation. 
7.2.3.4.2. A Study of the General Case  
To elaborate the determination of the probability, we examine the most general 
case and analyze the process of calculating expression (7-3). This case covers all of the 
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situations, policies and sub-cases that will be considered later. All other cases are either 
subset of this case or variations that can be easily adapted from this one. 
The general case is that, the decision maker (either the carrier or the fighter) 
does not know Lw, Lc, and Lf. The estimation for Lw can base on Lc because the 
wumpus must be inside of the carrier’s observation area. Since Lc is also unknown (this 
happens even if the carrier itself is the decision maker as the carrier makes estimation 
to future decisions), the decision maker could use the most recent location of the carrier 
it knows and calculate the range of possible motions. The statistical estimations for tn 
and tp will be used to estimate this range. To estimate Lf (the fighter needs not do that 
since it does not need to estimate its own future decisions), the carrier can take 
advantage of wumpus locations sent to the fighter because the fighter won’t move 
before receiving a new location. Having estimations for Lw, Lc, and Lf, the distance 
between the wumpus and the fighter can be determined. Combining this distance with 
the knowledge about D0, J, tp and tn, expression (7-3) can be computed. 
Since either tn or tp may be unknown, depending upon whether it is the carrier 
or the fighter that is making a decision, the carrier may move between the last point at 
which its locations were known to the decision maker (either the carrier or the fighter) 
and the time tp. In order to calculate an approximation for the desired value, we will 
need to consider the range of possible motions from some known points in time. In 
order to be able to refer to these, we use the following notation: 
tcl = the most recent time at which the decision maker knows the location of the carrier. 
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Let σ be the length of time the carrier moves from the time tcl to tp, the time at 
which it finds the wumpus. The reason of introducing σ is that in some cases, Lc is 
unknown, so we need to estimate Lc, based on distance the carrier moved from a 
known time point tcl to tp. So σ must be greater than 0, i.e., 
σ = max(tp–tcl, 0).  
The actual values to be used for σ will vary with the situation, policy and decision 
maker being considered. However, once these values are known, the desired value can 
be approximated. 
Next we analyze the length of time it takes the fighter to move to the wumpus’ 
location. We denote this length of time as Dk. Dk is equal to the distance between the 
fighter and the wumpus, since the fighter moves one step toward the wumpus at each 
time step, 
Dk=|Xf−Xw|+|Yf−Yw| 
where Xf, Yf, Xw and Yw denote the x and y coordinate positions for the fighter and the 
wumpus (Lf = (Xf, Yf), Lw = (Xw, Yw)). Xf, Yf, Xw and Yw must conform to these 
constraints: 
1≤Xw≤20,    1≤Xf≤20, 
1≤Yw≤20,    1≤Yf≤20. 
Given a number of steps, j, after which the wumpus will jump, the fighter must 
also be able to reach the wumpus within j steps. As a first step in calculating Pr(tu−tp 
<J), we calculate the probability that given j and a wumpus location, Lw = (Xw, Yw), the 
fighter can reach the wumpus before it jumps (recall that the fighter does not move 
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without knowing a wumpus location). We define a function fm which indicates whether 
or not a fighter’s location Lf is within j steps from the Lw: 
fm(Xw, Yw, Xf, Yf, j) = ⎩⎨
⎧ ≤−+−
otherwise                                 0
j|YY| |XX| if    1 fwfw . 
To determine Dk, we need to know the wumpus’ location Lw which in some 
cases depends on the carrier‘s location Lc, since Lw must be inside the carrier’s 
observability area. This region is an equilateral rhombus whose vertices are 
observability radius rc in the X and Y directions from Lc; the area of this rhombus is 
2 2cr +2 cr +1. We assume the wumpus will be randomly located in the observable area 
of the carrier23. Then, given the carrier’s location (Xc, Yc) at time tp, the probability that 
the wumpus is inside of the carrier’s observability range, and meanwhile can be 
reached by the fighter within j steps, is: 
Pw(Xc, Yc, j) 
=∑ ∑+ −= −−+ −−−=)rX ,20min( )rX max(1,X |))XX|(rY min(20, |))XX|(rY max(1,Ycc ccw cwcc cwccw 1r22r 1 c2c ++ ×fm(Xw, Yw, Xf, Yf, j). 
Next, we consider the effect of possible carrier’s motion. Since we know that at 
time tp, the carrier must be able to sense the wumpus, the wumpus must be located 
within the region to which the carrier could have moved from its last known location, 
denoted Lcl, extended by the observability region. Lc must be inside the region which is 
reachable from Lcl within σ steps. This region is also an equilateral rhombus whose 
radius is σ and center is Lcl, and its area is 2σ2+2σ+1. 
                                                 
23 While this is not precisely correct, it can be shown to be a good approximation. 
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We represent the probability that the carrier is at a location Lσ after σ steps 
from Lcl by Pr(Lσ). Then the probability that the carrier is within σ steps from (Xcl, 
Ycl), and the wumpus is inside of the carrier’s observability range and can be reached 
by the fighter within j steps is: 
Pc(Xcl, Ycl, j) 
=∑ ∑+ −= −−+ −−−=)σX ,20min( σ)X max(1,X |))XX|(σY min(20, |))XX|(σY max(1,Ycl clc clccl clcclc Pr(Lσ = (Xc, Yc))×Pw. 
Finally, combining all of these, with J, D0 as random variables,  
E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} 
=∑ ∑= −= −×401d d401j d401401 × 
∑ ∑+ −= −−+ −−−=)σX ,20min( σ)X max(1,X |))XX|(σY min(20, |))XX|(σY max(1,Ycl clc clccl clcclc Pr(Lσ = (Xc, Yc))×  
∑ ∑+ −= −−+ −−−=)rX ,20min( )rX max(1,X |))XX|(rY min(20, |))XX|(rY max(1,Ycc ccw cwcc cwccw 1r22r 1 c2c ++ ×fm(Xw, Yw, Xf, Yf, j)   (7-4) 
In Eq. (7-4), though we use several layers of summation, the computational 
complexity is not as high as it appears because ranges of the variables are limited. In 
addition, in many of the sub-cases that must be evaluated, tn>tp, which means that 
information I was produced a while before the fighter needs it, will further increase the 
lower bound on the values of j that are possible, and this in turn, will decrease the 
upper bound on the range of possible values of d. Hence the range of the summations 
over j and d is further reduced. Moreover, in many of the sub-cases, one or more of the 
variables are known, and the expression can be reduced (we will consider these sub-
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cases separately in Section 7.2.4). However, Eq. (7-4) depends upon one unknown 
probability mass functions, Pr(Lσ = (Xc, Yc)). In order to use it, one must either 
determine this mass functions or approximate it in some way. 
Determining the exact value of these mass functions is difficult. In the absence 
of a theoretical solution, which we have not been able to find, there are several 
different ways of approaching the problem of determining values to use for these mass 
functions. For example, one could run a large number of Monte Carlo simulations to 
determine them. Alternatively, one can make some simplifying approximations. These 
will be considered in the next section. 
7.2.3.4.3. Approximations for Pr(Lσ) 
One probability mass function appears in Eq. (7-4), that is Pr(Lσ=(Xc, Yc)), the 
probability that the location to which the carrier might have moved is within σ steps 
from a known location. In the following, we propose two approximations for 
Pr(Lσ=(Xc, Yc)). 
7.2.3.4.3.1. General Approximation 
A trivially simple approximation would be that, having no information about 
the carrier’s location, we assume that the carrier is randomly placed in the area which is 
within σ steps to its location at tcl. In other words, Pr(Lσ=(Xc, Yc))=1/(2σ2+2σ+1), 
which means that all points inside of the area are reachable with equal probability. 
However, clearly the points further away are less likely to be reached than those closer 
to the carrier’s location at tcl, because the carrier’s motion conforms to random walk; 
we can take advantage of the nature of the random walk. 
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7.2.3.4.3.2. Simplified Approximation 
This assumption uses some results of random walk to generate a simple 
approximation to the probability Pr(Lσ = (Xc, Yc)). [126] shows that without our 
restriction of not revisiting a place, the average distance the carrier has gone within σ 
steps would be σ . Note that σ  will not be an integer. Then, one might use an area 
with a radius equal to the expected value of the distance of movement. Therefore, we 
will use σ  as the expected distance the wumpus will move in σ steps, and 
approximate the distribution by a constant within an equilateral rhombus whose 
vertices are σ  in the X and Y directions from the last wumpus location. That is, we 
could take Pr(Lσ = (Xc, Yc))=1/(2σ+2 σ +1). 
7.2.3.4.3.3. Finalizing Pr(Pσ) 
While the Simplified Approximation is still a coarse approximation, it is likely 
to be better than the General Approximation because it does capture, in some sense, the 
feature of random movement of carrier. Therefore we use Simplified Approximation. 
Using the Simplified Approximation, Eq. (7-4) is modified to: 
E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} 
=∑ ∑= −= −×401d d401j d401401 × 
∑ ∑+ −= −−+ −−−=)σX ,20min( )σX max(1,X |))XX|σ(Y min(20, |))XX|σ(Y max(1,Ycl clc clccl clcclc 1σ22σ 1 ++ ×  
∑ ∑+ −= −−+ −−−=)rX ,20min( )rX max(1,X |))XX|(rY min(20, |))XX|(rY max(1,Ycc ccw cwcc cwccw 1r22r 1 c2c ++ ×fm(Xw, Yw, Xf, Yf, j)(7-5) 
 190
which needs three inputs: σ, Lcl and Lf. 
The general case will be referred frequently by later cases, so we abbreviate it 
as GenrealCase. Based on it, we can compute Pr(tu–tp<J) for each situation/policy 
combinations. In Appendix D, we study Pr(tu–tp<J) for each situation/policy 
combination needed to apply our decision theoretic model. For specific combinations, 
several variables have known or estimatable values, reducing the number of 
summations of Eq. (7-5), and the probability mass function usually take on a simple 
form. Moreover, the ranges of the summations are related in many cases, further 
reducing the complexity of the computation. 
7.2.4. EDF Implementation Issues 
In Section 5.5, we discussed implementation issues related to our EDF 
approach and proposed various possible solutions for each issue. In this section, we 
specify the solutions that are feasible in our domain. 
7.2.4.1. System Initialization 
We assume that needers have needs at the beginning of a trial, i.e., they are 
ready to fight wumpuses, but have no knowledge of wumpus locations (except in the 
low probability event that a wumpus is initially adjacent to a fighter). We ran the 
system in a trial mode and collected data of information production or need time 
intervals. We used these data to create initial values for the need and production 
intervals; these are replaced with EDF generated values when the agents begin to 
collect current data. Therefore agents are able to predict time points of productions or 
needs as soon as the system starts.  
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7.2.4.2. Preventing Having History Starvation and Communication Deadlock 
A fighter could wait a long time if the carrier’s estimate of the fighter’s need 
time is far off due to limited data. Communication also could be in deadlock if both 
needer and provider each wait for a message from the other. In both cases, agents need 
secondary decisions. Our approach is to set a time cutoff To=80 steps. If a fighter has 
being waiting beyond this time, it will send out a request to the carrier and attach its 
historical data. It is unnecessary for the carrier to initiate the contact or to make contact 
whenever the delay expires, because it is important that the carrier have the historical 
data about the fighter’s need, adjust its own prediction, and help the fighter proactively. 
7.2.5. Experiments 
We report two experiments. The first validates the systems development and 
the second evaluates the effectiveness of Proactive Communication. 
7.2.5.1. Comparison Conditions 
We will compare our approach, Proactive Communication, with other two 
approaches: Always Tell and Always Ask. All other settings are the same for each of 
the three test conditions except communication policies being used, which is described 
below. 
7.2.5.1.1. Always Tell Condition 
The different location for each distinguishable wumpus will be told when the 
carrier observes it. The carrier’s decision-making is based on each fighter’s last 
location. Initially, this is each fighter’s initial location. Later, it is the location of the 
last wumpus to which the fighter was directed. It will assign the wumpus to the nearest 
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fighter on that basis. The fighters do not issue communication throughout the game and 
will stay at the wumpuses’ locations if the wumpuses have jumped before the fighter’s 
arrival. If the fighters have more than one wumpus location, they will use the most 
recent one.  
7.2.5.1.2. Always Ask Condition 
Since we assume needers have needs at the beginning, all fighters will ask the 
carrier for wumpuses’ locations at the first step. After that, each fighter will send out a 
request once it finishes killing a wumpus about which the carrier told it. When the 
fighter arrives at the location told but does not sense the wumpus, it will ask the carrier 
again and stay at this position until it receives other information. 
Rules of the carrier’s reply are: 1) if the carrier has one request and one 
information item available, it will assign the information to that fighter who sent the 
request; 2) if the carrier has multiple requests and multiple information items, it will 
assign each location to the nearest requesting fighter; initially, each fighter’s location is 
its initial position, and later, it will be the location of the last wumpus it killed; 3) if the 
carrier has multiple requests and one information item, it will send that information 
item to the fighter that made the earliest request; 4) if the carrier has no information 
item available when it receives a request, the reply will be deferred to the time at which 
an item is produced; 5) if the carrier receives no request at the time of production, it 
will save this information and will provide it to the next request. If multiple 
information items are saved, the providing is based on the order from the most recent 
item to the old one. 
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7.2.5.1.3. Proactive Communication Condition 
For both carrier and fighters, decisions about communication policies depend 
on the utility of the policies. The carrier makes decisions every time it finds a different 
location for each distinguishable wumpus, whether or not this wumpus’ previous 
locations were sent. The fighters make decisions every time they finish killing the 
wumpuses about which the carrier told them. In the case that the fighters do not see the 
wumpuses when arriving at the locations indicated, a new need will raise and the 
fighters need to make new decisions at this time. 
7.2.5.2. Experiment Data 
The following data were collected from experiments: 
WK: the number of wumpuses killed; 
WF: the number of wumpuses found; 
WT: the total number of wumpuses generated; 
AL: the number of agents left alive; 
FK: the number of fighters killed; 
MT: the total number of messages exchanged; 
ST: the total number of steps a game runs before the end (the game may be 
forced to end before 5000 steps if all fighters died). 
7.2.5.3. Measurements 
We measure the effectiveness of Proactive Communication, Always Tell and 
Always Ask based on the elements listed in Table 7.3. 
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Table 7.3. Experiment Measurements. 
Measurement Formula Criterion 
Metric1 
1000
WK
FK ×  The lower the better 
Metric2 Metric1 × MT The lower the better 
Metric3 AL × WK The higher the better 
Metric4 
MT
Metric3  
The higher the better 
 
We measured team performance from two aspects: loss and gain. Metric1 and 2 
regard the former and Metric3 and 4 regard the latter. 
Metric1 presents the loss ratio of FK (fighter killed) vs. WK (wumpus killed). 
Since FK may be much less than WK, we amplify the ratio 1000 times. We expect 
fewer fighters dead but more wumpus killed, so the lower Metric1, the better team 
performance. 
In Metric2, MT (message total) is added to Metric1 as a factor. Metric2 
combines effects of loss ratio and communication load. We expect the low loss ratio 
and the low communication load. So a low Metric2 is desirable for an effective team.  
Metric3 measures team performance from a gain aspect. It evaluates AL (agent 
alive) and WK (wumpus killed). Obviously high Metric3 means effectiveness.  
Metric4 adds MT (communication amount) to Metric3 as a numerator, meaning 
that we expect more alive agents and killed wumpuses, but less communications. 
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7.2.5.4. Experiment Basics 
We used three teams, Team PC (using Proactive Communication), Team AT 
(using Always Tell) and Team AA (using Always Ask). Except for the communication 
conditions, settings of all teams were exactly the same. 
We ran 30 randomly generated worlds under each condition. We use statistical 
t-test to test means of results for three teams. The t-test is often used to assess the 
equality of a pair of means by using the formula as follow [42]: 
s
mean2-mean1P =  
where s is a measure of variation, which has specific form for different types of tests 
[51]. We use unpaired t-test, where s is combination of standard deviations of two 
samples (detail about the combination can be found in [42]). 
7.2.5.5. System Developments Validation and Analysis 
Obviously WK, the number of wumpuses killed, is a key measurement. WK 
largely depends on WF, the number of wumpuses found by the carrier. WF in turn 
depends on the carrier’s observability, the fighter’s observability and WT, the total 
number of wumpuses which are generated during a game. Since the fighter has very 
limited observation radius (only 1), the large amount of WF is produced by the 
carrier’s observability. Since the carrier’s observability radius is the same for all three 
test conditions, WT becomes the prime element on deciding WF. In fact there are two 
way relations between WT and WF. On the one hand, the higher WT may lead to more 
WF. On the other hand, the higher WF is, the more wumpus locations will be told by 
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the carrier to the fighters, resulting in more wumpuses being killed by the fighters, and 
consequently more new wumpuses being generated, resulting in more WT. To present 
relations between WF and WT, and more important, to provide a fair test base for three 
teams, we validate WF and WT for each team and show they produce the same 
quantity of data.  We use the ratio WF/WT as the base for validation. The data is 
shown in Table 7.4. 
 
Table 7.4. Experiment Base Validations in Sample Runs. 
        
Data 
Team 
ST WF WT WF/WT(%) 
Team PC 5000 358 1146 31.29 
Team AT 4761 369 1167 31.59 
Team AA 4300 304 992 31.02 
 
Table 7.4 first gives us basic ideas about general performance of each team. 
Basically about one thousand wumpuses are generated for a 5000 steps game. Team 
PC is able to perform all games throughout 5000 steps; while the other two teams end 
the game earlier (especially for Team AA), meaning all fighters were dead before 5000 
steps. The cause for fighters’ early death is the communication risk. We will elaborate 
this point in next experiment. 
Another observation to Table 7.4 is that the value of WF/WT is about the same 
for three teams. Table 7.5 shows P value for two pair teams, PC vs. AT and PC vs. AA, 
with respect to WF/WT. By conventional criteria, their differences are considered to be 
not statistically significant. This validates system developments such as agents’ motion 
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rules, agents’ observability rules, rules about wumpuses’ random jumping, and rules 
about new wumpuses’ generation. Based on these, we can perform the further 
evaluation. 
 
Table 7.5. P Value with Respect to WF/WT. 
Team P Explanation 
PC vs. AT 0.3454 Not statistic different 
PC vs. AA 0.5700 Not statistic different 
 
 
7.2.5.6. Effectiveness Evaluation and Analysis 
This experiment explores how Proactive Communication reduces 
communication load and improves team performance in multi-agent teamwork. Fig. 7.4 
shows the effectiveness evaluation and the P value of the two pair teams, with respect 
to Metrics1, 2, 3 and 4. We expect Team PC to have lower values for Metric1 and 2, 
and higher values for Metric3 and 4.  
By studying Fig. 7.424, we find that, as our expectation, Team PC performs best 
, regarding Metric1, Metric2, and Metric4. The P values also show that the differences 
between the two pair teams are statistically significant. 
 
                                                 
24 The lines between the sample points should not be there, as the points are not interpolating values. The 
lines are only used to distinguish the data for each team. 
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Metric1 
AA 15.16 PC vs. AA <0.0001 Extremely statistic different 
(a) Metric1. 
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PC 1252.09 P Explanation 
AT 2691.09 PC vs. AT 0.0004 Extremely statistic different 
 
Metric2 
AA 8422.00 PC vs. AA <0.0001 Extremely statistic different 
(b) Metric2. 
Fig. 7.4. Effectiveness Evaluation with Respect to Metric1-Metric4. 
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(c) Metric3. 
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Metric4 
AA 0.48 PC vs. AA <0.0001 Extremely statistic different 
(d) Metric4. 
Fig. 7.4. Continued. 
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The results for Metric3 were not quite as good in that while Team PC has a 
very significantly better performance than Team AA, and its average metric is better 
than that of Team AT, the difference from AT is not quite statistically significant. The 
reason is that, by being always told about wumpuses locations, fighters of Team AT, 
are able to receive the most timely and the most recent items, allowing them to kill as 
many wumpuses as they can in a limited length of time, though they are exposed to 
greater risk and suffer some loss from this. To help understand these results, it is 
interested to take a close look to communication policies used by each team.  
By Always Asking for information at the time when needs occur, fighters are 
able to receive the most timely and the most recent items, allowing them to kill as 
many wumpuses as they can in a limited length of time. Moreover, carriers can track 
the exact locations of fighters, which are the locations of the wumpuses’ the fighters 
were last told. This ensures their choosing the fighter closest to the wumpus found 
every time. The disadvantage of Team AA is the possible high communication risk. 
Under the Always Ask condition, obtaining an information item by a fighter costs at 
least two messages (one ask and one reply). So Team AA would exchange the largest 
numbers of messages. When the fighter asks for a wumpus location, the chance of 
alerting the wumpus will be increased. This again increases the chance that the fighter 
is killed, and consequently, fewer wumpuses killed, and often ends the game ahead of 
time with all of the fighters being killed.  Hence, the Proactive Communication 
approach is better because of the better management of risk. 
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The Always Tell condition can almost guarantee a high degree of effectiveness 
in conveying timely and the most recent information as Always Ask does. The carrier 
is able to (without time delay) provide the latest wumpus location to fighters and then 
the fighters can use the most recent location to chase wumpuses. However, this 
approach also has a high communication risk, resulting in similar disadvantages to 
those of Always Ask. Therefore, the more wumpus locations provided; the more 
wumpuses will be alerted. Consequently, the chance that the fighter will be killed is 
increased over that of proactive communication, though not as much so as with active 
ask. 
Proactive Communication may not be able to deliver as timely as the other two 
conditions. Sometimes carriers must keep silence or fighters have to wait or use the old 
information, if the risk of communication exceeds its value. This keeps the team safe 
but brings two side effects: 1) fewer wumpus locations are told, compared to the 
number of wumpuses found; and 2) information exchange is delayed. Hence Team PC 
may not be able to kill as many wumpuses as the other two teams do. However, this 
could be compensated by minimizing the number of messages sent and the risk of 
fighters’ death. In fact, the death of a fighter is a heavy loss to the team. It will lead to 
the fewer wumpuses been killed, or even the forcefully end of the game. Proactive 
Communication wins on communication amount mainly because it sends the 
information only when it is needed, in spite of changes of the information. So Proactive 
Communication results in the fewest messages exchanged. 
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Based on above analysis, it makes more sense to compare the average number 
of wumpus killed per message. In this term, which is Metric4, the performance of 
Team PC is statistically better than those of Team AT and Team AA. Hence, our 
algorithms for managing Proactive Communication have been effective. 
7.3. Summary 
In this section, we have first conducted in-depth empirical evaluations in the 
Multi-Agent Wumpus World, comparing the relative numbers of O-Tell and O-Ask for 
agent teams with and without observability. We have also given specific forms of risk, 
cost, timeliness and currency functions in the Multi-Agent Wumpus World. We 
presented two experiments that validate the system developments and explore the 
effectiveness of operating teamwork under Proactive Communication.  The results of 
these experiments show that our approaches have improved the team performance. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1. Conclusions 
My long-term research goal is to understand intelligence and to build human 
knowledge into software agents to support decision-making, and to improve the 
productivity and adaptability of autonomous systems in complex and dynamic 
environments. Toward this goal, I have researched Proactive Communication in agent 
teamwork 
In Observation-Based Proactive Communication, we employed agents’ 
observabilities as major means for decreasing the volume of communication in a 
dynamic and partially observable environment [141]. We formally defined what is 
observable and under which conditions. The exploration of observability also carefully 
clarifies the relationships among what an agent can see, what it actually sees, and what 
it believes from its seeing. This, however, is not enough to allow inference of belief 
about other agents and use of this belief to track their mental states. We then defined 
agents’ beliefs about the observabilities of other agents. The amount of communication 
is reduced by agents’ using observation of the environment and beliefs of teammates’ 
observabilities to estimate the teammates’ beliefs without generating unnecessary 
messages. 
Decision-Theoretic Proactive Communication uses decision theory to enable 
agents to decide whether or not to engage in a communication act when less is known 
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about the domain and the results of their interaction with it, and communication may 
incur cost and risk. It allows agents to tell others proactively about a piece of 
information when producing it, or to ask actively for a piece of information when 
needing it [14, 141]. It formally includes the notion that the times at which an agent 
needs or produces a value for an item of information is random according to some 
(unknown) distributions. The idea of Dynamic Information Prediction is to develop 
techniques for estimating the distributions of information production or need and use 
these data to model utilities of each communication strategy available for agents on 
each situation of decision-making. The estimation serves proactive communication in 
two ways: first, agents can proactively tell up-to-date information to agents who need 
it; second, it helps on providing a more accurate and efficient way of communicating 
information than randomly selecting a receiver, or making the selection in a specific 
order, in that agents can dynamically issue communication at the right time to the right 
receivers without having to know all about the receivers. 
The decision-theoretic approach provides agents with an optimal way to fulfill 
their information needs under uncertainties, caused by incomplete information about 
the teamwork, the environment, and the potential value, cost and risk of information 
delivery. We developed a set of communication policies for agents in different 
situations. Since the various policies involve using the information produced at 
different times or satisfying needs at different times, we carefully studied different 
points in time, which describes the range of possibilities encompassed by the different 
strategies adequately. We analyzed parameters that should be included in the utility 
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function and recognized effects in determining the form of the value, the cost and the 
risk which compose the utility function. The distinguishing feature of the decision-
theoretic approach is that we focus on analyzing the information production and need 
of team members and use these data to capture the complex decision processes of 
information needer and provider. Moreover, this approach emphasizes decision 
interactions between the needer and provider, i.e. their decisions are interdependent, so 
they must consider the impact of their counterpart’s decisions upon their own. 
8.2. Future Work 
There are two aspects work we plan to do in the future. First we will enhance 
the current model by extending its functionalities. Then this model will be applied into 
several real applications. 
8.2.1. Extensions to This Research 
8.2.1.1. Extending the Current Model to Multiple Needers and Providers Model 
The current selectPolicy algorithm (see section 6.9) can well handle the one-to-
one model, i.e., there is one provider and one needer for an information item I25. In this 
case, agents consider interactions with their counterpart agents and make decisions. To 
deal with many-to-many model, which includes multiple needers and providers of an 
information item I, we did a straightforward extension to the one-to-one model. We 
assume agents still focus on interactions with their counterparts and consider only the 
number of counterparts is extended. 
                                                 
25 The system may still contain multiple agents. But for a piece of information, there is only one needer 
and one provider. 
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Extending the one-to-one model to the many-to-many model in a more 
complete way would require including complicated interactions among needers and 
providers. For a needer, it must monitor not only each provider, but also other needers. 
Thus, when making decision, the needer must estimate every provider's policy to the 
needer itself, every provider's policy to every other needer, and every other needer’s 
policy to every provider. Similar processes can occur to the provider. This extension of 
our work could take advantage of policies and utilities devised in current model and 
focus on developing feasible decision rules to coordinate time orders of multiple 
productions and needs.  
We would start with analyzing the case of multiple needers. When several 
needers want I, their needs for I are dynamically changed during teamwork. In many 
situations, every new value for I must be used and once it is used, it is unnecessary to 
use it again, such as location of an enemy target. Hence, except that the provider should 
pay attention to provide the unused I to needers who have needs, every needer also 
needs to watch when other needers’ needs raised and whether they have actively asked 
for I or have been told proactively. Therefore, when making a decision, a needer needs 
to consider the provider's decision in relation to the needer, the provider's decision 
relative to every other needer, and every other needer’s decision relative to the 
provider. 
In the case of multiple providers, a provider has the similar concerns to those of 
the needers above. In the situation where a provider produces I, it is possible that 
another provider also produced I recently and has sent I to the needer, by either 
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proactive tell or reply to the needer’s request. In this case, the provider may not provide 
I because the needer may not need I soon. Just as the needer can ask an arbitrary 
provider for I, an arbitrary provider can help the needer proactively. Thus, a provider 
needs to consider the needer's decision in relation to the provider, the needer's decision 
relative to every other provider, and every other provider’s decision relative to the 
needer. 
In the future, we still want to focus on decision interactions between the 
decision maker and its counterparts. In the many-to-many model, we can adjust the 
decision rule we will develop for the one-to-one model. We will add the counterpart 
agent as one parameter in the utility function. In the case of multiple providers, the 
needer will evaluate the utility function with respect to each provider, and then follow 
the strategy of the provider that yields the highest utility. However, when end states in 
the needers state diagram that call for additional reasoning are reached, the needer will 
re-evaluate the utility functions and possibly make a new decision, which may mean 
asking a different provider. However, the decision process will have to be extended 
because additional situations can occur, e.g., a needer might have received multiple 
proactive tells before its need arose. In the case of multiple needers, the provider will 
evaluate the utility function with respect to each needer, and then follow the strategy 
that has the maximum utility. 
8.2.1.2. Using Plan Recognition to Generate Information Flow 
Our present proactive communication algorithm analyzes preconditions and 
effects of actions and plans for which each agent is responsible in the teamwork. The 
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purpose of doing so is to determine potentially useful information flow among agents. 
Currently the information flow is generated offline. The problem of this approach is 
that the predicates of potential information needers or providers extracted by the offline 
algorithm may contain variables, and agents will bind actual values to these variables 
dynamically during the teamwork processes. For example, in the Multi-Agent Wumpus 
World, the offline algorithm only extracts that a fighter needs wumpus’ location, but 
cannot identify which fighter among three fighters. Our solution to this problem is to 
use the decision-theoretic proactive communication to estimate agents that would be 
most likely bound to a plan at the time of information production or need. 
Alternatively, we could make the recognition of information needers or 
providers more dynamic by doing plan recognition [69]. Agents can recognize the 
plans of other agents by observing actions of the other agents, and tracking the 
sequence of sub-goals on which they are working dynamically. Using this information 
together with the action an agent has most recently performed, the most likely 
information need or production of other agents could be dynamically estimated over a 
finite time horizon. Then we could send or ask other agents information only when 
they had just needed/produced the information, or if they are expected to need/produce 
the information in the near future. 
8.2.2. Future Directions 
8.2.2.1. Multi-Agent Learning 
Multi-agent learning supports learning from interaction with open-ended, 
dynamic environments that include multiple, autonomous data and knowledge sources. 
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Examples of such domains include data-driven collaborative knowledge discovery; 
distributed information networks for selective information retrieval; distribution of 
software and real-time audio/video streams; and distributed parallel processing. Multi-
agent learning methods would include design of algorithms for learning from 
heterogeneous data sources, distributed in time and space. As a consequence of the 
developments in technology that make it possible to accumulate large amount of data 
incrementally every day, in physically distributed, autonomous data repositories (e.g. 
bioinformatics), such algorithms seem to be the need of the hour.  Analogous to the 
work done here, decision theory and empirical distribution function analysis might be 
usable for analyzing data pattern of various applications and reducing communication 
among data sources and sinks. 
8.2.2.2. Distributed Information Networks for Selective Information Gathering 
There are many types of applications for which time-constrained and 
predictable response is required, which is closely related to my research; the most 
familiar are electronic trading systems, games, defense systems, and multimedia 
applications. There, time-critical applications depend on careful system design and 
timely resource allocation to deliver the required performance. For example, in an 
online E-Commerce system, stores that sell the same types of products consist of a 
multi-agent system over the Internet. Each agent (store) in such a system wants to 
charge a price that beats the other stores, but at the same time maintain maximum 
profits for the store over a period of time. The interaction among the stores can be 
modeled as a stochastic game. The agent’s price has to take into account the future 
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prices charged by other stores and potential loss resulting from that. Agents then need 
to monitor the prices charged by other stores continuously, learn about their price-
setting pattern, and modify their stores’ prices accordingly. Proactive Communication 
fits these requirements well and could support interaction analysis between two stores. 
8.2.2.3. Virtual Humans for Training 
Agents can be used to develop a foundation for efficacious training of complex 
performance. In Intelligent Team Training Systems, human team members are trained 
by putting them into a simulation, which allows them to perform and refine their team 
skills. The two types of agents which can be developed to assist team training are 
partner agents [113] and coaching agents [87, 132]. Coaching agents provide coaching 
feedback to trainees and their team based on the performance and the process of the 
team. Partner agents assist individual trainees by taking over the execution of some of 
the component tasks, allowing the trainee to concentrate on learning specific 
components, and assist team training by fulfilling the roles of some team members. 
Both types of agents require communication to achieve the desired team interactions. 
The agents should track the activities of the human trainee, reason about possible 
conflicts or constraints, establish certain parameters for performing joint actions, and 
provide or request any information needed by the human trainees to perform their 
tasks. However, this complex team cooperation behavior may involve much 
unnecessary message exchange because of introducing the human team members. 
Proactive Communication could provide desired interactions for humans and agents. 
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APPENDIX A 
CALCULATING PROBABILITIES 
In this appendix we calculate the probabilities, Pr( NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ), Pr(
0
,PaT < NbT , ), 
and Pr( 0,PaT  < NbT ,  < 
1
,PaT ), used by the provider in Chapter VI for calculating the 
currency. 
• Pr( NbT , ≤ 0,PaT ) 
First we need to decide the base from which the provider can estimate NbT , . 
There are two bases, depending on the needer’s decision for the need immediately 
before NbT , , i.e. the need raised at 
1
,
−
NbT . If the needer chose Silence at 
1
,
−
NbT , the base for 
estimating NbT ,  is 
1
,
−
NbT ; if the needer ActiveAsk or Wait at 
1
,
−
NbT , this need can be 
satisfied by IP( lsPaT , ), so the base is 
ls
PaT , .  In this latter case, the calculation is 
straightforward, as the provider knows both values.   
Pr( NbT ,  ≤  
0
,PaT ) 
=Pr( NbT , –(
ls
PaT , ) ≤  
0
,PaT –(
ls
PaT , )) 
=CDFb,N( 0,PaT –
ls
PaT , ). 
In the former case, the provider knows lsPaT ,  but not 
1
,
−
NbT . It is easy to conclude 
that 1,
−
NbT  < 
ls
PaT ,  < NbT , . To seek a reasonable and computationally feasible solution for 
deciding the base for NbT , , we used the expected value of where 
ls
PaT ,  would lie in the 
interval ( 1,
−
NbT , NbT , ), which under reasonable assumptions would be half way in 
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between them. Then, we use lsPaT , −τn/2 as an estimate for the base for NbT ,  (τn denotes 
the average length of time between needs of I and is defined in Section 6.7.1.1.1). 
Pr( NbT ,  ≤  
0
,PaT ) 
=Pr( NbT , –(
ls
PaT , − τn/2) ≤  0,PaT –( lsPaT , − τn/2)) 
=CDFb,N( 0,PaT –
ls
PaT , +τn/2). 
• Pr( 1,PaT  ≤  NbT , ) 
Pr( 1,PaT  ≤  NbT , ) 
=∑∞= 1,PaTτ Pr( 1,PaT ≤ NbT ,  | NbT , =τ)×Pr( NbT , =τ) 
=∑∞= 1,PaTτ 1×Pr( NbT , =τ) 
=∑∞= 1,PaTτ PMFb,N(τ– lsPaT , +τn/2) 
=1–CDFb,N( 1,PaT –
ls
PaT , +τn/2) 
=∑∞ += 11 0,PaTτ Pr( 1,PaT =τ1)×(1–CDFb,N(τ1– lsPaT , +τn/2)) 
=∑∞ += 11 0,PaTτ PMFa,P(τ1– 0,PaT )×(1–CDFb,N(τ1– lsPaT , +τn/2)). 
Though above equation involves infinite ∞, since the distributions are based on 
a finite number of measured values, therefore only a finite number of terms needed to 
be added. 
• Pr( 0,PaT < NbT , < 1,PaT ) 
Pr( 0,PaT < NbT , <
1
,PaT ) 
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=1–Pr( NbT , ≤ 
0
,PaT )–Pr(
1
,PaT ≤ NbT , ) 
=1–CDFb,N( 0,PaT –
ls
PaT , +τn/2)– 
∑∞ += 11 0,PaTτ PMFa,P(τ1– 0,PaT )×(1–CDFb,N(τ1– lsPaT , +τn/2)). 
• Pr( 0,PaT < NbT , ) 
Pr( 0,PaT < NbT , ) = 1–Pr( NbT , ≤ 
0
,PaT ) 
=1– CDFb,N( 0,PaT –
ls
PaT , +τn/2). 
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APPENDIX B  
MULTI-AGENT WUMPUS WORLD MALLET PLAN 
(plan wumpusgame(?ca ?f1 ?f2 ?f3) 
  (process 
    (par 
      (while (cond (goal killwumpus)) 
        (seq 
          (do ?ca (findWumpus ?ca)) 
          (do ?ca (retract (newKnow ?wumpusId ?x ?y))) 
        ) ;end seq 
      )   ;end while 
      (while (cond (goal killwumpus))   
        (do ?f1 (killWumpus ?f1))  
      ) ;end while  
      (while (cond (goal killwumpus))   
        (do ?f2 (killWumpus ?f2))  
      ) ;end while  
      (while (cond (goal killwumpus))   
        (do ?f3 (killWumpus ?f3))  
      ) ;end while  
    ) ;end par 
  )   ;end process 
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)     ;end plan 
(plan findWumpus(?ca) 
  (effects (newKnow ?wumpusId ?x ?y))    
  (process  
    (while (cond (not (newKnow ?wumpusId ?x ?y))) 
      (do ?ca (moveAndFindStep ?ca)) 
    )   ;end while 
  )     ;end process 
)       ;end plan 
(plan moveAndFindStep(?who) 
  (process 
     (seq 
        (do ?who (observe ?who))         
        (do ?who (move)) 
        (do ?who (nextstep ?who)) 
     )  ;end seq 
  )     ;end process 
)       ;end plan 
(plan observe(?who) 
  (process 
    (seq 
      (do ?who (see ?who))  ;see is an operator; when see is executed, 
 235
                                           ;all bound (canSeeNow ?who ?item ?x ?y) 
                                           ;will be asserted to KB of ?who 
      (do ?who (generateNewKnow ?who)) 
      (do ?who (updateMostRecentSeen ?who)) 
      (do ?who (retract (canSeeNow ?who ?anyitem ?anyx ?anyy))) 
    ) ;end seq 
  )   ;end process 
)     ;end plan 
(plan generateNewKnow(?who) 
  (process 
    (foreach (cond (canSeeNow ?who ?item ?x ?y)) 
      (if (cond (not (mostRecentSeen ?item ?x ?y)))    
        (seq 
          (do ?who (assert (mostRecentSeen ?item ?x ?y))) 
          (if (cond (wumpus ?item)) 
            (seq 
              (do ?who (assert (newKnow ?item ?x ?y))) 
              (do ?who (assert (unsafe ?x ?y))) 
            ) ;end seq   
          )   ;end inner if 
        )     ;end seq 
      ) ;end if 
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    )   ;end foreach         
  );end process 
)  ;end plan 
(plan updateMostRecentSeen(?who) 
  (process 
    (foreach (cond (mostRecentSeen ?anyLastItem ?anyLastx ?anyLasty))    
      (if (cond (not (canSeeNow ?who ?anyLastItem ?anyLastx ?anyLasty))) 
        (seq 
          (do ?who (retract (mostRecentSeen ?anyLastItem ?anyLastx ?anyLasty))) 
          (do ?who (retract (unsafe ?anyLastx ?anyLasty))) 
        );end seq 
      )  ;end if 
    )    ;end foreach        
  );end process 
)  ;end plan 
(plan killWumpus(?fi) 
  (process 
    (par 
      (while (cond (not (newKnow ?wumpusId ?x ?y))) 
        (seq  
          (do ?fi (noop)) 
          (do ?fi (nextstep ?fi)) 
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        );end seq 
      ) ;end while 
      (do ?fi (startKill ?fi)) 
    ) ;end par 
  )   ;end process 
)     ;end plan 
(plan startKill(?fi) 
  (pre-cond (newKnow ?wumpusId ?x ?y)) 
  (process     
    (seq         
      (do ?fi (moveToWumpus ?fi ?wumpusId ?x ?y))      
      (do ?fi (shootwumpus ?wumpusId ?x ?y)) 
      (do ?fi (retract (newKnow ?wumpusId ?x ?y))) 
      (do ?fi (nextstep ?fi)) 
    ) ;end seq     
  )   ;end process 
)     ;end plan 
(plan moveToWumpus(?fi ?wumpusId ?x ?y) 
  (process  
    (while (cond (notAdjacent ?fi ?wumpusId ?x ?y)) 
      (do ?fi (moveToStep ?fi ?x ?y)) 
    );end while 
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  )  ;end process 
)    ;end plan 
(plan moveToStep(?fi ?x ?y) 
  (process 
    (seq 
      (do ?fi (observe ?fi))         
      (do ?fi (moveto ?x ?y)) 
      (do ?fi (nextstep ?fi)) 
    )         ;end seq 
  )           ;end process 
)             ;end plan 
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APPENDIX C  
CALCULATING RISK IN MULTI-AGENT WUMPUS WORLD 
The risk function has been defined in Section 7.2.3.1 as 
R = k × (5000 − t) × Prh × Prf 
where k=0.01 is the number of wumpuses a fighter can kill per unit time, t is the 
number of steps passed, Prh is the probability that the wumpus overhears the message 
sent by the carrier, and Prf=0.1 is the probability that the wumpus can win against the 
fighter. 
The last value to compute is Prh, 
Prh = Prr × Pra, 
where Prr denotes the probability that an agent is within the wumpus’ hearing range rw, 
and Pra denotes the probability that the wumpus pays attention to the message.  
Prr must be calculated for all three of carrier’s policies: ProactiveTell, Reply 
and WaitUntilNext. 
There are two cases to consider for Pra. 
a The wumpus is “unalerted” so may or may not pay attention to the 
message: 
Pra = 0.1. 
When it is important to distinguish the alerted and unalerted 
conditions in the same expression, the “unalerted” case will be 
denoted by Pran; Pran will still have the value 0.1. 
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b The wumpus is “alerted” by the request send by the fighter so will 
pay attention to the coming reply. Calculating Pra in this case is 
more complex. However, it needs only be done for two of the three 
carrier’s policies, Reply and WaitUntilNext, as in the ProactiveTell 
case the wumpus is never alerted. 
Next we calculate Prh for three of carrier’s policies: ProactiveTell, Reply and 
WaitUntilNext. 
C.1. The Case That the Carrier Proactively Tells a Message 
Since rc<rw, the carrier is within the wumpus’ hearing range. Therefore Prr=1 
and Prh equals to Pra. Thus: 
Prh=Pra=0.1. 
C.2. The Case That the Carrier Replies a Request sent from a Fighter 
When the carrier receives a request, it must select one of the two policies 
identified in the general analysis (see Section 6.2.2), i.e., Reply with the location of the 
last wumpus sensed or WaitUntilNext time it finds a wumpus. Our analysis follows 
these two policies. 
C.2.1.   Policy – Reply Last Location Found 
As part of its decision process, the carrier needs to estimate the possible effect 
of a wumpus detecting that it has been found by using the risk function. There are 
multiple sub-cases to consider, depending upon whether or not the carrier can still 
sense the wumpus. The situation is complicated in that one must consider both the 
probability that the wumpus can hear the carrier and the probability that the wumpus 
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heard the request from the fighter. Fortunately, which case applies can be decided by 
the carrier because the fighter sends its location with the request and the carrier thus 
knows the locations of both the fighter and the wumpus, as well as the wumpus’ 
hearing range. 
To distinguish the situations of the wumpus hearing the carrier or the fighter, 
we add one subscript to Prh, Prr, and Pra to indicate the agent to which it refers; i.e., we 
use Prhc and Prhf respectively. We use Prrc and Prrf to denote the probability that the 
carrier or the fighter is within the hearing range of the wumpus, and use Prac and Praf to 
denote the probability that the wumpus pays attention to the message sent by the carrier 
or the fighter. Then, we have: 
Prhc=Prrc×Prac,                (C-1) 
Prhf=Prrf×Praf. 
C.2.1.1. Sub-Case 1 – Carrier Can Still Sense Wumpus 
If the carrier is still able to sense the last wumpus found at the time of replying, 
the carrier is within the wumpus’ hearing range. Therefore, Prrc=1, and we have 
Prhc=Prac. 
Prac is determined by Prhf, the probability that the wumpus heard the fighter’s request. 
Prac is give by the following relation: 
Prac=Pran×(1–Prhf)+1×Prhf. 
We have seen that Prhf=Prrf×Praf. Since we are considering the fighter who 
initializes the communication, the wumpus was “unalerted” at that moment and Praf 
was assumed to be 0.1. Since the fighter attached its location to the request, the carrier 
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knows the distance between the fighter and the wumpus. Therefore Prrf is decidable by 
the carrier. There are thus two further sub-cases to consider: 
a The fighter was within rw the wumpus hearing radius. In this case, 
Prrf=1, and therefore Prhf=Praf = 0.1. 
b The fighter was not within rw. In this case, the wumpus could not 
hear the fighter and therefore Prrf=0. Prhf=Prrf×Praf =0 × 0.1=0. 
Then the carrier will go back and use Prhf and Praf to decide Prhc. If Prhf=0.1 
(sub-case a), then Prhc = Praf×(1–Prhf)+1×Prhf = 0.1×(1–0.1)+1×0.1=0.19, and if Prhf=0 
(sub-case b), then Prhc= 0.1× (1–0)+1×0=0.1. 
C.2.1.2. Sub-Case 2 – Carrier Cannot Sense Wumpus 
If the carrier cannot sense wumpus at the time of evaluation, two further sub-
cases may arise:  
a The wumpus has stayed at the location last sensed by the carrier. 
b The wumpus has jumped since the carrier last saw it. 
Prhc can then be calculated as: 
(Prhc | WNJ)×Pr(WNJ|)+( Prhc | ¬WNJ)×(1–Pr(WNJ)), 
where WNJ means “wumpus not jump” in the interval between when the carrier last 
saw it and the present time, conditioned upon the fact that it has not jumped between 
when it first appeared in the location it was observed and the time last seen.  In the 
following, we will first consider Prhc for the two cases and then calculate Pr(WNJ). 
If the wumpus has not jumped, the carrier is able to determine whether or not it 
is within the wumpus’ hearing range. Prhc is then as calculated in Sub-case 1 above. 
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If the wumpus has jumped, we assume it no longer pays specific attention to a 
message emanating from a carrier within its hearing radius; it simply goes back to the 
“unalerted” status and hears the message with probability Prac=0.1; from Eq. (C-1), the 
problem then reduces to determining Prrc. The difficulty of determining Prrc is caused 
by the fact that the carrier cannot decide whether or not it is within the wumpus’ 
hearing range. Thus, we must estimate the probability that such is the case. If there is 
no other information available about the location, we assume that the wumpus is 
randomly placed in the area that is not observable at this moment. The area of the 
carrier’s observation rhombus is 2 2cr +2 cr +1. So the area of possible wumpus location 
is O−(2 2cr +2 cr +1). Since the carrier cannot sense the wumpus, the area in which the 
carrier cannot sense the wumpus but can be heard by the wumpus is approximated by 
(2 2wr +2 wr +1)−(2 2cr +2 cr +1) (recall that rw>rc). Therefore the probability that the carrier 
is within the hearing range of this wumpus is: 
Prrc= )1r22r(O
)1r22r()12r(2r
c
2
c
c
2
cw
2
w
−−−
−−−−− . 
Consequently we have: 
Prhc=Prrc×Prac= )1r22r(O
)1r22r()12r(2r
c
2
c
c
2
cw
2
w
−−−
−−−−− ×0.1. 
What is left, then, is to calculate Pr(WNJ). Let D0 be the time duration that the 
wumpus has stayed at this location before it was first sensed by the carrier, Ds be the 
length of time between when the carrier first saw this wumpus and when it last saw this 
wumpus, and Dn be the length of time between when the carrier last saw the wumpus 
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and the current time. The carrier knows Ds and Dn but not D0. Further, let H denote the 
time difference between when the carrier last saw the wumpus and the time at which 
the wumpus jumps. When a wumpus is created, a random variable, X, is given a value 
between 1 and 40 under a uniform distribution.  Then, recalling that our notation of 
WNJ implied a conditional probability, the probability that the wumpus did not jump 
during Dn is equal to: 
Pr(WNJ) = Pr(Dn<H| D0+Ds < X). 
H must conform to the following constraints: 
H∈[1, 40−D0−Ds], 
D0∈[1, 40−Ds], 
D0+Ds+Dn<40. 
We calculate the probability Pr(WNJ), with D0=d and H=h as the random variables: 
Pr(Dn<H | D0+Ds<X) 
=∑ −−−= 1DD401d ns Pr(D0=d) × Pr(Dn<H | D0+Ds<X ∧ D0=d) 
=∑ −−−= 1DD401d ns Pr(D0=d) × Pr(Dn+D0+Ds<H+D0+Ds | D0+Ds<X ∧ D0=d) 
 
But, H+D0+Ds = X, the random duration chosen for the next wumpus jump. Thus, 
 
Pr(Dn<H | D0+Ds<X) 
=∑ −−−= 1DD401d ns
sD40
1
−  × Pr(Dn+D0+Ds<X | D0+Ds<X ∧ D0=d) 
=∑ −−−= 1DD401d ns
sD40
1
−  × d)D|XDPr(D
d)D|XDDPr(D
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0s0n
=<+
=<++  
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C.2.2.   Policy – Carrier Decides to Wait until Next Finding after Receiving 
Request 
In the case that the carrier will wait until the next time it finds a wumpus, 
though it does not know the wumpus’ location at this moment, the carrier can be sure 
that it will be inside of the wumpus’ hearing radius rw at the time of finding because rc 
< rw. Therefore the probability that the carrier is within the hearing range of the 
wumpus, Prrc, is one: 
Prrc = 1. 
Then since Prhc = Prrc×Prac, Prhc = Prac, the probability that the wumpus pays 
attention to the reply. Prac is again determined by Prhf, the probability that the wumpus 
heard the request sent by the fighter, by the form defined in Sub-case 1: 
Prac=Pran×(1–Prhf)+1×Prhf. 
As noted above Prhf=Prrf×Paf; hence the carrier needs to calculate 1) Prrf, the probability 
that the fighter was inside of the wumpus’ hearing radius rw at the time of sending the 
request, and 2) Praf, the probability that the wumpus pays attention to the request that is 
within its hearing range. For Prrf, the carrier will not know if the fighter is inside of rw, 
because the carrier does not know the wumpus’ location at this moment. The carrier 
can use a method similar to the one it uses to calculate Prrc in Sub-case 2 in Section 
C.2.1. Then Prrf = ((2rw2–2rw–1)–(2rf2–2rf–1))/(O–(2rf2 –2rf–1)). Praf=0.1 because the 
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wumpus was in “unalerted” status at the time of the fighter sending the request. 
Therefore, in this case, 
Prhc 
=Prrc×Prac 
=1×Prac 
=Praf×(1–Prhf)+1×Prhf 
=0.1× 
(1–0.1×
)1r22r(O
)1r22r()12r(2r
f
2
f
f
2
fw
2
w
−−−
−−−−− )+ 
1×(0.1×
)1r22r(O
)1r22r()12r(2r
f
2
f
f
2
fw
2
w
−−−
−−−−− ) 
=0.1+0.09×
)1r22r(O
)1r22r()12r(2r
f
2
f
f
2
fw
2
w
−−−
−−−−− . 
In summation, risk will take place for three of carrier’s policies: ProactiveTell, 
Reply and WaitUntilNext. The following table shows Prh, the probability that the 
wumpus overhears the message sent by the carrier, for these policies. Once Prh is 
computed, risk can be easily computed. 
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                                  Probability 
Policy 
Prh 
ProactiveTell  0.1 
Fighter was 
within rw 
0.19 
 
Carrier 
still see 
wumpus Fighter was not 
within rw 
0.1 
 
 
Fighter was 
within rw 
0.19× E{Pr(Dn<J)}+ 
)1r22r(O
)1r22r()12r(2r
c
2
c
c
2
cw
2
w
−−−
−−−−− ×0.1× 
(1– E{Pr(Dn<J)}) 
 
 
 
 
 
Reply 
 
Carrier  
not see 
wumpus 
 
Fighter was not 
within rw 
0.1× E{Pr(Dn<J)}+ 
)1r22r(O
)1r22r()12r(2r
c
2
c
c
2
cw
2
w
−−−
−−−−− ×0.1× 
(1– E{Pr(Dn<J)}) 
 
WaitUntilNext 0.1+0.09×
)1r22r(O
)1r22r()12r(2r
f
2
f
f
2
fw
2
w
−−−
−−−−−  
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APPENDIX D  
CALCULATING PROBABILITY OF CORRECTNESS IN 
MULTI-AGENT WUMPUS WORLD 
The probability of currency, P, is shown in Section 7.2.3.4 to be 
Pr(tu–tp<J) 
where tu is the time at which the fighter arrives at wumpus’ location, tp is the time at 
which the carrier finds this wumpus, and J denotes the difference between the time at 
which the value for I was produced and the time at which the wumpus jumps. Since 
some parameters of P may be unknown, we compute the expected probability E{Pr(tu–
tp<J)}. 
In Section 7.2.3.4, we examine the GeneralCase and deduce Eq. (7-5) for 
calculating E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} in this case: 
E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} 
=∑ ∑= −= −×401d d401j d401401 × 
∑ ∑+ −= −−+ −−−=)σX ,20min( )σX max(1,X |))XX|σ(Y min(20, |))XX|σ(Y max(1,Ycl clc clccl clcclc 1σ22σ 1 ++ ×  
∑ ∑+ −= −−+ −−−=)rX ,20min( )rX max(1,X |))XX|(rY min(20, |))XX|(rY max(1,Ycc ccw cwcc cwccw 1r22r 1 c2c ++ ×fm(Xw, Yw, Xf, Yf, j) 
where σ = max(tp–tcl, 0) is the length of time the carrier moves from the time tcl to tp; tcl 
is the most recent time at which the decision maker knows the location of the carrier; 
Lcl=(Xcl , Ycl) is the carrier’s location last known by the decision maker; Lc=(Xc, Yc) is 
 249
the carrier’s location at time tp; Lw=(Xw, Yw) is the wumpus’s location at time tp; 
Lf=(Xf , Yf) is a fighter’s location at tn, the time at which the fighter needs a wumpus’ 
location; and rc is the observable rhombus vertex distance from the carrier. 
Based on the GeneralCase and Eq. (7-5), this appendix calculates E{Pr(tu–
tp<J)} for each situation/policy combination. 
D.1. Situation PA: The Carrier Finds a Wumpus’ Location – ProactiveTell 
In this case, tp= 0,PaT , which is known to the carrier, and tn= NbT , , which is 
unknown. However, the value for I provided at time 0,PaT , IP(
0
,PaT ), may not always be 
used for the need that arose at NbT ,  because the wumpus might jump before the fighter 
arrives at the wumpus’ location. P is specified as: 
Pr(tu– 0,PaT <J), 
where tu, the time at which the fighter arrives at the wumpus’ location, will be specified 
later. This probability can be evaluated conditionally on two sub-cases: 
Pr(tu– 0,PaT <J | NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ) × Pr( NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ) 
+ Pr(tu– 0,PaT <J | 
0
,PaT < NbT , ) × Pr(
0
,PaT < NbT , ). 
Pr( NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ) and Pr(
0
,PaT < NbT , ) are calculated in Appendix A. Below we 
consider Pr(tu– 0,PaT <J) for the two sub-cases. Since some variables of this probability 
are unknown, we calculate E{Pr(tu–tp<J)}. 
 250
D.1.1. Sub-case PT–1 NbT , ≤
0
,PaT  
The carrier is the decision maker and t=tcl=tp= 0,PaT . Thus, σ = max(0, tp – tcl) = 
0, and the two summations involving σ in Eq. (7-5) reduce to a single point. Also, since 
the carrier knows Lw, the summations over possible wumpus locations are irrelevant, 
leaving only the portions involving D0 (the length of time that the wumpus was in its 
current location before being sensed by the carrier), J and the fighter location. There 
are then two further sub-cases to consider: 1) the carrier senses the fighter at this 
moment, 0,PaT , and 2) the carrier does not sense the fighter at 
0
,PaT . 
In the first sub-case, Lf is known. Since there is a pending need (because in this 
case NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ) and the location of the wumpus is being proactively told, the fighter 
will immediately use the information and start moving toward the wumpus. Hence, tu = 
0
,PaT  + Dk
26. Lf and Lw are known and hence Dk is known. In addition, since Dk is 
known, this puts a lower bound on the values of j27 that are possible, and this in turn, 
places an upper bound on the range of value of d that is possible. Hence, Eq. (7-5) 
reduces to: 
E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} 
=Pr( 0,PaT +Dk–
0
,PaT <J) 
=Pr(Dk < J) 
                                                 
26 Recall that Dk is the distance the fighter must travel to reach the wumpus, and since the fighter moves 
one step per unit of time, Dk is also the time it take the fighter to reach the wumpus. 
27 Recall from Chapter VII that j and d are random variables representing J and D0, respectively. 
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=∑ ∑−= − += −×1D-401d d40 1Djk k d401401              (D-1) 
We call this case SimpleCase, because E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} simply needs one input 
Dk. Having probabilities of d and j, E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} can be computed and then all other 
parameters in expression (7-3) are irrelevant. Therefore for any other case that Dk is 
known, it can be classified to the SimpleCase and the currency can be calculated with 
Eq. (D-1). 
If the carrier does not sense the fighter, Lf is unknown. However, it is still the 
case that the fighter will use the information as soon as it receives it. Thus, tu = 0,PaT  + 
Dk. The fighter must have moved to the location of the last wumpus that the fighter 
killed. The last wumpus the fighter killed could be either a wumpus whose location 
was sent to the fighter by the carrier (which is not necessarily the last one told by the 
carrier), or a wumpus the fighter found itself. Since the carrier is much more likely to 
find a wumpus than the fighter, we ignore the latter case, and assume that, at tn, the 
fighter killed a wumpus whose location was sent by the carrier. However it would be 
hard for the carrier to know, among those wumpuses’ locations which have been sent 
to the fighter, which is the last wumpus the fighter killed. It could be the last one the 
carrier sent or some other one before the last one. Since we assumed that NbT ,  is the 
first need that arose after lsPaT ,  (see Section 6.7.1), we assume the wumpus last killed is 
the one immediately before the last one the carrier told the fighter about at lsPaT , . Hence 
Lf is approximated by the last wumpus location which the carrier sent it just before 
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ls
PaT , . Denote this as Lwl-1. So Lf = Lwl-1. By having estimation for Lf, Dk is known. This 
case is the SimpleCase and E(Pr(tu – tp < J)} can be calculated with Eq. (D-1). 
D.1.2. Sub-case PT–2 0,PaT < NbT ,  
In this case, tu depends upon the decision the needer will make at NbT ,  and the 
provider’s response decision at NbT , . We consider combinations of cases. 
Pr(tu– 0,PaT <J | 
0
,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ En) × Pr(En), 
where En, n=1,..,4, denote the following events: 
E1: needer decides to Wait at NbT , ; 
E2: needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ; 
E3: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to Reply at 
NbT , ; 
E4: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to 
WaitUntilNext at NbT , . 
Based on the analysis in Section 6.7.1.1.2, the needer won’t use IP( 0,PaT ) for 
events E1 and E4. Hence we do not consider these cases. Specially in this domain the 
needer will not use IP( 0,PaT ) given E3 either. This is because we are considering 
Proactivetell at 0,PaT , so the only condition under which the provider will decide to 
reply at NbT ,  is NbT , =
1
,PaT . Therefore the needer won’t use IP(
0
,PaT ) for E3 and hence we 
also do not need to consider it. 
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Then the case left is E2. Here we first consider E(Pr(tu – tp < J)} for E2 and then 
compute Pr(E2). 
D.1.2.1. Calculating Pr(tu– 0,PaT <J | 
0
,PaT < NbT , ) ∧ E2) 
• PT–2 E2: needer decides to keep Silence at NbT ,  
In this case, tu = NbT ,  + Dk. Also t = tp = tcl =
0
,PaT  which is known, and tn= NbT ,  
which is unknown. Thus, σ = tp – tcl = 0, and the summations in Eq. (7-5) dealing with 
σ and carrier movement reduce to a single term. Also, since the wumpus location is 
known, the summations in Eq. (7-5) that deal with wumpus location reduce to a single 
term. Since tn > tp, the fighter is chasing a wumpus up until time NbT , . Either it is 
chasing a wumpus whose location was sent to it by the carrier, or it chasing a wumpus 
it found itself. Since the carrier is much more likely to find a wumpus than the fighter, 
we ignore the latter case, and assume that the fighter is chasing a wumpus whose 
location was sent to it by the carrier. With this assumption, what is needed, then, is 
some way to estimate the unknown time NbT , . 
From the information supplied by the fighter with active asks (and occasionally 
with the forced deadlock-breaking protocol), the carrier can determine the average 
time, τn, taken by the fighter to reach and kill a wumpus, measured from the time at 
which it received the wumpus location (which is not necessarily the time at which it 
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started chasing the wumpus). Thus, the carrier can estimate NbT ,  to be 
ls
PaT ,  + τn/228 (see 
Section 6.7.1.1.1). In the current sub-case, though, we are considering NbT ,  >
0
,PaT , and 
there is no guarantee that lsPaT ,  + τn/2 > 0,PaT . Thus, we will use 
NbT ,  = max(
0
,PaT +1, 
ls
PaT ,  + τn/2). 
Since NbT , >
0
,PaT , NbT , –
0
,PaT  would be used to reduce the range of the 
summations over j and d, and the computation for Pr(tu – tp < J) reduces to: 
Pr(tu – tp < J) 
=∑ ++−−= )1Dt(t401d kpn 401 ×∑ − ++−= −d40 1Dttj kpn d401            (D-2) 
We call this case ReducedSimpleCase because the difference between this case 
and the SimpleCase is that this case uses tn – tp to further reduce the ranges of 
summation. So for any later case if it knows Dk and tp, and tn>tp, we will classify it to 
ReducedSimpleCase. 
D.1.2.1.1. Calculating Pr(E2) 
• Pr(E2):Pr( needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ) 
Pr(needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ) 
=Pr(U(e, NA, Silence, NbT , , tp, {m}) > Max(U(e, NA, ActiveAsk, NbT , , tp, {m}), U(e, 
NA, Wait, NbT , , tp, {m}))), 
where tp will be replaced, for a given policy, by the value called for in that policy. 
                                                 
28 It would, of course, be theoretically possible to use the distribution obtained from EDF and add 
another level of summation to the expression for Pr(tu – tp <J). 
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The solution involves evaluating the utility function under each of the possible 
policies the needer might make at NbT , . The most difficult part is to determine the 
currency. Determinations of currency involve a set of parameters. As before, for an 
unknown NbT , , we use an estimate: 
NbT ,  = max(
0
,PaT +1, 
ls
PaT ,  + τn/2). 
Having this estimate, next we will specify all parameters which are need for Eq. (7-5) 
to calculate the currency. We consider three needer’s possible policies separately. 
Needer δ = Silence 
The evaluation of Silence for the needer under the condition that a need has 
arisen is given in Section D.2.4.6, which requires these inputs for calculating the 
currency: Dk, Ds, Dn, tn and tp. Since we are evaluating the carrier’s estimation for the 
fighter’s use of Silence at NbT , , the carrier needs to use its own knowledge to fill in 
these inputs. However the carrier‘s knowledge may be quite different from that of the 
fighter because of their different observabilities and motions. Moreover for the present 
case NbT ,  is in the future so the carrier is estimating the fighter’s future decisions, while 
in Section D.2.4.6, the needer considers using a previous value. This makes the carrier 
be unable to know some of the inputs for calculating the currency in Section D.2.4.6. 
For example, in Section D.2.4.6, Dk is known to the fighter because the fighter knows 
itself’s location Lf and the wumpus’s location Lw. However for the present case the 
carrier may has no way to know Lw if this location will be provided in the future. So 
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the carrier cannot use the form of Section D.2.4.6 to calculate the currency. Instead, it 
should consider tp and then decide which form of currency it can use. 
Let’s consider tp first. We estimate 1,PaT  = 
0
,PaT  + τP, where τP is the average 
length of time for producing a new value for I. Since we have an estimate for NbT ,  
( NbT ,  = max(
0
,PaT +1, 
ls
PaT ,  + τk/2)), then we are able to decide the order of 0,PaT , 1,PaT  and 
NbT , . We consider two cases: 1) 
0
,PaT < NbT ,  <
1
,PaT  and 2) 
1
,PaT ≤ NbT , . 
In the case of 0,PaT < NbT ,  <
1
,PaT , tp = 
0
,PaT  so the carrier knows Lw. As before Lf 
is approximated by the last wumpus location which the carrier sent. So the carrier 
knows Lf. Therefore Dk is known. This case is exactly the same with Sub-case PT-2 E2 
(ReducedSimpleCase), where the fighter also will use IP( 0,PaT ). E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} will be 
estimated with the same form of Eq. (D-2). 
In the case of 1,PaT ≤ NbT , , tp is the most recent production time before NbT , . We 
assume tp equals the most recent production time before tn (see Section 6.7.1.1.1.1 for 
rationale). Then we use Eq. (6-1) for tp. Thus tp= 0,PaT +Z×τp where Z = ⎥⎥⎦
⎥
⎢⎢⎣
⎢ −
p
0
,
τ
Pab,N TT ) 
which returns 0 or an positive integer, meaning the number of productions during NbT ,  
and 1,PaT . Therefore 
σ = max(0, tp–tcl) = tp – 0,PaT  = 0,PaT +Z×τp – 0,PaT = Z×τp. 
 257
The carrier knows Lcl its current location at 0,PaT . It also knows Lf which is assumed to 
be the last wumpus location which the carrier sent to the fighter. Since NbT , >
0
,PaT , 
NbT , –
0
,PaT  would be used to reduce the range of the summations over j and d. Then 
E{Pr(tu–tp <J)} can be approximated as the follows: 
E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} 
=∑ ∑+−−= − +−= −×1)t(t401d d40 1ttjpn pn d401401 × 
∑ ∑+ −= −−+ −−−=)σX ,20min( )σX max(1,X |))XX|σ(Y min(20, |))XX|σ(Y max(1,Ycl clc clccl clcclc 1σ22σ 1 ++ ×  
∑ ∑+ −= −−+ −−−=)rX ,20min( )rX max(1,X |))XX|(rY min(20, |))XX|(rY max(1,Ycc ccw cwcc cwccw 1r22r 1 c2c ++ ×fm(Xw, Yw, Xf, Yf, j)  (D-3). 
We call this case ReducedGeneralCase because besides requiring σ, Lcl and Lf as what 
the GeneralCase does, this case also uses tn – tp to reduce summations. For any later 
case which has the same requirement, we classify it to ReducedGeneralCase and the 
currency can be calculated with Eq. (D-3). 
Needer δ = Wait 
The evaluation of Wait for the needer is given in Section D.2.4.7, which 
requires these inputs for calculating the currency: σ, Lf and Lcl. Since there is a need, 
we assume tp is the next production time after 0, NbT . Thus we can use Eq. (6-2) to 
estimate tp. Thus tp= 0,PaT +(Z+1)×τp. Also since 0,PaT  is the most recent time at which the 
carrier know is own location (in fact 0,PaT  is the current time), so tcl = 
0
,PaT , then: 
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σ = max(0, tp – tcl) = tp – 0,PaT =(Z+1)×τp. 
Having estimations for σ, and knowing Lcl, its own location at 0,PaT , which is 
the current time, and Lf, the last wumpus location which the carrier sent to the fighter, 
the carrier is able to calculate E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} with Eq. (7-5) of the GeneralCase. 
Needer δ = ActiveAsk 
In this case, tp depends on the carrier’s responding decision at NbT , . So the 
carrier needs to estimate whether it will Reply or WaitUntilNext at NbT , . The carrier 
needs to calculate Pr(provider decides to Reply at NbT , ) and Pr(provider decides to 
WaitUntilNext at NbT , ). It is enough to compute one of them because they are 
complement to each other. We choose Pr(carrier decides to Reply at NbT , ). 
Pr(provider decides to Reply at tn) 
=Pr(U(e, PB, Reply, NbT , , tp, {m}) > U(e, PB, WaitUntilNext, NbT , , tp, {m})), 
where tp will be replaced, for a given policy, by the value called for in that policy. 
If Provider δ = Reply, tp is the production time just before tn, and we use Eq. 
(6-1) to estimate tp. Thus tp= 0,PaT +Z×τp. As before, Lf = Lwl-1. Since t < 0,PaT  < NbT , , tcl = 
0
,PaT . Then: 
σ = max (0, tp – tcl) = Z×τp. 
Lcl is the carrier’s location at the current time 0,PaT . Lf is approximated by the 
last wumpus location which the carrier sent to the fighter at time 0,PaT . In conclusion, 
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the carrier uses estimated tp= 0,PaT +Z×τp to calculate σ, uses its current location at 0,PaT  
as Lcl, and uses the wumpus location provided to the fighter at 0,PaT  to estimate Lf. 
Since 0,PaT < NbT , , NbT ,  – 
0
,PaT  would be used to reduce the range of the summations over 
j and d. This case is ReducedGeneralCase because it requires σ and Lcl and Lf as inputs 
and has tp<tn. E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} can be calculated with Eq. (D-3). 
If Provider δ = WaitUntilNext, tp is the production time just after 0, NbT , we use 
Eq. (6-2) to estimate tp. Thus tp= 0,PaT +(Z+1)×τp. Since t< 0,PaT < NbT , , tcl = 0,PaT . Then: 
σ = tp – tcl = (Z+1)×τp. 
Lcl is the carrier’s location at 0,PaT  and Lf is approximated by Lwl, which is the 
wumpus location provided to the fighter at 0,PaT . This case is the GeneralCase because 
it requires σ and Lcl and Lf as inputs. E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} can be calculated with Eq. (7-5).  
Once the currency for three possible policies can be computed, their utilities 
can be computed and then Pr(needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ) is deterministic 
either 1 or 0. 
D.2. Situation PA: the carrier finds a wumpus’ location – Silence 
In this case,  
Pr(tu−tp < J), 
where tp may be before, equal to, or after 0,PaT , depending upon decisions the agents 
make, and tu will be the time at which the fighter arrives at the wumpus’ location. This 
probability can be evaluated conditionally on two sub-cases: 
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Pr(tu−tp < J) × Pr( NbT , ≤ 0,PaT ) 
+ Pr(tu−tp < J) × Pr( 0,PaT < NbT , ) 
Pr( NbT , ≤
0
,PaT ) and Pr(
0
,PaT < NbT , ) are calculated in Appendix A. We now 
consider E{Pr(tu−tp < J)} for two sub-cases. 
D.2.1. Sub-case PS–1 NbT , ≤
0
,PaT  
In this case, the needer could not have chosen ActiveAsk because otherwise, the 
needer would have asked and the provider would be obligated to provide the value at 
0
,PaT  and could not choose Silence. Therefore the needer must be either Waiting for a 
proactive tell from the provider or keeping Silence, so we use IP( lsPaT , ). We consider 
combinations of these two cases: 
∑ =6 5n Pr((tu−tp < J | NbT , ≤ 0,PaT  ∧ En) × Pr(En), 
where En, n=5 and 6, denote the following events: 
E5: needer decides to Wait at NbT , ; 
E6: needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , . 
We first calculate E{Pr(tu−tp < J)} for E5 and E6 and then compute Pr(E5) and 
Pr(E6). 
D.2.1.1. Calculating E{Pr(tu−tp < J)} for E5 and E6 
• PS–1 E5: needer decides to Wait at NbT ,  
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In this case, we have t = tcl = 0,PaT , and tn= NbT , , which is unknown. Since the 
carrier knows tcl, so Lcl is known. tp is the next ProactiveTell time, which will be at 
some future production time (not necessarily the next production time). Since by 
assumption there is a need at t, the fighter must have chased the wumpus whose 
location was most recently sent to it. This wumpus location was denoted by Lwl which 
is the wumpus’ location at time lsPaT , . As before, we approximate Lf by Lwl. Since tp is 
the production time just after 0, NbT , we use Eq. (6-2) to estimate tp. Thus 
tp= 0,PaT +(Z+1)×τp. We approximate σ as: 
σ = tp – t = 0,PaT +(Z+1)×τp. 
All of the parameters needed for evaluating Eq. (7-5) (the GeneralCase), σ, Lcl 
and Lf, are thus estimated and this equation can be used to estimate E{Pr(tu – tp < J)}. 
• PS–1 E6: needer decides to keep Silence at NbT ,   
In this case, t= tcl = 0,PaT , tn= NbT , , which is unknown, and tp=
ls
PaT , , the known 
time of the most recent value for I the needer has. lsPaT ,  must be less than t, and must 
correspond to the time at which some previous proactive tell occurred. As an estimate, 
we will consider the two most recent wumpus locations sent to the fighter and assume 
that the fighter has just killed the next-to-last wumpus and is about to chase the most 
recent wumpus, whose location was sent. While this situation is not guaranteed, it is 
the most likely situation. We also take the wumpus location that will be sought to be 
Lw = Lwl, and hence it is known. Having this estimate for Lf and Lw, Dk turns out to be 
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a fixed number. Since tn>tp, we also need to consider unknown tn. Therefore tn – tp 
would be used to reduce the range of the summations over j and d. We approximate tn 
by 
NbT ,  = max(
ls
PaT , +1, min(
ls
PaT ,  + τn/2, 0,PaT )). 
Since Dk and tp are known, and tn>tp, this is ReducedSimpleCase and then 
E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} can be estimated with Eq. (D-2). 
D.2.1.2. Calculating Pr(En) 
• Pr(E6): Pr(needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ) 
Pr(needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ) 
=Pr(U(e, NA, Silence, NbT , , 
ls
PaT , , {m}) > U(e, NA, Wait, NbT , , 
0
,PaT , {m}), 
where as before, we estimate NbT ,  = max(
ls
PaT , +1, min(
ls
PaT ,  + τn/2, 0,PaT )).  We assume 
Lwl-1 is the wumpus’ location the carrier sent just before lsPaT ,  and the carrier knows this 
time.  
The solution will involve (the provider) evaluating the utility function under 
each of the possible policies the needer might make at tn = NbT , . The evaluation of the 
utility function includes cost, timeliness and currency (risk is only associated with the 
carrier). Having tp and tn, determinations of cost and timeliness are straightforward. 
Next we consider the currency for each policy. 
Needer δ = Silence 
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The evaluation of Silence for the needer under the condition that a need has 
arisen is given in Section D.2.4.6, which requires the following inputs for calculating 
the currency: Dk, Ds, Dn, tn and tp. Since we are evaluating the carrier’s estimation for 
the needer’s use of Silence at tn, the carrier will use its own knowledge to fill in these 
inputs. Let’s consider these inputs one by one.  
Dk. Under our assumption, the fighter will be at Lwl-1 at time tn. This is also the 
time at which the fighter begins to chase the wumpus at Lwl, thus Lf = Lwl-1. We also 
take the wumpus location that will be sought to be Lw = Lwl, and hence Lw is known. 
Having this estimate for Lf and Lw, Dk turns out to be a fixed number.  
Ds and Dn. During the time interval [ lsPaT , , tn], where tn = max(
ls
PaT , +1, min(
ls
PaT ,  
+ τn/2, 0,PaT )), the carrier is able to determine Ds, the length of time between when the 
carrier first saw this wumpus and when it last saw this wumpus, and Dn, the time 
duration since the carrier last saw the wumpus. Having these inputs, the carrier is able 
to estimate the currency given in Section D.2.4.6. 
Needer δ = Wait 
The evaluation of Wait for the needer under the condition that a need has arisen 
is given in Section D.2.4.7, which requires the following inputs for calculating the 
currency: σ, Lf and Lcl. However, in this case, tp=tcl= 0,PaT , and σ = max(0, tp−tcl) = 0. 
Since σ=0, the carrier did not move so Lcl is irrelevant. Also as before Lf is 
approximated by Lwl-1. Having estimations for Lf, this fits the form of Sub-case PT-1, 
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which also has σ=0. The currency will be estimated with the same form of Sub-case 
PT-1 (Eq. (D-1) for the SimpleCase). 
Once the currency for three possible policies can be computed, their utilities 
can be computed. Consequently the estimated needer’s decision is deterministic, thus 
the needer will choose a policy which has the max utility. So the probability that the 
needer will choose this policy is 1. Since the needer only can make one decision at a 
decision point, so the probability of choosing other policies is 0. Then Pr(needer 
decides to keep Silence at NbT , ) equals either 0 or 1. 
• Pr(E5): Pr(needer decides to Wait at NbT , ) 
The event E5 is complement of E6. Pr(E5)=1–Pr(E6). 
D.2.2. Sub-case PS–2 0,PaT < NbT ,  
In this case, tp and tu depend upon the decision the needer will make at NbT ,  and 
the provider’s decision at NbT , . We consider combinations of cases: 
∑ =10 7n Pr(tu–tp <J | 0,PaT < NbT ,  ∧ En) × Pr(En), 
where En, n=7,..,10, denote the following events: 
E7: needer decides to Wait at NbT , ; 
E8: needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ; 
E9: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to Reply at 
NbT , ; 
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E10: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to 
WaitUntilNext at NbT , . 
Based on Section 6.7.1.2.2, IP(tp) will be used for all events. So we first must 
consider E{Pr(tu–tp <J)} for all events and then compute Pr(En). Generally these 
computations need parameters: tp and tcl to calculate σ=max(0, tp–tcl), Lcl the carrier’s 
most recent known location, and Lf the fighter’s location at time NbT , . 
D.2.2.1. Calculating E{Pr(tu–tp <J)} for E7-E10 
• PS–2 E7: needer decides to Wait at NbT ,  
This case is very similar to Sub-case PS–1 E5. Sub-case PS–1 E5 also requires 
that the needer be waiting when the need occurs. Sub-case PS–1 E5 uses Eq. (7-5) 
which requires three parameters: σ, Lcl and Lf. In order to calculate σ, the carrier needs 
tp and tcl. In the present case, tp can be estimated by the same way in Sub-case PS–1 E5: 
tp = 0,PaT +(Z+1)×τP, and tcl equals to the current time 0,PaT . Then Lcl is the carrier’s 
current location at 0,PaT . As before Lf is approximated by Llw-1. Having σ, Lcl and Lf, 
this is GeneralCase and then Eq. (7-5) may be used for currency. 
• PS–2 E8: needer decides to keep Silence at NbT ,  
In this case, t= tcl = 0,PaT . Since the carrier knows tcl, so Lcl is known. As before, 
Lf=Lwl-1. Since tp<tn, tn – tp would be used to reduce the range of the summations over j 
and d. As in Sub-case PS–2, E5, we approximate tn by 
NbT ,  = max(
0
,PaT +1, 
ls
PaT ,  + τn/2). 
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tp is the time at which the last wumpus’ location the carrier will have sent to the 
fighter (not necessarily lsPaT , ). We use an estimation 
1
,PaT =
0
,PaT +τP. Having estimations 
for tn and 1,PaT , we are able to determine their order. If 
0
,PaT <tn<
1
,PaT , tp = 
ls
PaT , ; 
otherwise we assume tp equals the most recent production time before tn: tp= 0,PaT +Z×τP. 
If tp= lsPaT , , this case is very similar to Sub-case PS–1 E6, the GeneralCase, 
which also required that the needer keep silence when the need occurred. The only 
difference in the present case is that the range of possible values for NbT ,  is different. 
Then, Eq. (7-5) may be used as in Sub-case PS–1 E6 with the revised value for NbT , . 
If tp = 0,PaT +Z×τP, this case is the ReducedGeneralCase because it requires σ, 
Lcl and Lf, and has tp < tn.since tcl < 0,PaT , then 
σ = tp – tcl = Z×τP+ 0,PaT  – 0,PaT  = Z×τP. 
E{Pr(tu–tp <J)} can be calculated with Eq. (D-3). 
• PS–2 E9: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to Reply at 
NbT ,  
In this case, tcl = t = 0,PaT , and the carrier knows its own location Lcl. The fighter 
will be at Lwl-1 at time NbT , ; thus Lf = Lwl-1. Since tp<tn, tn – tp would be used to reduce 
the range of the summations over j and d. As in Sub-case PS–2 E7, we approximate tn 
by  
NbT ,  = max(
0
,PaT +1, 
ls
PaT ,  + τn/2). 
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tp could be either 0,PaT  or some production time greater than 
0
,PaT . Different 
values for tp will lead to σ equal to zero or not and this consequently will result in using 
different forms to calculate E{Pr(tu–tp <J)}. 
As before we use an estimation 1,PaT  = 
0
,PaT  + τP. Having estimations for tn and 
1
,PaT , we are able to determine their order.  If 
0
,PaT  < tn < 
1
,PaT , tp = 
0
,PaT . This case is 
exactly the same with Sub-case PT-2 E2, where the fighter also will use IP(tp). Pr(tu–
tp<J) will be estimated with the same form of Eq. (7-5) in Sub-case PT-2 E2 (the 
GeneralCase). 
If 1,PaT  ≤ tn, tp is the production time just before tn; we use Eq. (6-1) to estimate 
tp: tp= 0,PaT +Z×τP. Then: 
σ = tp – tcl = Z×τP+ 0,PaT  – 0,PaT  = Z×τP. 
This case is ReducedGeneralCase because it requires σ, Lcl and Lf as inputs, and uses 
tn – tp to reduce summations. E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} will be estimated with Eq. (D-3). 
• PS–2 E10: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to 
WaitUntilNext at NbT ,  
In this case, tcl = t = 0,PaT , and the carrier knows its own location Lcl. The fighter 
will be at Lwl-1 at time NbT , , thus Lf = Lwl-1. As in Sub-case PS–2, E7, we approximate tn 
by  
NbT ,  = max(
0
,PaT +1, 
ls
PaT ,  + τn/2). 
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The carrier will reply the next wumpus’ location found after tn. tp can be 
approximated by Eq. (6-2): tp= 0,PaT +(Z+1)×τP. Then:  
σ = tp – tcl = 0,PaT +(Z+1)×τP– 0,PaT  = (Z+1)×τP. 
This case is GeneralCase because it requires σ, Lcl and Lf as inputs. Eq. (7-5) may be 
used for currency. 
D.2.2.2. Calculating Pr(En) 
We consider Pr(En) (n=7-10): 
E7: needer decides to Wait at NbT , ; 
E8: needer decides to keep Silence at NbT , ; 
E9: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to Reply at 
NbT , ; 
E10: needer decides to ActiveAsk at NbT ,  ∧ provider decides to 
WaitUntilNext at NbT , . 
These events cannot occur simultaneously. In order to estimate the needer’s 
decisions, the provider must compute utilities for all needer’s possible policies. Once 
the utilities can be computed, the estimated needer’s decision is deterministic, thus the 
needer will choose a policy which has the max utility. So the probability that the 
needer will choose this policy is 1. Since the needer only can make one decision at a 
decision point, so the probability of choosing other policies is 0. For example, if the 
utility of Silence is greater than that of Wait and ActiveAsk, then Pr(needer decides to 
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keep Silence at NbT , ) = 1 and Pr(needer decides to Wait at NbT , ) = 0 and Pr(needer 
decides to ActiveAsk at NbT , ) = 0. Therefore we can identify that Pr(En) is deterministic 
either 1 or 0. This means these probabilities are dependent with each other. For 
example, in order to compute Pr(E7) which is about policy Wait, we must also consider 
the other two possible policies Silence and ActiveAsk, and if  Pr(E7)=1 then the other 
two policies become impossible decision for the needer. Since consideration of the 
probability about one of the needer’s decisions includes evaluating utilities for all 
policies, here we only show the probability about one of the needer’s decisions and the 
probability about one of the provider’s responding decisions, and then the probabilities 
for all four events can be determined. We choose Pr(needer decides to keep Silence at 
NbT , ) and Pr(provider decides to Reply at NbT , ). 
In order to compute Pr(needer decides to Wait at NbT , ), again we need to 
compute utility for all Wait, Silence and ActiveAsk. This process is very similar to what 
has been done in Sub-case PT–2 where we computed Pr(needer decides to Wait at 
NbT , ) under the condition that NbT ,  > t. There is only one difference between Sub-case 
PT–2 and the present case. For the present case, since the provider won’t provide 
IP( 0,PaT ), so for the case of needer’s δ= Silence, if 0,PaT < NbT , < 1,PaT , tp = lsPaT ,  (tp = 0,PaT  
for the previous case). Therefore in this case σ= max(0, tp – tcl) will be computed with 
tp = lsPaT , . Except this difference, any other computation for this case is exactly the same 
with that of Sub-case PT–2. So Pr(needer decides to Wait at NbT , ) is computable. 
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In order to compute Pr(provider decides to Reply at NbT , ), again we need to 
compute utility for both Reply and WaitUntilNext. This process is exactly the same as 
Sub-case PT–2 needer δ=ActiveAsk, where we computed Pr(provider decides to Reply 
at NbT , ) under the condition that the needer ActiveAsks for I at tn and tn > t. So we can 
compute Pr(provider decides to Reply at NbT , ) with the same manner. 
D.3. Situation PB: the carrier receives a request from a fighter – Reply 
In this case, tn = t = Tb,q, tu = Tb,q+Dk and tp = 0,
q
PaT , which is the latest 
production time before the request time, Tb,q. Also, tp < tn, and the carrier knows both 
of them. Because the carrier is assumed to reply with the last observed wumpus’ 
location, it also knows Lw. We presume that in addition to asking the carrier the 
location of the wumpus, the fighter will also tell the carrier its own location so that the 
carrier can use it as a point of reference. Therefore Lf is known, and hence Dk is 
determined. 
During the time interval (tp, t], the carrier may still be able to sense the wumpus 
some of the time. Therefore (tp, t] could be divided into two time durations: Ds, the 
length of time between the carrier’s first sight of this wumpus and its last sight of this 
wumpus, and Dn, the time duration from the carrier last saw the wumpus to the current 
time. Ds will decrease the hypothesis space of D0 from [1, 40] to [1, 40–Ds]. Dn, plus tn 
– tp, will increase the lower bound on the values of j and decrease the upper bound on 
the range of value of d. This case is similar to the ReducedSimpleCase because Dk and 
tp are known and tn>tp. E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} is calculated with 
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E{Pr(tx–tp<J)} 
=∑ +++−−−= 1)DDt(tD401d knpns
sD40
1
− ×∑ −− +++−= s knpn Dd40 1DDttJ sDd40
1
−− . 
D.4. Situation PB: the carrier receives a request from a fighter – WaitUntilNext 
In this case, since tp is a future time but tcl is the current time, so σ≠0. We need 
to use Eq. (7-5) to compute currency. Eq. (7-5) requires three parameters σ, Lcl and Lf. 
For this case, t = tcl = tn = Tb,q, tp = 1,
q
PaT , and tu = 
1
,
q
PaT +Dk; where 
1
,
q
PaT  is the next 
production time following the request time, Tb,q. Since the carrier knows tcl, so Lcl is 
known. We presume that the fighter will attach its location to the request at Tb,q, so Lf 
is known. And σ = max(0, tp – tcl) = tp – Tb,q. We can use an estimation 
tp=max( 0,
q
PaT +τP, Tb,q+1). Then: 
σ = tp – Tb,q =max( 0,qPaT +τP, Tb,q+1) – Tb,q. 
This case is the GeneralCase because it needs σ, Lcl and Lf. Eq. (7-5) will be used for 
computing currency. 
D.5. Situation NA: the fighter needs a wumpus’ location – ActiveAsk 
In this case, tn= 0, NbT . tp and tu depend upon the provider’s responding decision at 
0
, NbT . We consider the following expression which can be evaluated by considering two 
sub-cases: 
∑ =12 11n Pr(tu−tp<J | En) × Pr(En), 
where En, n=11 and 12, denote the following events: 
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E11: provider decides to Reply at 0, NbT ; 
E12: provider decides to WaitUntilNext at 0, NbT . 
Below we first consider Pr(tu−tp<J | En) and then Pr(En). 
D.5.1. Calculating E{Pr(tu−tp<J)} for E11 and E12 
• E11: provider decides to Reply at 0, NbT  
In this case, the fighter is the decision maker. The fighter knows t = tn = 0, NbT , 
but tp= 0,
a
PaT  < tn and tp is unknown; 
0
,
a
PaT  is the time at which the carrier most recently 
produced a wumpus’ location. 
The fighter will know a set of previous locations of the carrier, because we 
presume that, in addition to telling the fighter the location of the wumpus, the carrier 
also tells the fighter its own location. The most recent location of the carrier that the 
fighter knows is at time lsPaT , , which denotes the time at which the carrier last sent a 
wumpus location to the fighter. Note that lsPaT ,  must be less than tp, because the carrier 
will not choose Reply if no new wumpus’ location has been produced after ts. So tcl = 
Tb,r29 and the fighter knows Lcl. As before we assume that tp is the most recent 
production time just before tn. Thus we estimate tp as tp = Tb,r+Z×τP, where Z = 
⎥⎥⎦
⎥
⎢⎢⎣
⎢ −
p
rb,
0
τ
Tb,NT . Then: 
σ = max(0, tp – tcl) = Z×τP+Tb,r–Tb,r = Z×τP. 
                                                 
29  Recall from Chapter VI that Tb,r is the most recent time at which the needer received a message from 
the carrier. 
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The fighter can obtain τP from the data about the average time between (new) 
wumpus findings sent from the carrier.  
This case is ReducedGeneralCase because it needs σ, Lcl and Lf, and has tp< tn.  
E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} will be calculated with Eq. (D-3). 
• E12: provider decides to WaitUntilNext at 0, NbT  
In this case, t = tn = 0, NbT , which is known, and tp = 
1
,
a
PaT , the next time at which 
the carrier finds a wumpus, which is unknown. Thus we estimate tp by tp = (Z+1)×τP+ 
Tb,r. Then: 
σ = max(0, tp – tcl) = (Z+1)×τP+Tb,r–Tb,r = (Z+1)× τP. 
This case is the GeneralCase because it needs σ, Lcl and Lf. E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} will 
be calculated with Eq. (7-5). 
D.5.2. Calculating Pr(En) 
Next we consider Pr(E11) and Pr(E12), the needer’s estimate to the provider’s 
responding decision. 
• Pr(E11): Pr(provider decides to Reply at 0, NbT ) 
Pr(provider decides to Reply at 0, NbT ) 
=Pr(U(e, PB, Reply, 0, NbT , tp, {m}) > U(e, PB, WaitUntilNext, 
0
, NbT , tp, {m})), 
where tn= 0, NbT  for both policies. 
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If provider δ = Reply, tp is the production time just before tn= 0, NbT . We estimate 
tp as tp= Tb,r+Z×τP, where Z = ⎥⎥⎦
⎥
⎢⎢⎣
⎢ −
p
rb,
0
τ
Tb,NT .Since the fighter may not know the carrier’s 
location from the fighter’s limited observability. Hence, we use the location sent at 
time Tb,r.  If Z=0 which means that no new production after the last told, Pr(provider 
decides to Reply at 0, NbT ) = 0, because the carrier won’t resend the last told. Otherwise 
σ = max(0, tp – tcl) = tp – tcl. Also the fighter knows its own location Lf at tn. Since tp<tn, 
tn – tp would be used to reduce the range of the summations over j and d. Therefore this 
case is ReducedGeneralCase because it needs σ, Lcl and Lf, and has tp<tn. Pr(tu–tp<J) 
can be estimated with Eq. (D-3). 
If provider δ = WaitUntilNext, tp is the production time just after 0, NbT . We 
estimate tp as Tb,r+(Z+1)×τP, where Z = ⎥⎥⎦
⎥
⎢⎢⎣
⎢ −
p
rb,
0
τ
Tb,NT . Also σ = max(0, tp – tcl) = tp – tcl. 
Meanwhile the fighter knows its own location Lf at tn. This case is the GeneralCase 
because it needs σ, Lcl and Lf. Pr(tu–tp<J) can be estimated with Eq. (7-5). 
After computing the currency, the risk can be estimated using Table 2 and 
hence  Pr(provider decides to Reply at 0, NbT ) be estimated to be either 1 or 0. 
• Pr(E12): Pr(provider decides to WaitUntilNext at 0, NbT ) 
The event E12 is the complement of E11. So Pr(E12) = 1 – Pr(E11). 
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D.6. Situation NA: the fighter needs a wumpus’ location – Silence 
In this case, t=tn= 0, NbT , tp=Tb,r, the time at which agent b most recently received 
a wumpus location, and tu= 0, NbT +Dk. The fighter knows Lf and Lw; hence Dk is 
determined. Likewise, tp, and tn are known, hence all other variables including Lc, Lw 
and Lf are known. This fits the ReducedSimpleCase and we can calculate the 
concurrency with Eq. (D-2). 
D.7. Situation NA: the fighter needs a wumpus’ location – Wait 
In this case, tn= 0, NbT . tp is the next ProactiveTell time after 
0
, NbT . Since there is a 
need, we assume tp is the next production time after 0, NbT . Thus we tp as Tb,r+(Z+1)×τP. 
Then: 
σ = max(0, tp – tcl) = (Z+1)×τP+ Tb,r – Tb,r = (Z+1)× τP. 
This case is the GeneralCase because it needs σ, Lcl and Lf. E{Pr(tu–tp<J)} can 
be estimated with Eq. (7-5). 
D.8. Situation NB: the fighter receives a wumpus’ location 
In this situation, the fighter will Accept the wumpus location received. The 
decision is deterministic, so we do not consider this case. 
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